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Abstract 
This thesis makes use of advanced econometric tools to improve empirical frameworks 
and methods for measuring inequality of opportunity. In addition, we apply these empirical 
methods to measure inequality of opportunity in China ― a developing country with rising 
economic inequality and rapid economic growth. A conventional approach to measuring 
inequality of opportunity classifies outcomes such as the distribution of income, wealth and 
health status into two sets of factors: those beyond individuals' responsibility 
(“circumstance”) and those within individuals' responsibility (“effort”). Based on this 
framework, we model the correlation between circumstances and effort.  
In Essays I and II, we use a model allowing heteroscedasticity between circumstances and 
a latent class model to identify two different ways that circumstances could be affected by 
effort. First, different types, which are groups with individuals sharing the same 
circumstances, could have different effort distributions. Second, circumstances can have 
different effects on income for different levels of effort. Using these models, we measure 
inequality of opportunity in China at both provincial and national levels and find a higher 
inequality of opportunity than the conventional approach identifies.  
In addition, we examine educational inequality of opportunity using administrative data 
from a highly-ranked university.  This study is different from most empirical literature in 
measuring inequality of opportunity in that graduate outcome, the outcome of interest, is a 
categorical variable. We use the multinomial regression model and stochastic dominance 
to study how graduates’ family backgrounds affect their graduate outcomes. We find that 
those who are from a low-income or from rural family are disadvantaged in receiving high-
quality higher education. Even though they are enrolled in a top university, they have less 
opportunity for a postgraduate degree. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic inequality has received significant attention from academics, the general
public and policy makers. Reports show that the wealthiest 1% own more than 50% of the
world’s wealth by 2016 (Hardoon, 2017). However, research suggests that what concerns
people is not economic inequality itself but the economic unfairness (Starmans et al., 2017)
— when one is unfairly under-rewarded or over-rewarded due to “irrelevant” factors such
as gender, ethnicity, parents’ socioeconomic background, etc. Because of the aversion to
economic unfairness, some scholars and politicians argue that policy interventions related
to redistribution should be based on economic fairness rather than economic equality.
Researchers have designed measures of inequality of opportunity to show the level
of economic unfairness and capture the extent to which economic inequality is due to
irrelevant factors (Roemer, 1998). However, these measures could be potentially biased
due to limited data and the use of simplified empirical methods. This thesis makes use of
advanced econometric tools to improve empirical methods used in measuring inequality
of opportunity. In addition, we apply these new empirical methods to measure inequality
of opportunity in China — the most populous country in the world, where economic
inequality has been rising amid rapid economic growth.
Rising economic inequality in China has been well-documented. Measured by the
Gini coefficient, income inequality is reported to have increased from under 0.30 before
1980 to 0.55 in 2012 (Xie and Zhou, 2014). Educational inequality has also risen with
income inequality. Children living in urban areas or having rich parents receive more
years of schooling (Zhang et al., 2015) and are more likely to enter a college (Wang et al.,
2013). In terms of wealth inequality, a report conducted by Beijing University using
China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) found that the top one percent of households held
one-third of total assets, while the bottom 25 percent held only one percent (ISSS, 2014).
These rising inequalities should be a great concern to the public if they are deemed
“unfair”, that is, if inequalities are determined by factors beyond individuals’ control.
For example, the Hukou system, a household administrative system in China that re-
strains rural population from accessing education and employment in urban areas (Liu,
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2005), has been found to contribute significantly to rural-urban inequality. Moreover, re-
gional disparities are reported to influence educational attainment (Hannum and Wang,
2006). To measure unfair inequality, we follow the framework of equality of opportunity
developed by Roemer (1998).
In the literature on economic inequality, most measures of inequality refer to inequality
of economic outcomes such as income, wealth and consumption. On the contrary, a
measure of inequality of opportunity shows the proportion of inequality of outcome that
is due to irrelevant factors — factors which are out of individuals’ control. Roemer (1998)
postulates that outcomes such as the distribution of income, wealth and health status
are determined by two sets of factors: those beyond individuals’ responsibility (denoted
as “circumstances”) and those within individuals’ responsibility (denoted as “effort”).
In order to achieve equal opportunity, he decomposes outcomes into circumstances and
effort, and argues that the effect of “circumstances” on inequality of outcome should be
eliminated. Based on this point of view, economists such as Roemer (1998) and Fleurbaey
and Peragine (2013) have established conceptual and theoretical frameworks to measure
inequality of opportunity.
Based on Roemer’s theoretical concepts and framework, researchers have measured
inequality of opportunity for different countries. Most of these studies focus on devel-
oped countries such as Norway (Almas et al., 2011), Sweden (Bjo¨rklund et al., 2012),
Italy (Checchi and Peragine, 2010), France (Lefranc et al., 2009) and U.S. (Pistolesi,
2009). Others measure inequality of opportunity in Latin America including Ferreira
et al. (2003), Bourguignon et al. (2007), Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) and Paes de Barros
et al. (2009). Few studies consider inequality of opportunity in China.
However, both the theoretical foundations and empirical methodologies currently in
use have limitations. First of all, one may question whether inequality of outcome can
be conceptually separated into circumstances and effort (Kanbur and Wagstaff, 2014).
It is possible that one’s effort is strongly influenced by circumstances. For example, a
child from a single-parent family may exert less effort in school than other children. In
addition, it is difficult to identify some factors such as luck, risk and talent as either
circumstances or effort. In addition, most empirical studies treat parents’ socioeconomic
status as one’s circumstances. It is equivalent to saying that one’s circumstances depend
on parents’ effort (Kanbur and Wagstaff, 2014). Thus, implementing inequality of oppor-
tunity by eliminating parents’ influence may weaken the role of the family (Roemer and
Trannoy, 2015, pp. 56). In our study, we do not focus on the conceptual limitation of the
literature. We take the view of Roemer (1998) that circumstances and effort are corre-
lated with each other and the effects of circumstances on effort should also be eliminated
in order to achieve equal opportunity. This view is also adopted in empirical research,
e.g. Bourguignon et al. (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2008).
The relationship between circumstances and effort is not just a conceptual issue. It
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has implication for empirical work. For example, circumstances and effort are assumed
to be independent in most empirical literature. However, if they are correlated with each
other, neglecting it could lead to a biased measure of inequality of opportunity. Another
problem is that individual effort is difficult to observe. Therefore, most studies treat
effort as an unobserved variable. This unobserved effort, combined with some unobserved
circumstances, could also bias the measures of inequality of opportunity.
Due to these theoretical and empirical limitations, the concept and the measurement
of equality of opportunity is still in development. In the thesis, we focus mainly on the
empirical issues rather than the theoretical ones.
In Essay I, we examine unfair income inequality in contemporary China at both the
national and the regional levels using data from the China Family Panel Study, which
contains 33,600 individual observations for the years 2010 and 2012. Our empirical anal-
ysis includes zero-income observations using a Hurdle model and a Heckman model. In
addition, we study the correlation between circumstances and effort by parameterizing
heteroskedasticity between circumstances using maximum likelihood estimation. Shapley
decomposition is implemented to identify the contributions of each of the identified “cir-
cumstances” and “efforts” to income inequality. We find that more than 20% of income
inequality is due to the effect of circumstances on income through effort. This finding
proves the significant effect of circumstances on effort. An estimation with no regards
to this correlation could lead to an underestimated measure of inequality of opportunity.
Within this model framework, we identify gender, geographic factors and parents’ socioe-
conomic status as the three main factors contributing to unfair income inequality. At
the regional level, as we move from low-income to high-income regions, fair within-region
income inequality decreases significantly while unfair within-region income inequality in-
creases slightly, with a small net effect on total income inequality. This implies that
people suffer similar unfair within-region income inequality no matter in which region
they live.
In Essay II, we propose an alternative approach which treats unobserved effort as a
categorical latent variable. In the conventional empirical approach, effort is commonly
treated as unobserved and captured by the residual in a model. Moreover, effort and cir-
cumstances are assumed to be independent of each other. In this essay, individual effort
is assumed to be distributed around three levels: low, middle, and high. The assignment
probability to each class is determined by a probabilistic function. These probabilities
are estimated by a finite mixture model. Using this model, we allow the effects of cir-
cumstances on income to be different across levels of effort. Including these heterogenous
effects, our estimates show a higher unfair income inequality than the estimates obtained
by using a conventional approach. In addition, we find a substantial income gap between
low-effort and high-effort levels and that inequality of opportunity is the highest if every
individual exerts the middle-level effort.
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In Essay III, we shift the focus from income to education by investigating the ex-
pansion of tertiary education in China. The number of graduates from Chinese higher
education institutions has increased substantially in the last two decades. However, it
raises the question as to whether the higher education sector provides equal opportunity
to everyone amid the expansion. Our study examines whether individuals’ circumstances
could affect enrolment in tertiary education and graduates’ outcomes using the admin-
strative data from a highly-ranked university. Our study finds a widening rural-urban
inequality in tertiary education. Urban students are overrepresented in this university
and they have more choices after graduation than their rural counterparts. Another de-
terminant is family income. A child from a low-income family background is less likely
to enter this university and has fewer choices after graduation.
Through these three essays, this thesis contributes to the literature on inequality of
opportunity in three aspects. Firstly, it provides an improvement on the econometric
methodology for measuring inequality of opportunity. In the first essay, a heteroskedas-
tic model is designed to capture the effect of circumstances on effort. In the second essay,
we use a latent class model to capture the unobserved effort and to deal with the het-
erogenous effects of circumstances on income between levels of effort. These two empirical
approaches shed light on how circumstances and effort are correlated and the role effort
plays in inequality.
Secondly, this thesis enriches the literature of inequality of opportunity in China.
Since most of the literature on inequality of opportunity focuses on developed countries
and Latin American countries, this thesis makes use of Chinese datasets from the last
decade and estimates the measure of inequality of opportunity in income and educational
outcome in contemporary China.
Finally, this thesis extends the study in equal opportunity to access to education. Most
studies measuring inequality of opportunity in education treat academic performances as
the outcome. In the third essay, we extend the framework to examine youths’ abilities to
gain access to higher education. Our study fills the knowledge gap on how circumstances
affect access to higher education in China.
The thesis comprises a comprehensive literature review and three essays. It proceeds
as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the current methodology of measuring inequality of
opportunity and previous empirical work on measuring inequality of opportunity in China.
Chapters 3 to 5 present three essays respectively. Chapter 6 offers a summary and
conclusion draw from the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
2.1 Introduction
Emerging only in the last two decades, equality of opportunity is a new and attractive
approach to improve social justice. It has a distinctive meaning in terms of equality of
outcome. In the traditional literature that examines economic inequality, most “inequal-
ities” are referred to as inequality of outcome — inequality such as income inequality,
wealth inequality and consumption inequality — while inequality of opportunity exam-
ines inequality of outcome in such a way that the allocation of justice and fairness should
be considered. It argues that there could be inequality which is fair and equality which is
unfair. The redistribution of inequality of outcome should eliminate the unfair part and
retain the fair one.
This literature review introduces the origin and development of the concept of equality
of opportunity, examines the establishment of theoretical frameworks and measurements,
presents the empirical works on inequality of opportunity in different countries and dis-
cusses the limitation and scope of this area.
This literature review proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the philosophical
background of equal opportunity. Section 3 examines theoretical models of equality of
opportunity. Section 4 reports the current methodology used in measuring inequality of
opportunity. Section 5 discusses the relationship between equality of opportunity and
other economic concepts and ideas such as development, income inequality and inter-
generational mobility. Section 6 provides empirical findings and measures inequality of
opportunity in China. Finally, the last section discusses the limitation and scope of
equality of opportunity.
2.2 Origins and Concepts of Equal Opportunity
The study on equal opportunity originates from the discussion of social choice, fair
allocation and distributive justice. Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and Rawls (1971) stated that
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a “just” social choice should be made by a rational agent with a fair mind. Rawls
(1971) assumed an “original position” so that “the veil of ignorance” is such an ”original
position“ from which the person makes a social choice under uncertainty without knowing
his own social status or circumstances in society (Rawls, 2009).
Under the assumption of “the veil of ignorance”, Rawls stated two principles of justice
(Rawls, 2009, p. 266):
First principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty
for all.
Second principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent
with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.
The first principle assumes that every individual has a lexicographic preference on
“primary goods”, goods that “every rational man is presumed to want” (Rawls, 1971,
p. 92), such as rights, liberties, income and wealth, intelligence, health, etc. The lexi-
cographic preference is that given two sets of “primary goods” that include intelligence,
health, liberties, wealth, and etc., one only compare the next important good if the
amount of the most important is equal. John Rawls claimed that “liberty” is the most
important among these primary goods so that each person is to have an equal right for
it.
The second principle prescribes social and economic inequalities by applying “the
difference principle”(which is part (a) in the second principle) and “fair equality of op-
portunity”(which is part (b) in the second principle).
The difference principle obeys a maximin criterion which can be expressed as the
following equation if a person’s preferences can be represented by a utility function.
min[u1(x), . . . , uN(x)] > min[u1(y), . . . , uN(y)] (2.1)
where ui(x), i = {1, . . . , N} is the utility function for individual i to the social state
x; and where ui(y), i = {1, . . . , N} is the utility function for individual i to the social
state y. A rational individual will be risk averse so that he/she will prefer “the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged”. This maximin criterion has been used in the theoretical
framework of inequality of opportunity (Roemer, 1998).
In terms of the “fair equality of opportunity”, according to Rawls (2009, p. 57), there
are two natural senses in which positions and offices are open equally to all: equality
as careers open to talents and equality as fair equality of opportunity. The difference
between these two senses is that the former fails to eliminate social contingencies, e.g.
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family background, while the latter succeeds. Nonetheless, even for the latter sense,
individuals’ abilities may be affected by either all kinds of social conditions or their
natural talents. Rawls asserts that “there is no more reason to permit the distribution of
income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical
and social fortune.”
Rawls addresses the question of “moral desert” (Rawls, 2009, pp. 274); that is,
whether the distribution of income and wealth according to some characteristics or con-
ditions is morally deserved. He lists at least three different kinds of factors which are
not deserved by individuals: natural talent, all kinds of social conditions and class atti-
tudes which develop natural capacities; and other social conditions which contribute less
to individual abilities. This question of “moral desert” affects the later debate on the
responsibility cut between circumstances and effort in terms of measuring inequality of
opportunity.
Although Rawls provides a constructive theory of distributive justice, his theory has
been criticized by many academics. Harsanyi (1976) disagreed with the application of
the maximin principle and the difference principle because of their violation of the as-
sumption of rationality. He provided a counterexample of a person deciding between
working in a low-paid job in New York and working in a well-paid job in Chicago. He
assumed that the person was currently living in New York, and if he decided to work in
Chicago, he had to take a plane with a very small possibility of being killed in a plane
crash. According to the maximin principle, he would prefer to stay in New York to avoid
the worst consequence. Then he further argues that people may face a lot of these worst
possible outcomes. He goes on to say:
If you took the maximin principle seriously then you could not ever cross a
street (after all, you might be hit by a car); you could never drive over a
bridge (after all, it might collapse); you could never get married (after all, it
might end in a disaster), etc. If anybody really acted this way he would soon
end up in a mental institution (Harsanyi, 1976, p. 595).
Thus, Harsanyi (1976) prefers the expected-utility maximization principle rather than
the maximin principle or the difference principle proposed by Rawls.
Dworkin (1981a) provided an alternate approach which applies the expected-utility
maximization. He claimed that the talents and abilities individuals have are pure luck
(“brute luck” defined by Dworkins), which are out of individuals’ control; while there are
the other kinds of luck (“option luck”) such as the lottery and gambling which are within
individuals’ control. Thus, the distributive justice problem can be solved by transferring
“brute luck” to “option luck” by means of a hypothetical insurance system to transfer
the “brute luck” to the “option luck”.
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In addition to “moral desert”, another issue concerning distributive justice is whether
individuals’ taste or preference should be respected. A debate related to this issue is
between equality of resources and equality of welfare. The former claims that individuals
should share the same amount of resources which are available to be distributed (Dworkin,
1981a). The latter states that regardless of how many resources are provided, individuals
should enjoy the same welfare. These two claims contradict each other because equality
of resources might fail to balance equality of welfare and vice versa.
In order to deal with the incompatibility of equality of resources and equality of wel-
fare, Arneson (1989) proposed an equal opportunity for welfare. He defines an opportunity
as “a chance of getting a good if one seeks it” (Arneson, 1989, pp. 85). Then he claims
that each individual should face “equivalent arrays of options” and these arrays of options
should be effective such that one of the following is true (Arneson, 1989, pp. 86):
(1) the options are equivalent and the persons are on a par in their ability to
“negotiate” these options
(2) the options are nonequivalent in such a way as to counterbalance exactly
any inequalities in people’s negotiating abilities
(3) the options are equivalent and any inequalities in people’s negotiating abil-
ities are due to causes for which it is proper to hold the individuals themselves
personally responsible.
The improvement of equal opportunity for welfare is that it considers individual’s
choices and options. Only welfare loss due to factors beyond a person’s control will be
compensated.
Although equal opportunity of welfare seems to solve the compensation difficulty in
terms of taste and preference, the problem with inequality of welfare and equal oppor-
tunity of welfare is that people who have the same loss of resources (disabilities, for
example) may suffer different welfare loss. In contrast, for resource-egalitarians, the
same degree of disabilities yields the same level of resource loss. Thus, people who have
the same degree of disabilities should be compensated at the same level. To deal with
this welfare deficiency, Cohen (1989) proposed a broader concept of equal opportunity
for welfare —equal access to advantage. He argued that both welfare-egalitarians and
resource-egalitarians assume a number of dimensions of disadvantage and judge whether
inequality due to the disadvantage is acceptable or not. The difference between them is
that welfare-egalitarians focus on preference and welfare, while resource-egalitarians pay
attention to the different kinds of resources individuals have. However, “the right cut is
between responsibility and bad luck”(Cohen, 1989, pp. 922). He believes that disadvan-
tage should be compensated only when it is out of a person’s control, regardless of his
“unfortunate resource endowment and unfortunate utility function”. This responsibility-
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sensitive thinking on the problem of justice led later to the emergence of an economic
literature dealing with the concept of inequality of opportunity.
In addition, Sen (1995) proposed equality of capability as an alternative way to deal
with distributive justice and this concept has a relationship with inequality of opportunity.
He defined a person’s position in a social arrangement under two different perspectives:
“the actual achievement” and “the freedom to achieve”(Sen, 1995, pp.31). Then, he pro-
posed functionings consisting of a person’s achievement, and capability as “the person’s
freedom to choose from possible livings”(Sen, 1995, pp. 40). Thus, the capability to
achieve functionings is the real opportunity which represents people’s freedom to achieve
well-being. He argued that capability can better reflect the level of a person’s freedom
and opportunity than the “primary good” proposed by John Rawls and the “equality
of resources” suggested by Ronald Dworkin because “primary good” and “equality of
resources” are means to freedom, not freedom itself; though improving means to freedom
can help a society to achieve better freedom. However, Sen’s equality of capability also is
difficult to apply in empirical research (one attempt is the Human Opportunity Index by
Paes de Barros et al. (2009)). It is hard to quantify with the intention of measuring the
real inequality of capability; furthermore, some capabilities are congenital and difficult
to be equalized.
In summary, this section discusses the theoretical background of inequality of oppor-
tunity. The concept of inequality of opportunity originates from the idea that equalizing
outcomes is not enough to achieve distributive justice. Political philosophers such as John
Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen, etc. propose a variety of theories and methodolo-
gies to improve distributive justice. These theories and debates have led to the emergence
of researches on inequality of opportunity in economics.
2.3 Theoretical Models of Equality of Opportunity
The theoretical models of equal opportunity are based on two basic principles: the
compensation principle and the reward principle. The compensation principle focuses on
compensating inequalities due to circumstances given the same degree of effort, while the
reward principle examines how individuals are rewarded under the same circumstances.
In terms of the compensation principle, individuals can be compensated before or after
their outcome have been made. An ex-ante compensation principle defines as a compen-
sation principle implemented before knowing one’s actual outcome. The compensation is
only based on circumstances that should not be the responsibility of individuals. An ex-
post compensation principle reallocates the resources after knowing individual outcomes.
In other words, the compensation is based on both circumstances and effort. Most litera-
ture use either the ex-ante or ex-post approach. However, the ex-ante approach is easier
to implement because it only requires the information on circumstances.
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In contrast, the reward principle values the inequality among those sharing the same
circumstances. For example, liberal reward principle states that income due to pure
effort should not be redistributed, while utilitarian reward focus on those who sharing
the same circumstances should have the same income. However, the reward principle is
incompatible with the ex-post compensation principles (Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2013).
In this section, we introduce several models developed based on these two principles.
2.3.1 A Model for Equal Opportunity Policy
Roemer (1998) proposed a model for an equal opportunity policy. He categorized the
population into a finite set of types T = 1, 2, . . . , T based on an individual’s circum-
stances. Within a type t, he defined an achieved level of individual outcomes (which
could be income and educational achievement) denoted by ut(e, φ) where e is a measure
of individuals’ effort and φ is a unitary social policy in the set of social policies Φ. He
assumed that the function ut is strictly monotone increasing in e.
In order to identify the effect of circumstances on the function ut, Roemer (1998)
examined the relationship between circumstances and effort and decomposes the raw
effort into the average effort for type t and the degree of effort pi = Gtφ(e) where G is the
distribution function of effort in type t given the policy φ. He argued that the influence of
circumstance is mainly due to the average effort for type t. An individual should only be
accountable for his effort compared with others having the same circumstances. Formally,
he defined:
vt(pi, φ) = ut(et(pi), φ) (2.2)
where vt is a function measuring the achieved level for a type t individual given his degree
of effort pi and the policy φ.
Given the limitation of resources and the feasible set of policies Φ, an optimal policy in
line with equal opportunity can adopt the principle of justice proposed by Rawls (1971)
in which he claimed that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged”.
Therefore, Roemer (1998) suggested an approach to maximize the least advantaged:
max
φ∈Φ
∫ 1
0
min
t
vt(pi, φ)dpi (2.3)
A similar approach from Van De Gaer (1993) is:
max
φ∈Φ
min
t
∫ 1
0
vt(pi, φ)dpi (2.4)
The difference between these two approaches is that Roemer’s (1998) approach chose
the minimum value of vt for each degree of effort pi and Van De Gaer’s (1993) approach
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calculated the average degree of opportunity (the aggregation of vt for every possible
effort in that type t) for each type t first and then chose to maximize the type with the
least average degree of opportunity.
Table 2.1 shows an example with 2 types and 4 degrees of effort. Following Roemer’s
approach, the optimal policy should maximize the outcome of type 1 with 1 and 3 degree
of effort and the outcome of type 2 with 2 and 4 degree of effort. Based on Van De
Gaer’s (1993) approach, the optimal policy should consider maximizing type 2’s outcome
instead of type 1’s since type 2 has the lower average outcome. The two approaches are
indifferent if one type is unambiguously disadvantaged compared with the other types
(that is, for each pi, there exists a tˆ whose achievement function vtˆ(pi) ≤ vt(pi) for all
t ∈ T ).
Table 2.1: An example with 2 types and 4 degrees of effort
Type 1 Type 2
1 3 5
2 5 3
3 4 6
4 8 2
As the above example shows, one requires the information of degree of effort if ap-
plying Roemer’s (1998) approach while for Van De Gaer’s (1993) approach, one needs
to know the average outcome for each type. However, both approaches do not consider
the population for each degree of effort. For example, both approaches might be biased
if one degree of effort in type t represents only one individual and the other comprises
thousands.
2.3.2 A Fair Compensation Model
Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) postulated several principles on dis-
tinguishing the responsibility of an individual’s income. They decomposed the sources
of income into “relevant characteristics” and “irrelevant characteristics”. The former
are the individual characteristics whose influence to income should be considered “rele-
vant” and the latter are the characteristics whose effect to income should be considered
as “irrelevant”. This decomposition is more general and broader than the concept of
equal opportunity in which income (or other forms of outcome) should not be affected
by circumstances (factors out of an individual’s control) but by effort (factors within
an individual’s control). Effort could be one of the “relevant characteristics” but not
vice versa. Besides, effort could be ordinal (high effort vs. low effort) while “relevant
characteristics” could be nominal.
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Based on Bossert’s (1995) framework, one can derive two principles: Group Solidarity
(GS) and Individual Monotonicity (IM). The former is deduced from the perspective of
irrelevant characteristics — if one changes his irrelevant characteristics, everyone should
change a similar amount of their income or keep the same income as before; while the
latter is derived from the perspective of relevant characteristics — if one changes his
relevant characteristics, no redistribution is needed.
Based on these two basic principles, researchers designed several redistribution mecha-
nisms to identify situations where the allocation is fair and equal opportunity is satisfied.
These redistribution mechanisms are designed to satisfy group solidarity or individual
monotonicity. Besides, they can also be designed to satisfy Pareto efficiency or the no-
envy principle. Using redistribution mechanisms, one can calculate the counterfactual
income distribution when the allocation is fair (equal opportunity is satisfied) and then
measure the distance between the real income and the counterfactual income.
However, there are some drawbacks when applying this approach. First, one needs
a reference or benchmark vector for personal characteristics. These benchmarks are
computed from specific redistribution mechanisms. In consequence, different benchmarks
yield different results. Second, it takes several steps to calculate the measurements,
which might increase the error. Besides, it is still not clear how to treat the error — as
irrelevant or relevant characteristics. The last shortcoming is that this approach assumes
the independence between the irrelevant and relevant characteristics. It neglects the
situation when the relevant characteristics are affected by the irrelevant characteristics.
In this section, we briefly reviewed the allocation mechanisms and their implementa-
tion in empirical studies.
2.3.2.1 The Notation
The population in a given society is N = 1, . . . , n, where n ≥ 2. There are r ∈ N
individual characteristics that are considered “relevant” and s ∈ N “irrelevant”. Person
i’s irrelevant characteristics are described by aSi ∈ Rs. The characteristics vector of i ∈ N
is ai = (a
R
i , a
S
i ) ∈ Rr+s. A characteristics profile is given by a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Rn(r+s),
and it can be partitioned into aR = (aR1 , . . . , a
R
n ) ∈ Rnr and aS = (aS1 , . . . , aSn) ∈ Rns.
The set of possible characteristics vectors is Ω = ΩR ×ΩS, where ΩR ⊆ Rr, ΩS ⊆ Rs,
and ΩR,ΩS 6= ∅.
Furthermore, each agent has his/her non-negative individual income yi ∈ R+. Let the
vector y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ R+n. The set of possible income vectors is y ⊆ R+n.
An economy e is a pair (y, a) ∈ y×Ω. Let E be the domain of economies. A complete
and transitive binary relation %O is defined to compare inequality of opportunity between
two economies. ∼O represents two economies having the same inequality of opportunity.
If %O is continuous on y × Ω, we can find a function I : y × Ω 7→ R such that I(e)
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represents the measurement of inequality of opportunity in economy e.
2.3.2.2 The Redistribution Mechanisms
The concept of equal opportunity states that inequality due to relevant characteris-
tics is acceptable and inequality due to irrelevant characteristics is offensive. Therefore,
(Fleurbaey and Bossert, 1996) purposed two basic principles for redistribution: Group sol-
idarity (GS) based on irrelevant characteristics and Individual monotonicity (IM) based
on relevant characteristics.
GS says that if one agent changes his irrelevant characteristics, the measurement
of inequality of opportunity should not change when every agent’s income increases or
decreases by the same amount.
Axiom 2.3.1 (Group solidarity (GS)) ∀a, aˆ ∈ Ω,∀k ∈ N , aSk = aˆSk and aj = aˆj,∀j ∈
N \ {k}. e ∼ eˆ if and only if yˆk − yk = yˆj − yj,∀k, j.
IM says that if one agent changes his relevant characteristics, the measurement of
inequality of opportunity should not change when only this particular agent’s income
changes.
Axiom 2.3.2 (Individual Monotonicity (IM)) ∀a, aˆ ∈ Ω,∀k ∈ N , aSk = aˆSk and
aj = aˆ
j,∀j ∈ N \ {k}. e ∼ eˆ if and only if yˆj = yj,∀j
Bossert (1995) proved that IM and GS are compatible only if the income is an addi-
tively separable function of relevant and irrelevant characteristics. He assumed that an
income function is a mapping f : Ω 7→ R++, a = (aR, aS) 7→ f(a). In other words, an
agent’s income is determined by his or her own characteristics only. He also suggested a
possible generalization that allows income to depend on the entire characteristics profile.
The redistribution mechanism might also aim to satisfy other allocation principles
such as the Pareto efficiency and no-envy allocation rule. Foley (1967) defined no-envy
allocation as follows.
Definition 2.3.1 (No Envy Allocation) Given e ≡ (R,Ω) ∈ E, the allocation z ∈
Z(E) is envy-free for e, written as z ∈ F (e), if for each pair i, j ⊂ N, ziRizj.
The no-envy allocation states that an allocation is said to be fair if nobody prefers
anybody else’s bundle over his own. The advantage of no-envy allocation is that “it
treats economic agents symmetrically, is ordinal in nature, and is free of interpersonal
comparisons of utility” (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978). However, Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) showed that among all Pareto-efficient allocations, none can be found that is fair
under the standard Arrow-Debreu production economies.
In order to have an allocation which never conflicts with Pareto efficiency, Pazner and
Schmeidler (1978) defined an egalitarian-equivalent allocation.
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Definition 2.3.2 (Egalitarian Equivalence) Given e ≡ (R,Ω) ∈ E, the allocation
z ∈ Z(e) is egalitarian-equivalent for e, written as z ∈ E(e), if there is z0 ∈ Z(e) such
that zI(z0, . . . , z0)
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) explained the egalitarian-equivalent allocation as fol-
lows:
“An allocation is said to be egalitarian-equivalent if there exists a fixed com-
modity bundle (the same for each agent) that is considered by each agent
to be indifferent to the bundle that he actually gets in the allocation under
consideration. It is shown that Pareto-efficient and egalitarian-equivalent al-
locations always exist under (even weaker than) the standard conditions on
the economic environment.”
Based on the fair allocation rule, Bossert (1995) defined a redistribution mechanism
to eliminate the effects of “irrelevant” characteristics given that income is a function
f : Ωn 7→ RN++ of individual’s own characteristics.
Definition 2.3.3 A redistribution mechanism is a mapping F : Ωn 7→ RN++, a 7→ F (a)
such that,
n∑
i=1
Fi(a) =
n∑
i=i
f(ai),∀a ∈ Ωn (2.5)
If income functions f are additively separable in R and S, the following mechanism
F 0 seems very plausible.
F 0k (a) ≡ g(aRk ) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
h(aSi ),∀a ∈ Ωn,∀k ∈ N. (2.6)
Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) found two alternative redistribution mechanisms to
avoid the impossibility theorem and release the assumption of additive separability.
The egalitarian-equivalent mechanism FEE is defined by
FEEk (a) ≡ f(aRk , a˜S)−
1
n
n∑
i=1
[f(aRi , a˜
S)− f(ai)],∀a ∈ Ωn,∀k ∈ N (2.7)
The conditionally egalitarian mechanism FCE is defined by
FCEk (a) ≡ f(ak)− f(a˜R, aSk ) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
f(a˜R, aSi ),∀a ∈ Ωn,∀k ∈ N (2.8)
Moreover, Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) proposed two additional redistribution mech-
anisms — the average egalitarian-equivalence and average conditionally egalitarian. How-
ever, these two mechanisms require more information than FEE and FCE. In equation
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(2.7) and (2.8), either the information of observed relevant characteristics or the observed
irrelevant characteristics are required, but not both.
2.3.2.3 Econometrics Issue for the Equal Opportunity Approach
The income function f can be estimated by linear regression.
log(f(a)) = βˆ0 + βˆSa
S + βˆRa
R + ˆ (2.9)
Devooght (2008) used FEE to calculate the norm income — i.e. the income which
achieves equal opportunity after redistribution and uses the distance measures proposed
by Cowell (1985) to measure the distance between the observed income and the norm
income.
There are several issues related to this model:
Error term
The EE and CE mechanisms are based on the assumption of the anonymous redis-
tribution mechanism (Fleurbaey and Bossert, 1996), which implies that persons with
identical characteristics should have the same pretax income. However, during the esti-
mation, the error term will cause the violation of this assumption. Thus, this error term
should be a new variable either assigned to aR and aS. Both Almas et al. (2011) and
Devooght (2008) treated the error term as the irrelevant characteristics aC . In Devooght
(2008), the inequality due to irrelevant characteristics is 90-97.5% and it is 75% in Almas
et al. (2011). The error term might contribute to the high inequality due to irrelevant
characteristics.
Responsibility Cut
Devooght (2008) and Almas et al. (2011) considered the responsibility cut as a decision
to be made by society. They provided empirical results with many possible cuts. For
example, Devooght (2008) considered hours worked as the only responsibility variable
in one reference group and then constructed several other groups by gradually moving
variables from the irrelevant variables aS to the responsibility variable aR.
The benchmark or reference vector
To apply the Egalitarian Equivalence mechanism, one needs to calculate the reference
or hypothetical irrelevant characteristics a˜S. Thus, one needs to choose a fixed benchmark
level of the compensation variables. Devooght (2008) suggested using the profile of the
most disadvantaged. He explains:
. . . anyone who works one hour extra (∈ aR) is entitled to keep the fruits of
his additional effort as far as his extra income is independent of his compen-
sation variables is taken to be the income one could earn if one were the most
disadvantaged in terms of earning power or the least marginally productive
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member of the economy. If you earn more than the least advantaged for the
same level of the responsibility variables, this is due to personal characteris-
tics of which you are the lucky possessor, and for that very reason is open for
redistribution (Devooght, 2008, pp. 289).
The Correlation between Relevant and Irrelevant Characteristics
This model requires relevant and irrelevant characteristics to be independent with
each other.
2.3.3 An Opportunity Set Approach
Based on the definition of fairness proposed by Kolm (1973) and Thomson (1994),
“equal opportunity” means that individuals in the society should face an identical op-
portunity set. Following this definition, Kranich (1996) developed an opportunity set
approach. He assumed that each individual i faces a finite set of opportunities Oi and
O = (O1, . . . , Oi, . . . , OI) is the set of all individuals’ opportunity sets. He defined a
cardinality difference relation % where O % O′ means the difference of the cardinalities
of opportunity sets between individuals in O is less than that in O′.
Basically, his approach identifies how many options or opportunities each individual
has. An “equal opportunity” society means that each individual is provided the same
amount of opportunities.
However, this theoretical approach is difficult to implement empirically because re-
searchers can only observe the choices individuals made rather than the options or op-
portunities available to choose. In Chapter 5, we use a multinomial regression model
to study university graduate outcomes. This model assumes that every graduate has
three options in their opportunity sets. Instead of measuring the cardinality of every
graduate’s opportunity set, we measure the probability of realising each option for each
graduate. This approach is empirically more plausible than the opportunity set proposed
by Kranich (1996).
2.3.4 The Stochastic Dominance Approach
Lefranc et al. (2008) and Lefranc et al. (2009) applied the stochastic dominance criteria
to rank the opportunity sets offered by difference circumstances. In their approach,
circumstances are treated as lotteries in such a way that inequality of opportunity is
determined by either unequal returns to the lotteries (circumstances) or unequal risk
of the lotteries. Assuming that individuals with circumstances c earn income y, the
definitions of stochastic dominance are as follows:
Definition 2.3.4 The circumstances c first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) the cir-
cumstance c′, i.e. c %FSD c′ iff:
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F (y|c) ≤ F (y|c′), ∀y ∈ R+ (2.10)
Definition 2.3.5 The circumstances c second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) the cir-
cumstance c′, i.e. c %SSD c′ iff:∫ y
0
F (x|c)dx ≤
∫ y
0
F (x|c′)dx,∀y ∈ R+ (2.11)
The SSD is equivalent to generalized Lorenz dominance (GLD). Formally:
∀y ∈ R+c SSD c′ ⇔ ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]GLF (|˙c)(pi) ≥ GLF (|˙c′)(pi) (2.12)
where GLF (|˙c)(pi) is the value of the generalized Lorenz curve at pi for the distribution of
F (|˙c).
Based on the definition of stochastic dominance, equality of opportunity is defined as:
Definition 2.3.6 Equality of opportunity is achieved if and only if @c, c′ ∈ C such that
c %SSD c′.
In the definition of equality of opportunity, Lefranc et al. (2008) used the SSD criterion
instead of FSD. This is because, in the empirical analysis, effort is usually difficult to
observe. Given only the information of circumstances, the outcome is uncertain. The
advantage of using the SSD criterion is that it takes not only the returns of the lottery
but the risk or uncertainty into consideration.
Since the SSD criterion is equivalent to the generalized Lorenz curve, inequality of
opportunity can be directly identified by comparing generalized Lorenz curves of different
circumstances. However, if the Generalized Lorenz curves intersect with each other, it is
uncertain which circumstances provide more opportunities. Another disadvantage of the
stochastic dominance is that it does not provide “a quantification of how far those groups
are from one another”(Ferreira et al., 2011). It cannot answer to which extent there is
inequality of opportunity is in an economy.
Another limitation is that it cannot measure the relative importance of any factor. For
example, suppose there are two factors —gender and parents’ income—, should we find
{male,rich} is the most advantageous type and {female,poor} is the least advantageous
type through stochastic dominance, we still would not know which factors, gender or
parents’ income, have the greater effects on their level of advantage. As the number of
categories expands, it is difficult to analyse data (Lefranc et al., 2008).
2.3.5 A Summary of the Theoretical Model
In this subsection, we compare the model of equality of opportunity of Roemer (1998)
and Van De Gaer (1993) with the fair compensation model of Fleurbaey and Bossert
(1996) and the stochastic dominance approach (Lefranc et al., 2008).
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Table 2.2 lists the differences between these four models on five different aspects.
Roemer (1998),Van De Gaer (1993) and Lefranc et al. (2008) use finite and discrete
circumstance. They categorized different circumstances into finite types. When applying
Roemer (1998) and Van De Gaer (1993) in an empirical study, one can use both non-
parametric and parametric approaches. In contrast, Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) allowed
the circumstance to be a continuous variable so it might be better to use parametric
approaches when applying Fleurbaey’s and Bossert’s (1996) model. Lefranc et al. (2008)
applied non-parametric approaches with a stochastic dominance criterion.
The second difference between the model of equal opportunity policy and the fair
compensation model is that the model of equal opportunity policy uses the degree of effort,
the relative measure of effort, instead of the level of effort which is the absolute measure
of effort. Roemer (1998) argued that the level of effort is correlated with circumstance
since the difference in average of effort between types is out of the individual’s control and
only the degree of effort comparing with others in the same type should be considered as
effort. Based on this argument, Fleurbaey’s and Bossert’s (1996) model might retain more
bias from the correlation between effort and circumstance when measuring inequality of
opportunity. Lefranc et al. (2008) and Van De Gaer (1993) did not require the effort
being observed.
In the fourth column in Table 2.2, we list whether the model adopts an ex-ante or
ex-post approach. In this context, ex-ante means inequality of opportunity is measured
before knowing individuals’ effort and ex-post means inequality of opportunity is mea-
sured after knowing individuals’ effort. The former does not require the observation of
effort while the latter does. Among four theoretical models, Lefranc et al. (2008) and
Van De Gaer (1993) are ex-ante, which means one can measure inequality of opportunity
without observation of effort.
In the fifth column, Table 2.2 shows that only Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) require
a reference vector. It is possible that choosing different reference vectors might influence
the measurement of inequality of opportunities.
Furthermore, the two models of equal opportunity policy consider the redistribution
with limited resources so the most disadvantaged group will be considered first. However,
the fair compensation model redistributes under a pure allocation framework. The model
first computes the ideal fair allocation with equal opportunity and then measures the
distance between the reality and the counterfactual equality. Thus, the two models of
equal opportunity policy are the second best approach and the fair compensation model
is the first best approach.
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Table 2.2: The Comparison of Theoretical Model
Model Circumstance Effort The Ap-
proach
Reference
Vecter
1st or 2nd
Best
Roemer (1998) finite/discretedegree of
effort
Ex-post No 2nd
Van De Gaer (1993) finite/discretedegree of
effort
Ex-ante No 2nd
Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) could be
continuous
level of ef-
fort
Ex-post Yes 1st
Lefranc et al. (2008) finite/discretedegree of
effort
Ex-ante No 2nd
2.4 The Measurement of Inequality of Opportunity
2.4.1 The Outcome of Interest in Measuring Inequality of Opportunity
Equal Opportunity can be advocated in terms of many different inequalities of out-
comes. A typical inequality of outcome is income inequality (Paes de Barros et al., 2009).
Others are educational inequality (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2014), health inequality (Jusot
et al., 2013). Most outcomes of interest are continuous variables. Some outcomes could
be binary variables (Foguel and Veloso, 2014) or categorical variables (Dias, 2009). For
a continuous outcome, a linear or log-linear specification is widely used. For a binary
variable or a categorical variable, nonlinear models such as a logit model, an ordered
probit or a multinomial model are more appropriate. In addition, one can use a stochas-
tic dominance test to evaluate inequality of opportunity (Lefranc et al., 2008) between
circumstances.
Given different outcomes of interest and different model specifications, the measures
of inequality of opportunity might not be comparable. Measures can only be compared
using the same outcomes of interest and the same model specifications.
2.4.2 Selection of Circumstances and Effort
Roemer’s framework divides inequality of outcome into circumstances and effort. This
raises questions about how to distinguish circumstances and effort. To clarify this ques-
tion, first we need to define inequality of outcome; that is, what kind of inequality are
we dealing with (just as “inequality of what” proposed by Sen (1995)). Second, factors
affecting inequality of outcome should be identified, e.g. gender, IQ, parents’ income, etc.
The last step is that these factors should be distinguished with respect to the responsible
factor (effort) and the non-responsible factor (circumstances).
In terms of “inequality of what”, although different philosophers propose different
kinds of inequality (e.g. inequality of welfare, inequality of resources, inequality of ca-
pability, etc.), most empirical literature uses earning inequality, wealth inequality and
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educational inequality as inequality of outcome. The outcome of interest has been dis-
cussed in the previous section. In this section, we focus on the last two steps.
2.4.2.1 Factors Contributing to Inequality
In considering economic inequality, including income inequality and wealth inequality,
we may distinguish between four different types of factors that account for inequality of
outcome: inheritable factors, personal choices and preferences, social background factors,
and luck.
Inheritable factors
Inheritable factors are the genetic or non-genetic influences from parents. The genetic
influence is the talent or innate ability inherited from parents. The non-genetic influence
includes the family’s cultural background and the intergenerational transfer of physical
and human capital from parents to children. The former refers to “meme”, an analogy
between cultural and genetic transmission proposed by Dawkins (2006). As mentioned
by Becker and Tomes,
Some children have an advantage because they are born into families with
greater ability, greater emphasis on childhood learning, and other favourable
cultural and genetic attributes. Both biology and culture are transmitted
from parents to children, one encoded in DNA and the other in a family’s
culture (Becker and Tomes, 1986, pp. S4)
Thus, the cultural transmission from parents to children can be seen as another endow-
ment determined when children are born.
Becker and Tomes (1986) emphasised intergenerational transfer through parents’ hu-
man capital investment, and monetary and asset transfers. The rich may invest more
in children’s human capital, may save more money in old age (Carroll, 1998) and may
leave larger bequests (Nardi, 2002). Although most literature concentrates on the role
of parents’ occupation and income, the role of intergeneration transfers such as human
capital investment, expenditure on children, and bequest is neglected. Furthermore, the
willingness to invest in children may vary. It is even more difficult to measure parents’
willingness to invest in their own children.
Personal choices and preferences
Personal choices and preferences also can cause inequality of outcome among individ-
uals. People face choices and uncertainties every day. Their differences in preferences and
decisions may largely influence their outcomes. One important issue is portfolio choice.
Rich households hold completely different portfolios compared with poor households. For
example, rich households own more risky assets than poor households (Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer, 2000). Studies of inequality of opportunity seldom include personal choices and
preferences because it is hard to observe and measure personal choices and preferences.
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Social background
The third type comprises the social background factors including the bias and dis-
crimination in society, geographical disparity and government policy. Inequalities caused
by social discrimination such as gender inequality, race inequality and regional disparities
have been widely studied by researchers. More literature on inequality of opportunity
will also consider these social background factors. Government policy also will affect
inequality of opportunity. Although some redistribution policies do reduce inequality,
these may not reduce inequality of opportunity.
Luck
The last factor is luck. The idea of luck referred to as “luck egalitarianism” was first
proposed by Dworkin (1981b). There are four different kinds of luck defined by Dworkin
(1981b): social background luck, genetic luck, brute luck and option luck. (Lefranc et al.,
2009)
Social background luck is individuals’ difference in social background beyond their
control. Individuals cannot decide either the country or region they were born or their
parents’ income or occupation; however, these differences determine the circumstances of
the rich or poor. A person born in a poor region will obviously have fewer opportunities
than in a rich region.
Genetic luck is the difference in inheritance of innate characteristics and abilities
from parents. Some people born with talents inherited from their parents. This genetic
endowment may cause some people richer than others.
Brute luck is the luck that provides no choice to an individual. For example, if one is
hit by a car on the street, it is totally out of that person’s control. In contrast, option luck
is the luck that provides choices to an individual such as lottery, gambling, etc. Dworkin
(1981a) proposed a hypothetical insurance to hedge the bad luck—social background luck,
genetic luck, brute luck. This insurance provides choices to individuals so that every kind
of luck eventually becomes option luck.
Dworkin (1981a) argued that option luck provides choices to individuals, and hence
individuals are responsible for their option luck. If every luck can be transferred into
option luck by means of the hypothetical insurance, their resources could be equalized
justly.
Since most studies just take social background luck (parents’ income and occupation)
into consideration, the measurement of inequality of opportunity excludes genetic luck
and brute luck. Presumably, it is absorbed in the random component of the model.
2.4.2.2 Distinguishing Circumstances and Effort
After identifying the factors influencing inequality, we need to distinguish between
factors that account for circumstance and those that do not. The question is referred to
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as “responsibility cut” in literature.
Table 2.3: A Literature Review on Responsibility Cut
Reference Responsibility variable Non-responsibility vari-
able
Outcome
(Checchi and Peragine,
2010)
unobservable the level of parents’ ed-
ucation, region of birth,
sex
individual annual earn-
ings
(Bourguignon et al.,
2007)
unobservable Race, parental school-
ing, region of birth, fa-
ther’s occupational sta-
tus
hourly earnings
(Zhang and Eriksson,
2010)
unobservable Parental household in-
come, Gender, parental
education, parental
occupational status,
household size, region,
urban or rural area
average household dis-
posable income
(Bjo¨rklund et al., 2012) unobservable Parental income,
parental education,
own IQ, number of
siblings, body mass
index, family structure
total market income be-
fore taxes
(Checchi et al., 2010) unobservable Parental education,
parental occupation,
gender, nationality,
geographical location
post-tax individual
earnings
(Pistolesi, 2009) unobservable age, parental educa-
tion, father’s occupa-
tion, ethnicity, region of
birth
individual annual earn-
ings
(Ferreira and Gignoux,
2008)
unobservable gender, ethnicity,
parental education,
father’s occupation,
region of birth
household per capita in-
come
Table 2.3 shows how literature allocates responsibility. There is no accepted standard
in responsibility allocation. Consequently, it is hard to compare these empirical researches
with each other. Besides, different literature may have different errors caused by different
responsibility cuts.
In empirical research, there are three main ways to allocate the responsibilities be-
tween circumstances and effort. Most literature concerns family background and social
background as circumstances. Some literature such as Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) considers
genetic influence, such as IQ as circumstances. One literature (Lefranc et al., 2009) even
takes luck into consideration.
Since most literature pays no attention to genetic influence, if we can estimate how
these genetic factors influence inequality of opportunity, we may be able to estimate the
bias in the empirical studies generated by ignoring genetic factors. One study conducted
by Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) found that IQ is the most significant factor behind income
inequality in Sweden. It accounts for 11.5% in total income inequality compared with
the second factor, parent income (7.1%). If genetic effect widely varies from country
to country, it is essential for researchers to control for it when measuring inequality of
opportunity.
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There is some evidence of genetic effects on effort. Mosing et al. (2014) studied 10,500
twins’ music performances in Sweden. They found that the genetic factors affected both
their willingness to practice and their skills. Music practice was substantially related to
heredity (40% —70%). Moreover, their study excluded the possibility of the causal effect
of music practice on musical ability. This result indicates that genetic variation affects
both ability and inclination to practice.
Another study by Hambrick and Tucker-Drob (2014) shows a similar result. They
looked for evidence for gene-environment correlation and interaction with respect to music
accomplishment. They found that genetic factors played a more important role in music
accomplishment compared with music practice. It is more likely that “genetic potentials
for skilled performance are most fully expressed and fostered by practice”.
2.4.3 Approaches to Measure Inequality of Opportunity
To measure inequality of opportunity, most of the literature starts from estimating
counterfactual distributions. However, researchers apply different theoretical frameworks,
make different assumptions and use different empirical models.
For example, some researchers use parametric estimates (Bourguignon et al., 2007)
and others prefer non-parametric estimates (Checchi and Peragine, 2010). Ramos and
Van de gaer (2016) discussed the pros and cons of the parametric approach. They ar-
gued that if non-parametric approach is applied, each group of data should contain a
sufficient number of observations. Because circumstance is multi-dimensional, if more
circumstances are added, number of types grows exponentially. As a consequence, the
observation for each type would be very few. In addition, if one of the circumstances
is continuous, the observation for each type would not be enough for non-parametric
methodology as well. Another advantage of the parametric approach is that one can
measure inequality caused by one circumstance (or a set of circumstances) by controlling
other sets of circumstances. Thus, the partial effect of a particular circumstance is able
to be measured.
Using a parametric approach (Bourguignon et al., 2007), the outcome of interest can
be ideally modelled in the following equation:
y = f(c, e, u) (2.13)
where y is the outcome of interest, c is the vector of circumstances, e is the vector
of efforts and u is an error term capturing variation due to unobserved factors. Since
circumstances and effort have limited categories, population can be grouped into types in
which individuals share the same circumstances, and tranches in which individuals share
the same effort.
The function f in equation (2.13) could be either linear or non-linear. Although a lin-
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ear parametric approach would be more easily applied, it could underestimate inequality
of opportunity compared with a nonlinear parametric approach (Hufe and Peichl, 2015).
To show different methods used in measuring inequality of opportunity, we further assume
a linear parametric model:
y = αc + βe + u (2.14)
where α, β are vectors of coefficients for vector c and e.
Given the linear parametric model, counterfactual distributions can be generated
based on the estimators of the coefficients in equation (2.14). Inequality of opportunity
can be either measured directly by the counterfactual distributions or indirectly by the
distance between the counterfactual distributions and the real distributions of y:
IOPD = I(y˜) (2.15)
IOPI = I(y)− I(y˜) (2.16)
where IOPD is the direct measure of inequality of opportunity, IOPI is the indirect
measure of inequality of opportunity and y˜ is the counterfactual distribution given that
effort is fixed. The difference between direct and indirect measure is that direct measure
estimates inequality of opportunity IOP by only considering the contribution of circum-
stances, while indirect measure measures the distance between total inequality and equal
opportunity by eliminating the inequalities due to differences in circumstances.
To estimate inequality of opportunity using direct and indirect measures, one should
first determine how to compute the counterfactual distributions. The estimation of the
counterfactual distributions depends on the theoretical frameworks and data limitations.
For example, effort is normally difficult to observe in datasets. In this case, one can
use an ex-ante approach (Van De Gaer, 1993). The counterfactual distribution can be
the fitted distribution given circumstances:
y˜ = αˆc (2.17)
where αˆ is the estimators of an OLS model in which we assumed that effort is unobserved
and in the error term u:
y = αc + u (2.18)
The advantage of this approach is that only the information on circumstances are
required. However, inequality of opportunity is underestimated using this approach be-
cause some unobserved circumstances could also be included in the error term. Re-
searchers have found substantial measurement error due to unobserved circumstances.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, Lara Ibarra and Martinez Cruz (2015) found that miss-
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ing a relevant circumstance could lead to up to 80% downward bias. Balczar (2015) also
found similar bias using the data of toddlers where effort plays no role.
To address the problem of underestimation, Niehues and Peichl (2014) used a panel
data from Germany and the United States and estimated inequality of opportunity using
a fixed-effects regression. In their fixed effect model, they assumed that all circumstances
are unobserved and interpreted the time-invariant individual effect as the effect of all
circumstances. In consequence, their results yielded an overestimated measure.
An alternative approach is to use a non-linear regression. Hufe and Peichl (2015) re-
leased the linearity assumption in a conventional framework and included the interaction
terms of circumstances in the regression. Their results showed a 50% upwards correction
of the downward bias. Donni et al. (2015) used a latent class approach to model the
unobserved circumstances. Their method also partially corrected the downward bias.
Inequality of opportunity can be more precisely estimated if effort can be observed.
In this case, an ex-post approach (Roemer, 1998) can be more appropriate to measure
inequality of opportunity. A counterfactual distribution can be generated given circum-
stances and effort:
y˜ = αˆc + βˆe (2.19)
where αˆ and βˆ are the OLS estimators of parameters in the model.
A direct measure given this counterfactual distribution is to replace each individual’s
income with the average of y˜ for the type each individual belongs to; that is, for each
individual i in type j, suppose the number of individuals in type j is Nj,
ydi =
1
Nj
Nj∑
1
y˜ji (2.20)
where yd = {yd1 , · · · , ydi , · · · , ydN} is the counterfactual distribution for the direct measure
and y˜ji is the outcome for individual i in j type.
An indirect measure is to replace individual’s income with the average of y˜ for each
tranche; that is, for each individual i in tranche k, suppose the number of individual in
tranche k is Nk,
yIi =
1
Nk
Nk∑
1
y˜ki (2.21)
where yI = {yI1 , · · · , yIi , · · · , yIN} is the counterfactual distribution for the indirect mea-
sure and y˜ki is the outcome for individual i in k tranche.
After generating ydi and y
I
i , the direct and indirect measures can be estimated using
equation (2.16).
One issue for the ex-post approach is that it requires the data on effort. However,
effort is related to personal choices and preferences and is hard to be observed. In the
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second essay, we contribute to the literature by proposing a latent class model to capture
the unobserved effort.
Another issue for the ex-post approach is that it is incompatible with the ex-ante
approach. Thus, norm-based measures choose a weakened version of this principle by
using norm income. (See Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) Almas et al. (2011) Devooght
(2008)). In order to find the norm income for a particular individual, first we need to
define a redistribution mechanism under which both ex-ante and ex-post compensation
are satisfied to some extent. Then the norm income is computed based on the mechanism
and treated as the income a particular individual should get. The distance from the real
income to the norm income is the inequality of opportunity.
One distribution mechanism is called “the generalized proportionality allocation” de-
veloped by Bossert (1995) and Almas et al. (2011).
zGPPi =
g(ei; ·)∑
j g(ej; ·)
∑
i
yi
where g(e; ·) = 1
n
∑
j f(ei, cj)
Another distribution mechanism was developed by Fleurbaey and Bossert (1996) and
is called “the egalitarian equivalent allocation”.
FEEk (c, e) := f(ek, c˜)− f(c, e)∀c, e ∈ Ωn,∀k ∈ N.
Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) argued that norm-based measure should be used
instead of the indirect measure because an indirect measure is only the decomposition
of inequality of outcome which ignores inequality of opportunity itself. It answered the
question of to which extent inequality of outcome is due to inequality of opportunity.
In contrast, direct measure and norm-base measure are concerned with the inequality of
opportunity directly.
2.4.4 The Partial Ordering of Inequality of Opportunity
Inequality of Opportunity can also be ranked using the partial ordering approach.
On the one hand, Between groups of those who share the same circumstances, less in-
equality is preferred for an equal opportunity policy. On the other hand, within groups
of those who exert the same effort, less inequality is preferred for an equal opportunity
policy. Following either criteria, one can use a partial ordering such as the Lorenz or the
generalized Lorenz partial ordering to rank difference policies (Peragine, 2004b). Several
criteria on the basis of equality of opportunities can also be derived and examined using
a partial ordering approach (Peragine, 2004a).
Rodrguez (2008) applies a partial equality-of-opportunity ordering to compare the
degree of equality of opportunity among 12 countries. He found that Denmark dominates
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all other economies in terms of post-tax income.
The benefit of using the partial ordering approach is that one can compare income
distribution rather than comparing the measure of income distribution.However, it cannot
tell whether one economy dominates another when one inequality-of-opportunity curve
cross the other.
2.4.5 Correlation between Circumstances and Effort
Effort could be shaped by circumstances. Jusot et al. (2013) summarized three differ-
ent views on the correlation between circumstances and effort proposed by Roemer (1998),
Barry (2005) and Swift (2005) respectively. They provided an example of education in
which some students study hard under the influence of their parents.
Roemer (1998) argued that individuals should be responsible for factors within their
control. This view is known as the control view. Based on this view, the influence of
parents on children’s efforts is out of the children’s control and it should be considered
as circumstances and cleaned from the effort variables.
In contrast with Roemer’s view, Rawls (1971) and Dworkin (1981b) argued that in-
dividuals should be responsible only for their preferences and choices (known as the pref-
erence view). Based on this view, Barry (2005) stated that students’ efforts are choices
based on their own free will, even if made under the pressure of their parents; thus, this
type of effort deserves respect.
Another view from Swift (2005) claimed that the pressure is an effort of parents which
should be respected. Swift (2005, pp. 271) argued that the effort of parents on their
offspring is “an interaction that we have reason to value and protect” and “preventing
those interactions would violate the autonomy of the family”.
Jusot et al. (2013) assessed whether the different views on the correlation affected
the measurement of inequality of opportunity in health. Using the French Health, Health
Care and Insurance Survey, they found that these three different views have little influence
on the measurement of inequality of opportunity in health.
Based on Roemer’s (1998) view, Bourguignon et al. (2007) developed a parametric
approach to deal with the correlation problem between effort and circumstances. They
used a matrix of coefficients to catch the effect of circumstances on effort which is vector-
valued.
Ei = HCi + vi
where Ei is the effort of individual i, Ci is the circumstance of individual i, H is a
matrix of coefficients and vi is the white-noise. This approach models Roemer’s view on
the correlation between circumstances and effort. It can be easily implemented if both
circumstances and effort can be observable.
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For example, individual educational level is commonly regarded as a variable related
to effort. Therefore, this variable can be regressed with circumstances variables to capture
the indirect effect of circumstances on inequality of outcome through educational levels.
For implementation of this approach, see Alain et al. (2010), Lazar (2013) and Deutsch
et al. (2018).
In addition to Bourguignon’s and Ferreira’s (2007) model, with effort unobserved,
Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) models the heteroskedasticity of effort across type so that the
effort correlating with circumstances can be captured.
In our study, we propose two models in Chapter 3 and 4 to deal with the correlation
issue given that effort variables are unobservable.
2.4.5.1 Human Opportunity Index
Paes de Barros et al. (2009) developed another approach called “Human Opportunity
Index” to measure inequality of opportunity in different countries. In light of Human
Development Index developed by Sen (1979), Paes de Barros et al. (2009) considered
the concept of basic capability, e.g. the capability to attain water and electricity. By
focusing on basic capability, this index is more applicable to developing rather than
developed countries.
2.4.6 Measure Educational Inequality of Opportunity
The empirical approaches introduced in previous section can also be applied in mea-
suring educational inequality of opportunity. For example, Ferreira and Gignoux (2014)
study how circumstances contribute to the test score of the Program of International Stu-
dent Assessment (PISA) which were conducted in 57 countries in 2006. They use a direct
ex-ante approach similar to Paes de Barros et al. (2009) to estimate the lower-bound
educational inequality of opportunity. The test score is used as a proxy of educational
achievement.
However, when measuring educational inequality of opportunity, some outcome vari-
ables could be categorical variables. For example, Brunori et al. (2012) measure inequal-
ity of opportunity in the access to tertiary education in Italy. The access of tertiary
is a binary variable. Zeng et al. (2014) look into gender inequality in education using
educational attainment — a categorical variable — as an outcome variable.
In Chapter 5, we also use a categorical variable — the graduate choice — to study
educational inequality in China. This variable is a multinomial variable. Our study shows
how circumstances affect college graduates’ choices in China.
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2.4.7 Inequality Measures
Inequality measures such as the Gini coefficients, Entropy index and the dissimilarity
index are widely used in empirical literature.
The Gini coefficients IGini can be derived from the relative Lorenz curve L which is
the normalised cumulative income functional by the mean (Cowell, 2000):
L(F ; q) ≡ C(F ; q)
µ(F )
(2.22)
where F is the distribution of income in the population q. C is the cumulative function
and µ(F ) is the mean of the distribution of income.
Thus, the Gini coefficient can be expressed as the normalised area between the Lorenz
curve and the 45 degree line (Cowell, 2000):
IGini(F ) ≡ 1− 2
∫ 1
0
L(F ; q)dq (2.23)
Entropy indices such as the Theil index and the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) in-
dex originate from the information-theoretic idea, which can be expressed in the following
inequality index (Theil, 1967).
The Theil index can be expressed as:
ITheil(F ) ≡
∫
x
µ(F )
log(
x
µ(F )
)dF (x) (2.24)
The MLD index can be expressed as:
IMLD(F ) ≡ −
∫
log(
x
µ(F )
)dF (x) (2.25)
They can be generalised into a single more flexible class—the generalised entropy
(GE) family of measures (Cowell, 2000):
IαGE(F ) ≡
1
α2 − α
∫
log[(
x
µ(F )
)α − 1]dF (x) (2.26)
where α ∈ (−∞,+∞) captures the sensitivity of a specific GE index to particular parts
of the distribution. The Theil index and the MLD index are two special cases of the
GE index. When α = 0 or 1, the GE index becomes the MLD index and the Theil
index respectively. Since positive and larger α entail more sensitivity to changes in the
distribution that affect the upper tail, the Theil index is sensitive to the extreme rich
while the MLD index is sensitive to the extreme poor.
Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira et al. (2011) prefer the MLD index rather
than the Theil index and the Gini index since it is the only decomposable index which is
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path-independent (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000). A path-independent index makes sure
that the sum of between-group inequality and within-group inequality is overall inequality.
An alternative is to apply the Shapley decomposition (Shapley, 1953) to any inequality
index to get a path-independent measure. The Shapley decomposition provides flexibility
to choose different inequality indexes with no violation of path independence.
Assume that a set of factors Xk indexed by K = {1, . . . , k, . . . ,m} with a character-
istic function (the inequality index) I : 2K → R. The set of factors can include circum-
stances such as gender, ethnicity and parents’ socioeconomic status, and effort. Some
researches (e.g. Zhang and Eriksson 2010 and Manna and Regoli 2012) decomposed only
the predicted income for each circumstance. This approach shows how each circumstance
contributes to total inequality of opportunity (Israeli, 2007). Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) take
effort as one of the factors. Based on the Shapley decomposition, the factor k’s contri-
bution is determined by the Shapley value of k: φk(I) that can be calculated using the
following equation:
φk(I) =
∑
S⊆K\{k}
|S|!(m− |S| − 1)!
m!
(I(S ∪ {k})− I(S)) (2.27)
where S is the subset of K without k and |S| is the number of factors in S. In this
equation, I(S∪k)−I(S) is the marginal contribution of the factor k to total inequality and
φk(I) can be interpreted as the average marginal contribution of all possible permutations
in which factor k affects inequality jointly with other factors in the set S.
Using this equation, one can decompose total income inequality into inequality con-
tributed by circumstances and effort. In Chapter 3, we use the Shapley decomposition
method to decompose income inequality measured using the Gini coefficients. We show
that, without using Shapley decomposition, the Gini coefficients could overstate inequal-
ity of opportunity.
2.5 The Economic Consequences of Inequality of Opportunity
Researchers have studied the economic consequences of inequality of outcome (such as
income inequality and educational inequality). However, different strands of the literature
draw different conclusions. For example, a common topic is the effect of income inequality
on economic growth. Kuznets (1955) found an inverted U-shape relationship between
income inequality and economic growth. However, other empirical findings suggested a
positive (Li and Zou, 1998) or a negative (Clarke, 1995) relationship.
These contradictory findings might be due to the fact that different factors within
income inequality could have the opposite effect to economic growth. Marrero and Ro-
driguez (2013) postulated that this opposite effect comes from inequality of opportunity.
Using the data from the U.S., they found a negative relationship between inequality
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of opportunity and growth, and a positive relationship between inequality of effort and
growth.
However, Ferreira et al. (2014) found that this negative relationship is not robust
when using a cross-country meta-dataset. They used a dataset containing 118 house-
hold surveys and 134 Demographic and Health Surveys and found no evidence of the
relationship between inequality of opportunity and growth.
In addition, Brunori et al. (2013) found an inverted U-shape curve of inequality of
opportunity with economic development. Given the empirical findings, the relationship
between inequality of opportunity and economic growth is also inconclusive.
Scholars also examined the relationship between inequality of opportunity, income
inequality and intergenerational mobility. Brunori et al. (2013) showed that inequality of
opportunity is positively related to income inequality and negatively related to intergen-
erational mobility. Corak (2013) postulates that high income inequality could result in
high inequality of opportunity and low intergenerational mobility. He illustrated his idea
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from the U.S. For example, he showed
that higher income families in the United States spend much more on their children pur-
chasing things that promote the capabilities of their children such as books, high-quality
child care, private schooling, etc. The expenditure gap grew during the period 1970 to
2010 as the income gap has increased since 1970. In this way, higher income parents
transfer their economic advantage to their children, which leads to low intergenerational
mobility and high income inequality.
In summary, inequality of opportunity is associated with income inequality and inter-
generational mobility; however, its effect on economic growth still needs further investi-
gation.
2.6 The Literature on Inequality of Opportunity in China
There are some recent researches on inequality of opportunity in China.
Using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), Zhang and Eriksson
(2010) measured inequality of opportunity in nine Chinese provinces from 1989 to 2006
using a parametric approach and found a substantial degree of inequality of opportunity
due to parental income, and to father’s and mother’s type of employer which accounted
for 23%, 19% and 20% of inequality of opportunity, respectively. However, parents’
education has little influence on the earnings of their offspring, which implies parents’
social connections have a more crucial effect on the earnings of their offspring than their
intelligence.
They also found that the annual ratio of inequality of opportunity to income inequality
from 1989 to 2006 in China ranged from 0.46 to 0.65. A similar study by Bourguignon
et al. (2007) reported the ratio of inequality of opportunity to income inequality in Brazil
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in 1996 as 0.23. The difference between two studies is that the former used the Gini
coefficients as the inequality measure and the sample size covered both rural and urban
areas while the latter used the Theil index and the sample size covered only urban areas.
To estimate inequality of opportunity, Zhang and Eriksson (2010) assumed that in-
come is a function of individuals’ circumstances which can be observed and effort which
is unobserved. Thus, after identifying the effect of circumstances, the remaining unex-
plained part of income is due to effort.
The model was specified as:
lnincome =α0 + α1gender + α2Province+ α3Urbanarea+ α4Age+ α5Father
′seducation
+ α6Mother
′seducation+ α7Father′semployer + α8Mother′semployer
+ α9ln(householdincome) + α10Householdsize+ α11waveofsurvey + e
(2.28)
In this equation, they included both parents’ education attainment, occupation and
household’s income. The educational attainment was categorized into four levels—
primary or less, middle school, high school or vocational school and College and above.
Parental employment was classified into five different groups according to the type of
employer they worked for—farming, collective, private enterprise, government or state-
owned enterprise and foreign-owned enterprise. In addition, in the equation, they also
considered the region of households—whether the province they lived in was inland or
coastal; and whether households lived in urban or rural areas. The inclusion of region
enabled the study to examine not only family background effect but also regional dispar-
ities.
Additionally, they applied sample restrictions on the CHNS data set. First, individ-
uals lacking information about their parental background or their children’s background
were excluded. Second, they collected data only from the participants aged between
20 to 50 for the reason that participants under 20 years old may still receive education
and those participants above 50 years old commonly have missing values for parents’
income. Eventually, an unbalanced panel with 1287 valid observations during 1989-2006
was generated after data filtering.
However, the descriptive statistics provided show that 18.4% respondents’ fathers
worked as farmers and 57.8% worked in government or state-owned enterprises. For
mothers, 23.2% are farmers and 48.0% worked for the government or state-owned enter-
prises. In this thesis we found that at least 50% of parents were farmers whether before
or after data filtering. In contrast, the original data provided by CHNS1 showed that
34.33% were farmers, fishermen and hunters, while Zhang and Eriksson (2010) found
that 12% of the offspring were farmers.
Another statistic they reported was the percentage of births in urban areas which was
1See the CHNS codebook:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/data/datasets/longitudinal/codebook/jobs 00.pdf
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51%. Since the study focused on the years between 1989 and 2006 and the average age
they reported was 26.5 years old, the sample’s year of birth ranges from 1962 to 1979 on
average. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS, 2013), the urban
population between 1966 to 1979 ranged from 18% to 19%. Since the percentage of place
of birth in urban areas is 51%, the current percentage of place of living in urban areas
will be higher due to the urbanization after 1978. Although the authors claimed that
inequality of opportunity is measured in a way that both urban and rural samples are
included, their sample filtering excluded most rural residents and the results are therefore
more representative of urban residents rather than the whole of China. This bias might be
one explanation for the small proportion of parents’ occupation being listed as a farmer.
Compared with Zhang and Eriksson (2010), Bourguignon et al. (2007) measured in-
equality of opportunity in Brazil in 1996 using only the urban sample. However, in 1996,
the urban population in Brazil was around 80%. Their estimation of inequality of op-
portunity represents the majority of the population in Brazil. While in China, the urban
population before 1980 was lower than 20%, the results from Zhang and Eriksson (2010)
can only represent the minorities, half of whom were born in urban areas before 1980.
In terms of the methodology, the inequality of opportunity can be measured by
G( ˆlnincome)
G( ˜lnincome)
where G( ˆlnincome) is the Gini coefficient of the fitted logarithm of income
from equation (2.28) and G( ˜lnincome) is the Gini coefficient of the observed logarithm
of income from the dataset.
Zhang and Eriksson (2010) also estimated the contribution of individual components
in equation 2.28 to the overall inequality of opportunity. In the implementation, first,
they drop the variable they would like to measure and do the regression again. Then, they
get the fitted income without the dropped variable, let’s say, the fitted income without
gender— ˆlnincomenogender. Thus, the contribution of gender to the overall inequality of
opportunity can be measured by
G( ˆlnincome)−G( ˆlnincomenogender)
G( ˆlnincome)
, where G( ˆlnincomenogender)
is the Gini coefficient of predicted income without the variable gender. This approach
might also be problematic since the estimators are estimated twice. A correlation be-
tween the omitted variable with remaining regressors may lead to two different estimators
between regression with and without the omitted variable, which may increase the bias.
In addition, they used the Gini coefficient as the inequality measure with the log-linear
model. Since the Gini coefficient cannot be decomposed, using G(
ˆlnincome)
G( ˜lnincome)
might lead to
bias. In our study, we show results using the Shapley decomposition to decompose the
Gini index and estimate inequality of opportunity.
2.7 A Summary of the Literature Review
The literature on inequality of opportunity established the theoretical and empirical
foundation on decomposing inequality of outcome into circumstances and effort. It ex-
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amines the sources of inequality of outcome by considering contributions of individual’s
circumstances to it.
Several theoretical and empirical issues still remain to be resolved. On a theoretical
level, it is still not clear whether circumstances and effort can be distinguished and sepa-
rated from inequality of outcome. For example, how should the individual’s responsibility
for their outcome be allocated? Are luck and genetic factors identified as circumstances
or effort? How about different types of luck, such as brute luck and option luck (Dworkin,
1981b)? Although these questions are important to the theory of inequality of opportu-
nity, they are not within the scope of the thesis.
Instead, the thesis mainly focuses on issues of the empirical implementation. We
consider circumstances and effort, observed or unobserved, that may correlate with each
other. Some researchers such as Jusot et al. (2013) and Bourguignon et al. (2007) tried
to solve the correlation between circumstances and effort. Their methods are applicable
under the assumption that circumstances and effort are both observable. This thesis
proposed alternative approaches to the correlation issue given that efforts are unobserved.
In terms of the literature in China, Zhang and Eriksson (2010) measured inequality of
opportunity in China during 1989-2006. However, the data might be out of date and rep-
resent a biased representation of the current situation in China. In addition, the method
used in Zhang and Eriksson (2010) assumes independence of circumstances and effort and
decomposes income inequality using the Gini coefficients which are path-dependent. This
thesis investigates inequality of opportunity using a more contemporary dataset and im-
proves the methodology by considering the correlation between circumstances and effort
and using better inequality measures.
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Chapter 3
Essay I: Measuring income inequality of op-
portunity in China
3.1 Introduction
The real per capita income in China has grown at an impressive rate in the last
two decades, but so has income inequality. The Gini coefficient, an indicator of income
inequality, rose from under 0.3 before 1980 to 0.55 in 2012 (Xie and Zhou, 2014); it
is higher than in the U.S. (0.41) (The World Bank, 2016a) but similar to some Latin
American countries such as Brazil (0.53) and Colombia (0.54). The increase in inequality
was not due to a fall in the income levels of the poor 1, but due to the more rapid income
growth of the rich (Li et al., 2013). This finding raises questions about the change in
income distribution in China and its sources. In particular, what is the main source of
the divergence in income growth between the poor and the rich?
The public is also aware of high income inequality in China. The International Social
Survey Program (ISSP) (2009) surveyed perceptions of economic inequality in 38 countries
in 2009. Most Chinese respondents tended to agree with the statement: “Income differ-
ences in China are too high” and the conceding rate is on par with the other 37 countries.
More importantly, Chinese respondents have the lowest “feeling of procedural justice”
Larsen (2016) among all respondents in the ISSP survey2. Most respondents strongly
believed that socio-political connections and parents’ socio-economic backgrounds were
important for getting ahead in society.
Many researchers have studied income inequality and its determinants in China. They
found that income inequality rose with regional disparities (Knight and Song, 1993, Wan
1Quite the opposite, the poverty rate decreased from 85% to lower than 11% during 1980-2012 (The
World Bank, 2016b).
2ISSP asked respondents to what extent do “coming from a wealthy family”, “having well-educated
parents”, “knowing the right people”, “having political connections” and “giving bribes” are important
to get ahead in society. (Larsen, 2016) combined these questions into a measure of perceptions on
“procedural justice”. This measure captures the extent to which people believe they used privileges to
get ahead in society.
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and Zhou, 2005), globalization (Wan et al., 2006), migration (Park and Wang, 2010),
urbanization (Wu and Rao, 2017) and private ownership of assets (Li et al., 2013). These
studies show the sources of income inequality from different perspectives; however, they
focussed little on “procedural justice” and their findings might not explain people’s per-
ception of procedural unfairness in China.
In this paper, we try to fill this knowledge gap using the framework of equal op-
portunity (Roemer, 1998, Cohen, 1989, Arneson, 1989), in which society should only
be concerned with inequality due to factors beyond individuals’ responsibility (“circum-
stances”) and acknowledge inequality due to factors within individuals’ responsibility
(“effort”). Inequality caused by circumstances is defined as “inequality of opportunity”
(IOP). We discussed the framework of equal opportunity in Section 2.3 in depth.
If China has a higher IOP than other countries, it may explain the public perception of
poor “procedural justice” in the country3. Implementing the theory of equal opportunity
requires first a working definition of individual responsibilities or circumstances. In this
essay, we define observed factors such as gender, ethnicity and parents’ socioeconomic
status as “circumstances” and effort as an unobserved factor. Furthermore, due to the
very short timeframe of our dataset, circumstances are treated as time-invariant variables,
while effort is time-variant.
In this paper, we used a representative dataset drawn from the China Family Panel
Study (CFPS), which contains 33,600 individual observations for the years 2010 and 2012.
We measured IOP at the national, regional, and provincial levels respectively. In addition,
we investigated the relationship between the provincial gross regional product (GRP) and
IOP. Since the data spans only three years, the emphasis is on the cross-regional variation
in IOP. Although China as a whole is growing rapidly, the level and change of develop-
ment and inequality differs vastly across various Chinese regions. The underdeveloped
north-west of China has relatively high income inequality, while the highly developed
south-east region has relatively low income inequality. Therefore, a cross-regional com-
parison in inequality can be used as a vehicle to assess how inequality might change with
development and how IOP contributes to that change.
Since the data include samples with no income, we estimated the probability of earning
positive income through a Heckman model and a hurdle model. In addition, Bjo¨rklund
et al. (2012) showed that the correlation between circumstances and effort is a source of
IOP. They used a non-parametric approach to measure the heterogeneous effect of effort
across circumstances. However, this approach only showed the effect of heterogeneity as a
whole but failed to reveal the effect of each circumstance. Instead, we took a parametric
approach and used maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) to show the effect of each
circumstance variable on heteroskedasticity.
3Some institutional features such as corruption are not considered in this paper but they may also
explain the public perception of procedural fairness.
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To better understand the roles of circumstances and effort in driving inequality in
China, we conducted two decompositions. First, we followed Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012)
and applied the Shapley decomposition (Shorrocks, 2013) to identify the contributions of
circumstances and effort to income inequality. This decomposition technique allows us to
use a common inequality index —Gini coefficient— without violating path dependency
(Foster and Shneyerov, 2000).
Second, we applied the Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973) to identify the differen-
tial effects of circumstances on income across the advantaged and disadvantaged groups
(e.g. gender, ethnicity, etc.). The IOP measure only provides an overview of the unfair
part of inequality, while the Oaxaca decomposition can reveal whether the higher income
for the advantaged group is due to their better circumstances or bigger influence of their
circumstances on income.
The main contribution of this paper is to evaluate IOP in China at both national
and regional levels using representative, cross-sectional data. Taking advantage of het-
erogeneity of Chinese regions, this study sheds light on the contribution of circumstances
to overall income inequality over various development stages. Moreover, this study is
the first one to apply the hurdle model with the Shapley decomposition to include those
who receive no income and to show the heterogeneous effect of each circumstance by
implementing MLE.
We found that at the national level, circumstances accounted for at least 30% of the
income inequality in China in 2010 and 40% in 2012. These figures rise by about 20% if
we include heteroskedasticity between types as parts of IOP, which indicates a significant
effect of circumstances on income through effort. Among this IOP, gender, geographic
characteristics and parents’ socioeconomic status are the three main factors for income
inequality.
At the provincial level, GRP appears to have a negative relationship with income
inequality and inequality of effort, but no discernible relationship with the level of IOP.
As a result, the share of IOP in the overall inequality rises with the increase of GRP.
Lastly, results from the Oaxaca decomposition show that getting rich does not require
better circumstances per se but rather, the bigger influence of circumstances to income.
In addition, the shares of IOPs in the overall inequality are similar across regions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we describe the approach
to measuring inequality of opportunity. In section 3.3 we discuss the empirical strategies.
Section 3.4 is the description of data. Section 3.5 shows the empirical results and section
3.6 is the conclusion.
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3.2 Literature on Measuring Inequality of Opportunity
Equality of opportunity was first conceptualized by John Rawls, who argued that
“offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of op-
portunity” (Rawls, 1971, p. 302). Based on Rawls’s argument, Roemer (1998) proposed a
framework to measure IOP. He started with a classification of people based on types and
tranches: those sharing same circumstances belong to the same type and those exerting
the same level of effort share the same tranche.
Based on Roemer’s division, IOP can then be measured ex-post or ex-ante. The ex-
post IOP captures the within-tranche inequality, the inequality of a counterfactual income
distribution where all tranches have the same mean income (Checchi and Peragine, 2010).
Ex-post IOP is driven entirely by inequality between types conditional on effort. In other
words, the ex-post approach defines equal opportunity as individuals with the same effort
receiving the same outcome regardless of their types. On the contrary, the ex-ante IOP is
the between-type inequality, the inequality of a counterfactual income distribution where
everyone in a type has the same type-average income (Checchi and Peragine, 2010). This
approach is based on a weaker definition of equal opportunity in which the inequality
within tranches is allowed. Due to the strong definition and high data-demand of the
ex-post approach, most literature uses the ex-ante approach. In this paper, we also use
the ex-ante approach.
Based on an ex-ante approach, a common application of this framework is to assume
that circumstances and effort are independent and measure how circumstances and effort
contribute to total inequality respectively.4 However, this method ignores the correlation
between circumstances and effort. If the correlation exists, the measure of inequality of
opportunity would be biased.
To address this issue, firstly, we need to clarify whether the correlation between cir-
cumstances and effort should be respected as individual effort or not. Roemer (1998) ar-
gued that individuals are not held responsible for the correlation between circumstances
and effort because the correlation is also beyond the individual’s control. In contrast,
Barry (2005) believed that this correlation should be respected because it reflects indi-
viduals’ preferences even though it could be shaped by circumstances. This paper adopts
Roemer’s view because the correlation could also be a significant source of income in-
equality, and studying the correlation between circumstances and effort is one objective
in this paper.
Another problem related to the correlation between circumstances and effort is the
observability of effort. Due to the difficulty in defining and observing effort, many re-
searches assume effort as totally unobserved (e.g. Ferreira et al. 2011). If effort can be
observed, one can use a structural equations model to identify the relationship between
4We discuss different approaches in measuring inequality of opportunity in Section 2.4 in detail.
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circumstances and effort (See Bourguignon et al. 2007 and Jusot et al. 2013). If effort can-
not be observed, one can capture the correlation by the type-specific variances (Bjo¨rklund
et al., 2012). If no correlation exists between circumstances and effort, the type-specific
variance should be homogeneous. Since this paper assumes effort cannot be observed,
we use the type-specific variances to identify the correlation between circumstances and
effort.
Roemer’s framework has widely been applied in empirical researches to measure in-
equality of opportunity in many countries. Paes de Barros et al. (2009) estimated the
ex-ante IOP in seven Latin American countries5. They found that although Mexico has
the highest overall income inequality, the contribution of IOP (20.8%) is the smallest
among the seven countries. The biggest share of IOP (37.3%) belongs to Guatemala.
Using longitudinal data, Pistolesi (2009) showed that rising income inequality in the U.S.
during 1968-2001 was not driven by increases in IOP. In fact, they found that IOP in the
U.S. had decreased from 43% to 20% over the period. Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) differ from
many other studies by including individual IQ and body mass index as circumstances
in a Swedish study and used the Shapley decomposition to decompose the effects of cir-
cumstances. They found that the share of IOP to total income inequality was less than
30%.
Only one research measured inequality of opportunity in China. Zhang and Eriksson
(2010) estimated that IOP moved broadly in sync with overall income inequality during
1989 to 2006, with its share of overall income inequality ranging from 46% to 65%. They
also found that the IOP was largely due to parental socio-economic status. However,
due to lack of information about parents’ socio-economic circumstances, most of their
estimations were restricted to the urban population or state-owned enterprise workers
which were mostly urban-based. Therefore, the study omitted the rural population, which
accounted for 55% to 74% of the population during the sample period.6 In addition, the
study measured IOP using the Gini coefficient but did not correct for the bias caused by
the coefficients path-dependency property (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000).
Some studies went beyond measuring IOP and examined the impact of IOP on de-
velopment. Using data from 42 countries, Ferreira et al. (2014) found IOP to have a
negative growth effect but the result is neither conclusive nor robust. In Marrero and
Rodriguez (2013), IOP was found to have a negative growth effect in rich countries only,
while both IOP and inequality of effort 7 enhanced growth in poor countries. In this
paper, we examine the relationship between IOP and development at the provincial level
in China.
Since the empirical researches introduced above used different approaches, inequality
5The seven countries are: Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru and Mexico
6China’s rural population share has been declining steadily over time. Source of data: World Devel-
opment Indicators.
7It is the counterfactual inequality after filtering out the effect of circumstances.
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measures (e.g. Gini, Theil index, etc.), and definitions of circumstances and effort, one
should be cautious about comparing their findings.
3.3 Measuring Inequality of Opportunity
3.3.1 The Model with Independent Circumstances and Effort
To measure IOP, we followed the approaches introduced by Checchi and Peragine
(2010). We first partitioned an income profile according to circumstances and effort.
Assuming that individuals’ income y (yi ≥ 0) is determined by a finite set of exogenous
and time-invariant circumstances c and one-dimensional continuous unobserved effort e,
we proposed a function g:
y = g(c, e) (3.1)
where c is a set of variables concerned as circumstances with n finite values so that each
value represents a type in which individuals have the same circumstances. Effort with m
finite values is represented by e. We assume that each value of e represents a tranche in
which individuals have the same effort.
This model also excludes the existence of random components or luck (Lefranc et al.,
2008) and interaction between circumstances and effort. Therefore, the following two
basic assumptions are satisfied given the non-observability of effort (Checchi and Peragine,
2010):
Assumption 3.3.1 Function g is monotonically increasing in effort e.
Assumption 3.3.2 The conditional distribution of effort e is independent of circum-
stance c
The first assumption indicates that the more effort one exerts, the more income one
earns, and the second assumption implies the independence between effort and circum-
stance. If equation (3.1) satisfies both assumptions, one can directly measure ex-ante
IOP by computing the inequality of a counterfactual income distribution in which the
contribution of effort has been eliminated (Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016). We denote
this counterfactual income distribution as Yc.
Therefore, IOP can be measured by Yc. In this paper, we used two indexes intro-
duced by Ferreira and Gignoux (2008): one for the absolute level of IOP —Inequality of
Opportunity Level (IOL)— and the other for the share of IOP relative to total income
inequality— Inequality of Opportunity Ratio (IOR). The former index is given by:
IOL = I(Yc) (3.2)
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where the function I : RN+ 7→ R+ is an inequality index such as Mean log deviation, Theil
index and Gini coefficients.
The latter index is given by:
IOR =
I(Yc)
I(Y )
(3.3)
An alternative approach —the indirect measure— is to estimate a counterfactual
income distribution Ye by ruling out the contribution of circumstances and to measure
inequality of opportunity by substracting inequality of Ye from income inequality.
We defined the inequality of Ye as the level of inequality of effort (EOL):
EOL = I(Ye) (3.4)
Based on the indirect measure, one can compute inequality of opportunity using the
following equations:
IOL = I(Y )− EOL = I(Y )− I(Ye) (3.5)
IOR = 1− EOR = 1− I(Ye)
I(Y )
(3.6)
where EOR is the ratio of inequality of effort.
To estimate the counterfactual income distribution, one can decompose the observed
income distribution into two — a smoothed between-type distribution by replacing the
within-type income with a type-average income, and a standardized within-type distribu-
tion that eliminates the differences in the type-average incomes (Foster and Shneyerov,
2000). Thus, Yc and Ye can be denoted as the following vectors (Checchi and Peragine,
2010):
Yc = {µ(Y1)1N1 , . . . , µ(Yk)1Nk , . . . , µ(Yn)1Nn} (3.7)
Ye = {Y˜1, . . . , Y˜k, . . . , Y˜n} (3.8)
where 1Nk is the unit vector of length equal to type k’s population and Y˜k =
µ(Y )
µ(Yk)
Yk.
This decomposition approach avoids the value of income in either counterfactual income
distribution becoming negative.
To compute µ(Yk) for each type k, we rely on a parametric model. Suppose e is
unobserved; an individual’s log income can be regressed on circumstances c using the
following equation (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2008):
ln yi = βci + vi (3.9)
where β is a vector of coefficients and vi is a normally distributed error term, i.e. v|c ∼
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Normal(0, σ2). The predicted value is µ(Yk) when circumstances ci corresponds to type
k: µ(Yk) = y¯i = exp(βci +
σ2
2
). We prefer this parametric model to a non-parametric
model because the measure would be more likely to be biased using a non-parametric
model if there are a large number of types.
3.3.2 The Model with Circumstances and Effort Correlated
In reality, effort could be shaped by circumstances so that assumption 3.3.2 is likely to
be violated. In this case, inequality of opportunity is comprised of inequality caused by
circumstances directly and inequality caused by circumstances indirectly through effort.
For measuring the direct effect of circumstances to income inequality, one can mea-
sure the inequality of the expected income given circumstances. For each individual,
the expected income conditional on circumstances can be computed using the following
equation:
E(yi|ci) = µ+ βci (3.10)
Measuring the inequality of this conditional expected income, however, eliminates
the degree of effort — that is, the deviation of the observed income from the expected
income. Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) argued that this deviation can also be a part of inequality
of opportunity if it varies across types. They identified the type-specific variances and
account them for the indirect effect of circumstances to income inequality.
Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) separated the contribution of effort to income Ye into a type-
specific heterogeneous effort Y˜e and a standardized homogeneous effort u, in which ui =
Yei
σi
σti
and Y˜e = Ye − u. The type-specific effort Y˜e is determined by variances because
each type has its own variance σ2t = V ar[Ye|c]. Therefore, the type-specific effort Y˜e is
recognized as the correlation between circumstances and effort and considered as parts of
circumstances, while the standardized effort u is the pure effort and should be respected.
This approach works well to identify the total contribution of the correlation. Bjo¨rklund
et al. (2012) found that the correlation accounts for around 4.3% to 6.4% of total income
inequality. However, this approach failed to identify to what extent each circumstance
contributes to total income inequality through the correlation between circumstances and
effort.
To capture heteroskedasticity and identify the contribution of each circumstance, we
use maximum-likelihood estimation(MLE). We identified the contribution of effort to
income Ye by rescaling individual income so that every type has the same average income
8:
yei =
µ(Y )
E(yi|ci)yi (3.11)
8Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) measured effort by the residual Ye = Y −E(Y |c). We did not use this method
because the residual could be negative, which could imply counterintuitive negative effort.
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Then, we specified the skedasticity function of income with respect to circumstances
c:
σ2i = exp(c
′
iθ) (3.12)
Under the assumption of normal distribution of income9, the likelihood function is:
f(y|c) = ( 1√
2pi exp(c′iθ)
)
n/2
× exp[−
n∑
i=1
(y − c′iβ)2
2 exp(c′iθ)
] (3.13)
Using MLE, we can estimate both β and θ. The estimators of MLE allow us to further
standardized Ye with respect to its variance:
y˜ei = yei ×
√
V ar(yei)
σˆ2i
(3.14)
where y˜ei is the homogenized effort and is independent of circumstances, and σˆ
2
i is the
estimator of σ2 in Equation 3.12. Since the type-specific variances are parameterized,
we can estimate and measure the contribution of each circumstance to income inequality
through effort.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we discuss the implementation of the econometric methodology. We
used three models to measure inequality of opportunity. First, we used the multiple
regression model in Equation (3.9) to estimate the expected income for each type. This
model assumes linearity and heteroskedasticity.
Since more than 6% of the individuals in our dataset have zero income, we used
the Heckman model (Heckman, 1979) and the lognormal hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) to
account for the zero income individuals. The Heckman model assumes that individuals
choose not to work when their reservation wage is greater than the market wage, while
the hurdle model assumes that zero income is a result of choice without referring to
reservation wage. Both of these models are superior to dropping zero income individuals
from the sample.
The third model to be considered is the heteroskedastic model (Equations (3.12) and
(3.13)) that extends the lognormal hurdle model by additional consideration of the corre-
lation between circumstances and effort. After estimating these models, we implemented
the Shapley decomposition, and measured inequality of opportunity not only for all cir-
cumstances combined but also for each circumstance as well. The last part of the analysis
is based on the Oaxaca decomposition. It is used to examine whether the income gap be-
9If income is log-normally distributed, then y represents log income in Equation (3.13)
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tween types is due to different levels of circumstances or different effects of circumstances
on income.
3.4.1 The Heckman Model
The Heckman model (Heckman, 1979) assumes that people with zero incomes could
have potentially earned wages. Wages could not be observed because their personal reser-
vation wage is higher than the market wage. If income is determined by circumstances:
y = cβ + u1 (3.15)
Income y can be observed if y is greater than the reservation wage y∗.
y − y∗ = zγ + u2 (3.16)
where z is the vector of variables affecting the difference between the market wage and
the reservation wage. Since equation (3.16) determines whether observations are selected,
we refer to this equation as the selection equation. Accordingly, equation (3.15) is the
level equation.
The errors that are correlated with each other are u1 and u2:
corr(u1, u2) = ρ (3.17)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between two errors. If ρ 6= 0, the estimator in
equation (3.15) is biased. Equation (3.16) helps correct the selection bias. If ρ = 0, this
model is equivalent to the hurdle model in which equations (3.15) and (3.16) are two
independent equations.
In addition, the Heckman model and the hurdle model are different in that the hur-
dle model assumes no reservation wage. Since the measure of inequality of opportunity
relies on observed incomes rather than counterfactual incomes or reservation wages, we
used the results from the hurdle model to compute the measure of inequality of oppor-
tunity. Nevertheless, we still used the Heckman model as a tool to explore the effect of
circumstances on labour participation and as a robust test of the measure of inequality
of opportunity.
3.4.2 The Lognormal Hurdle Model
The lognormal hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) takes the zero-income observations into
consideration without assuming a reservation wage. The model consists of a binary
outcome model, which is used to account for zero versus positive incomes, and a non-
linear model, which deals with the positive income.
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Assume that income y can be generated as
y = wy∗ (3.18)
where w is a binary variable that equals 1 if y > 0, and y∗ is a continuous variable
that equals y but it is observed only when w = 1. We assumed y∗ to have a lognormal
distribution:
y∗ = exp(c′β + u) (3.19)
where c stands for circumstances and the error term u|c ∼ Normal(0, σ2). So the
expectation of y∗ given c is:
E(y∗|c) = exp(c′β + σ
2
2
) (3.20)
To estimate the probability of receiving positive income w, we used the logistic model:
Pr(w = 1|c) = Λ(c′γ) (3.21)
where Λ is the logistic function and γ is the vector of coefficients for the circumstance
variables in the logistic model.
Therefore, the between-type income distribution can be represented by the expecta-
tion conditional on circumstance variables:
yc = E(y|c) = Λ(c′γ)× exp(c′β + σ2/2) (3.22)
where yc represents the expected income in each type.
To estimate the contribution of effort to income, we computed the within-type income
distribution by rescaling the observed income until the income distribution in each type
has the same mean as the overall income distribution:
ye =
y ∗ y¯
yc
(3.23)
An alternative approach is to treat the residual of the model as income earned by
effort (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2008). We did not use this approach because the residual
would sometimes be negative, which might affect the computations of the Gini index
(Chen et al., 1982).
To apply equation (3.22), we undertook the estimation in three steps. First, we esti-
mated the binary part using a logistic regression and obtained the estimator γˆ. Second,
we estimated the continuous part using a log-linear regression and obtained the estimator
βˆ. The last step was to estimate the predicted income yˆ. Since y is assumed to follow a
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log-normal distribution and the true distribution σ2 could be unknown, we used Duan’s
(1983) smearing estimate.
If u is independent of c, E(y∗|c) = E[exp(u)] exp(cβ). Let τ = E[exp(u)]. We can
use the estimated smearing factor τˆ to estimate τ . The value of τˆ is:
τˆ = N−1
∑
i
exp(uˆi) (3.24)
where uˆi is the residual of the log-linear regression.
3.4.3 The Shapley Decomposition
When measuring inequality of opportunity, we first decomposed income distribution
Y into a smoothed distribution Yc and a standardized distribution Ye. the contribution of
circumstances (IOL) and effort (EOL) can be computed based on Yc and Ye respectively
using Equation (3.2) and (3.4). To ensure IOL is consistent with IOE, we require the
sum of both indexes to be the total income inequality:
I(Y ) = I(Yc) + I(Ye) (3.25)
However, Equation (3.25) holds only if the inequality index I() is path independent10.
One path independent inequality measure is the mean log deviation (MLD). An alterna-
tive is to apply the Shapley decomposition (Shapley, 1953) to any inequality index. The
Shapley decomposition provides flexibility to choose different inequality indices with no
violation of path independence. Zhang and Eriksson (2010) used the Gini coefficients
of I(Yc) to measure inequality of opportunity without the Shapley decomposition. In
Section 3.6, we show that this method could lead to an overestimated IOL.
We used the Shapley decomposition to decompose income inequality by assuming a
set of factors Xk indexed by K = {1, . . . , k, . . . ,m} with a characteristic function (the
inequality index) I : 2K → R. The set of factors can include both circumstances such as
gender, ethnicity and parents’ socioeconomic status, and effort. Some researchers (e.g.
Zhang and Eriksson 2010 and Manna and Regoli 2012) regressed income with circum-
stances and decomposed the predicted income for each circumstance. This approach
shows how each circumstance contributes to total inequality of opportunity but not in-
come inequality (Israeli, 2007).
Deutsch and Silber (2007) demonstrates an alternative approach to decompose income
inequality by population subgroups using the Shapley decomposition. If those population
subgroups indicate differences between individuals’ circumstances, decomposing income
inequality into the between-group and within-group inequality can effectively measure
10Path independence holds when overall inequality is the sum of between-group inequality and within-
group inequality (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000)
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inequality of opportunity.
In this paper, we follow Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012), taking effort as one of the factors.
Based on the Shapley decomposition, the factor k’s contribution is determined by the
Shapley value of k: φk(I) that can be calculated using the following equation:
φk(I) =
∑
S⊆K\{k}
|S|!(m− |S| − 1)!
m!
(I(S ∪ {k})− I(S)) (3.26)
where S is the subset of K without k, |S| is the number of factors in S and ! represents
factorial. In this equation, I(S ∪ k) − I(S) is the marginal contribution of the factor k
to total inequality and φk(I) can be interpreted as the average marginal contribution of
all possible permutations in which factor k affects inequality jointly with other factors in
the set S.
For a factor in set S, we used the observed value of this factor; otherwise, we took
the average of the observed value so that this factor has no effect on inequality.
Suppose we have k circumstances variables; the OLS model and the Heckman model
would have k + 1 factors (k circumstances and 1 effort variable) for the Shapley decom-
position. We used the counterfactual income distribution Ye as the effort variable. In
Equation (3.26), Ye is used when effort is in the set S and the mean of Ye is used when
effort is not in the set S.
The hurdle model would have k + 2 factors (includes the factor of whether income is
equal to zero or not). We used the predicted probabilities from the selection equation
as the factor of whether an individual earns zero or positive income. If this factor is
excluded in S, we used the average probabilities.
The number of factors would not increase when considering heteroskedasticity because
we combined the contributions of direct and indirect effect of each circumstance. The
difference between this model and the homoskedastic model is that this model uses the
estimator from the heteroskedastic model. Both mean and variance change when a factor
changes from observed values to fixed values.
One advantage of the Shapley decomposition is that the sum of the Shapley value of
each factor is the total contribution of these factors to income inequality. In our study,
Gini coefficients are used and the effort affected by the residuals of the model is taken
into account. Therefore, the sum of the Shapley value for each factor measured by Gini
coefficients is equal to total income inequality:
I(y) =
∑
k
φk(I) (3.27)
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3.4.4 The Oaxaca Decomposition
If the population is divided into two groups (e.g. female and male, urban and rural,
minority and majority group or under-developed and developed region), circumstances
may have different effects on income for each group. To study the group differences, we
employed the Oaxaca decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973).
Considering two groups, A and B, income distribution for each group is denoted as
YA and YB, and the difference between the means of the groups is:
R = E(YA)− E(YB) (3.28)
where E() is the expected value of income distribution.
We decomposed the between-group difference to three components (Jann et al., 2008):
R = EN + CO + INT (3.29)
where EN is the “endowments effect”, CO is the contribution of differences in the coef-
ficients and INT is the interaction effect of the former two.
In our model, we assumed that only circumstances can be observed. We specified the
following model:
lnY = c′β +  (3.30)
where β is the vector of coefficients and  is the error term.
Using this model, the difference between the means of the groups R becomes
R = E(cA)
′βA − E(cB)′βB (3.31)
The first component EN ,
EN = (E(cA)− E(cB))′βB (3.32)
captures the group differences in the predictors, i.e. whether the difference in income
between groups is due to the difference in circumstances between groups.
The second component CO,
CO = E(cB)
′(βA − βB) (3.33)
is the difference in the contribution of coefficients. The level of contribution indicates the
amount of inequality between groups coming from the effect of circumstances.
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The third component INT ,
INT = (E(cA)− E(cB))′(βA − βB) (3.34)
is the interaction accounting for both the differences in endowments and coefficients.
The Oaxaca decomposition can also be applied to any number of groups to examine
sources of income inequality (Deutsch and Silber, 2008).
3.5 Data Description
To measure inequality of opportunity in China, we used data from the China Family
Panel Studies (CFPS). CFPS is a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey
containing not only individual-level data but also household- and community-level data.
It has been conducted since 2010 by the Institute of Social Science Survey (ISSS) of
Peking University, China. As in 2016, this project has released data from the 2010
baseline survey, the 2011 maintenance survey, and the 2012 follow-up survey. Since the
survey conducted in 2011 is a maintenance survey and the sample size is small relative
to 2010 and 2012, we do not include the 2011 survey in our research.
CFPS covers 16,000 households with more than 33,000 adults and 8,900 children aged
under 15 in 25 provinces/municipalities/autonomous regions in China. It is designed
to record changes in the socioeconomic wellbeing of Chinese people, covering a variety
of topics such as economic activities, educational attainment, family relationships and
dynamics, migration, and physical and mental health.
The original sample sizes in 2010 and 2012 were 33,600 and 35,720 respectively in
which 26,393 samples were recorded in both 2010 and 2012. Of these we focused on
individuals aged between 21 to 60 because the labour participation rate outside this age
range is relatively low. After filtering, the sample size was reduced to 19,736.
3.5.1 Micro-Level Data: Income and Circumstances
Table 3.1 and 3.2 present the summary statistics of variables used in the study. Male
respondents make up 47% of the sample. Ethnicity is represented by the dummy variable
“minority”. It is equal to 0 if an individual’s ethnicity is the majority group — Han;
otherwise, it is equal to 1. The percentage of the minority group is around 8%. In
addition, the average age of the respondents is 42.25. 90% of them are married. The
percentage of members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the sample is 6% and
7% in 2010 and 2012 respectively.
We also included the number of siblings as one of the circumstance variables. Becker
and Lewis (1974) studied the relationship between the number of children and children’s
outcome such as educational attainment and socioeconomic status. An empirical study
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conducted in China (Li et al., 2008) also found a negative correlation between the family
size and child outcome. In the dataset, the average number of siblings is around 3.
Another circumstance variable we used is the region of residence when the respondent
was 12 years old. Two dummy variables were generated for the region of residence. One
is whether the respondent held a non-agriculture Hukou at 12 years old and the other is
whether the respondent lived in coastal provinces at that time. We used these variables
because children are unlikely to change these circumstances through their own effort.
Hukou is a system for recording household registration in China. It divides households
into an agriculture (rural) and a non-agriculture (urban) Hukou. The former lives in
rural areas and is registered as a rural household and the latter lives in urban areas and
is registered as an urban household. Due to the difficulty in changing a Hukou status
from agriculture to non-agriculture, lots of rural immigrants hold an agriculture Hukou
status even though they live in urban areas. These rural Hukou holders have lower
educational attainment, are more likely to be unemployed, and are less likely to have
employer-provided healthcare benefits (Liu, 2005).
Individuals normally have the same type of Hukou as their parents’ before they grow
up. In our sample, the percentage of individuals who held an urban Hukou status when
they were 12 years old is 15%. We chose Hukou status instead of a place of residence
because of the difficulty in changing the Hukou status (Wu and Treiman, 2004).
Coastal provinces are the provinces on the eastern coastline of China. This area is
more developed than the inland area. We used a dummy variable to capture whether the
respondents lived in the coastal provinces when they were 12 years old (coastal12). The
data show that about 43% of the respondents grew up in a coastal province.
Table 3.2 shows respondents’ parents’ socioeconomic status (SES) when respondents
were 14 years old11, including parents’ education level, parents’ occupation status and
parents’ political affiliation. For all variables, we used only the higher of the values
observed by parents.
Parents’ education level is reported in eight levels in CFPS. We merged them into
three levels, namely (1) low level: illiterate or semi-literate; (2) middle level: primary
and junior high school; and (3) high level: senior high school or above. Of the parents
surveyed, 38% and 21% had low and high levels of education, respectively.
Parents’ occupation is divided into 8 big categories including 595 specific occupational
codes in CFPS. We regrouped them into three levels: (1) low level: agricultural workers
and workers in manufacture and transportation sectors; (2) middle level: professionals,
clerks, technical staffs and other tertiary sector workers; and (3) high level: including
the administrative/management positions, teachers for tertiary education, lawyers and
high-rank military officers. On average, 79% and 9% of individuals reported low- and
high-level of their parents’ occupation, respectively.
11Parents’ SES were only provided for respondents when they were 14 years old in CFPS
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics (Respondents)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Individual income(2010) 19,736 13,812.55 28,002.96 0.00 980,000.00
Individual income(2012) 19,736 17,297.48 32,215.31 0.00 1,809,000.00
Household income per capita(2010) 18,729 17,549.66 27,087.06 2.89 1,000,000.00
Household income per capita(2012) 19,248 23,470.16 28,641.32 0.45 918,924.00
Male 19,736 0.47 0.50 0 1
Minority 19,696 0.08 0.27 0 1
Age in 2010 19,736 42.25 10.79 21 60
Urban Hukou at age 12 19,625 0.15 0.35 0 1
Live in coastal province at age 12 19,736 0.43 0.50 0 1
Number of sibling 19,736 2.98 1.90 0 14
Married in 2010 19,736 0.90 0.30 0 1
CCP member in 2010 19,736 0.06 0.24 0 1
CCP member in 2012 19,736 0.07 0.25 0 1
1 Income is the nominal value in Yuan.
2 Income in 2012 is adjusted for inflation at the provincial level to 2010.
3 CCP is the Chinese Communist Party.
4 Household income per capita is shown in individual level.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (Respondents’ Parents’ SES)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Low Occupation 17,309 0.79 0.41 0 1
Mid Occupation 17,309 0.13 0.33 0 1
High Occupation 17,309 0.09 0.28 0 1
CCP member 19,736 0.16 0.37 0 1
Low Education 19,736 0.38 0.49 0 1
Mid Education 19,736 0.40 0.49 0 1
High Education 19,736 0.21 0.41 0 1
1 All variables are defined when the respondents were 14 years old.
2 All variables only record the higher value between parents.
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A dummy variable indicating whether one of the parents was a member of the China
Communist Party (CCP) when respondents’ were 14 years old was used as a proxy for
parents’ political affiliation. 16% of the parents had at least one CCP membership.
Among the variables introduced above, we selected gender, ethnicity, Hukou at age
12, a coastal or inland province at age 12, number of siblings, parents’ educational level,
parents’ occupational level and whether at least one parent was CCP member as circum-
stances. In total, the respondents were divided into 1331 types 12. Most types had fewer
than 10 samples. Therefore, using a non-parametric method to measure inequality of
opportunity will result in a large upward bias.
For the dependent variables, we used the annual individual income because household
income does not necessarily reflect how a person’s upbringing affects his/her income when
household members have different upbringings. Household income, household consump-
tion and individual labour earnings have also been used in other studies (Ferreira and
Gignoux, 2008). The annual individual income was 13,813 yuan on average in 2010 and
17,297 yuan in 2012. To construct the income variable, we first computed the labour
income by summing up individual wages, awards and allowances provided by employ-
ers, income from working out of town and bonuses. Then we matched each individual
to his household’s business income (including agricultural and non-agricultural business
income), property income, transfer income and other income (including gifts). The in-
dividual income is equal to labour income plus income from all sources of non-labour
income divided by the square root of the family size13. The individual income increased
by 30% from 2010 to 2012, which is mostly attributable to the increase in the household
income per capita.
The household income per capita in 2010 was 17,550 yuan on average and rose to
23,470 yuan by 2012. Both the annual individual income and the household income were
adjusted for inflation.
3.5.2 Macro-Level Data at the Regional Level in China
To measure inequality of opportunity at the regional level, we divided the whole
dataset into 8 regions. Figure 3.1 shows the eight regions in colours, where the red region
represents municipalities. Municipalities/autonomous regions and 25 out of 31 provinces
in China are covered in the dataset. Generally, we grouped the regions by geographic
proximity and development similarity.
The gross regional product (GRP) and the growth rate per capita for each province
are shown in Table 3.3. Generally, the east and metropolitan regions have higher per
12Those types with no observation are not counted
13Non-labour income and household income are rescaled by the square root to adjust the economies
of scale within households. We also constructed income variables without the rescaling. We found that
the results in this study are not affected by using income with different scales.
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capita GRP compared with the remaining regions; while the west and north west have
higher growth rates compared with the others.
Figure 3.1: The Regional Division of China
1. 25 provinces covered in the dataset are coloured in the map.
2. The detailed division for each province is presented in Table 3.3
3.6 The Results
The empirical results are presented in four sub-sections. The first sub-section explores
how circumstances affect labour participation. The second sub-section presents inequality
of opportunity at the national level; the third sub-section presents the provincial IOP and
its relationship with GRP. Inequality of opportunity in regards to gender, ethnicity and
Hukou status constitutes the final sub-section.
3.6.1 The Effect of Circumstances on Labour Participation
In our dataset, around 6.8% and 8.1% of the respondents received no income in 2010
and 2012 respectively. This raises the question to what extent do circumstances affect
labour participation. One way to show the influence of circumstances is to compare
circumstances between positive income and zero income observations. Table 3.4 shows the
independent t-test between zero-income and positive income respondents. The coefficients
represent the difference between the mean of the zero-income group and the mean of the
positive income group. A positive coefficient suggests that a zero-income group is more
likely to have individuals with a higher value of the relative variable. In terms of the
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Table 3.3: Per Capita Gross Regional Product and Indices
Per Capita GRP(Yuan) Indices (preceding year=100)
Province Region 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
Fujian East 40025 47377 52763 113.2 111.6 110.5
Jiangsu East 52840 62290 68347 112 110.3 109.7
Shandong East 41106 47335 51768 111.3 109.9 109.2
Zhejiang East 51711 59249 63374 109.5 107.2 107.7
Tianjin Metropolitan 72994 85213 93173 111.7 110.9 109.2
Shanghai Metropolitan 76074 82560 85373 106.4 105 105.7
Beijing Metropolitan 73856 81658 87475 104.8 103.8 104.9
Shanxi Mid-North 26283 31357 33628 111.2 110.4 109.6
Hebei Mid-North 28668 33969 36584 110.6 109.7 108.9
Anhui Mid-South 20888 25659 28792 118.8 112.6 111.8
Hubei Mid-South 27906 34197 38572 114.7 113.5 110.7
Jiangxi Mid-South 21253 26150 28800 113.2 111.8 110.4
Henan Mid-South 24446 28661 31499 112.6 112.5 110.1
Jilin North 31599 38460 43415 113.6 113.5 111.9
Liaoning North 42355 50760 56649 113.4 111.6 109.4
Heilongjiang North 27076 32819 35711 112.6 112.2 110.1
Shaanxi Northwest 27133 33464 38564 114.4 113.7 112.6
Gansu Northwest 16113 19595 21978 111.6 112.3 112.2
Guangxi South 20219 25326 27952 113.9 112 110.4
Hunan South 24719 29880 33480 112.9 111.2 110.7
Guangdong South 44736 50807 54095 109.5 108 107.4
Chongqing West 27596 34500 38914 116.2 115.1 112.4
Sichuan West 21182 26133 29608 115.7 115.9 112.3
Guizhou West 13119 16413 19710 114.7 116.1 113.5
Yunnan West 15752 19265 22195 111.6 112.9 112.3
Source: China Statistical Yearbook NBS (2013)
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significance, “Male”, “coastal province” and “high parents’ occupation” are significant in
both years. “Urban Hukou status”, “number of siblings” and “high parents’ education”
are significant in 2010, and “minority”, “mid parents’ education” and “mid parents’
occupation” are significant in 2012. From the sign of the coefficients of these variables, a
zero-income individual is more likely to be a female Han (the major ethnic group), living
in coastal provinces with an urban-Hukou status, having few siblings, and whose parents
have a higher socio-economic status.
Table 3.4: Zero Income Vs Positive Income (the Independent t-test)
(1) (2)
2010 2012
Male -0.102∗∗∗ (-7.15) -0.124∗∗∗ (-8.78)
Minority group -0.00720 (-0.94) -0.0255∗∗∗ (-3.37)
Coastal province at age 12 0.0909∗∗∗ (6.38) 0.0922∗∗∗ (6.56)
Urban Hukou at age 12 0.0685∗∗∗ (6.83) 0.0158 (1.59)
Mid education(Parents) -0.000528 (-0.04) 0.0232∗ (1.66)
High education(Parents) 0.0255∗∗ (2.32) 0.0113 (1.04)
Mid occupation(Parents) 0.00624 (0.65) 0.0173∗ (1.84)
High occupation(Parents) 0.0206∗∗ (2.57) 0.0166∗∗ (2.10)
Member of CCP(Parents) 0.00542 (0.50) -0.00490 (-0.46)
Number of sibling -0.257∗∗∗ (-4.72) -0.0767 (-1.42)
1 ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
2 The standard error is in the parentheses.
3 The coefficients represent the mean difference between the zero-income group and the positive-
income group. The null hypothesis for the independent t-test is the mean (of the percentage of
male, for example) for the zero-income group is identical to the mean for the positive-income
group.
Including zero income observations, we ran regressions based on the Heckman model
and the hurdle model for the data in 2010 and 2012 respectively. The results for 2012 are
shown in Table 3.5. Since the results for 2010 are similar to those for 2012, we show the
results in Table 3.14 in the Appendix. In Table 3.5, columns (1) and (2) show the results
from the hurdle model. Columns (3) and (4) are the results from the Heckman model.
Columns (1) and (3) are the results from the selection equations, in which the estimators
are presented in the form of marginal effect. Columns (2) and (4) are the results from
the level equations.
In the selection equations (columns (1) and (3)), we added two variables —the inter-
action between male and marital status— as the exclusion restriction of the Heckman
model because gender and marital status are likely to affect the reservation wage and the
decision on labour participation. We did not include these two variables in the Hurdle
model because this model does not require exclusion restrictions.
In general, compared to the Hurdle model, the Heckman model estimates a higher
log income distribution. This implies that zero income observations could receive higher
market wages than the average income level. This implication is also supported by the
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negative correlation (ρ in Table 3.5) between the errors of the selection and the level
equation and the coefficients of the selection equation as well. The coefficients of the
selection equation suggest that those with circumstances such as female, major ethnic
group, urban Hukou, coastal provinces and higher parents’ SES are more likely to have
a higher reservation wage than the market wage. Most of these circumstances, however,
contribute to a higher income.
Table 3.5: Hurdle Model vs Heckman Model (2012)
Hurdle Model Heckman Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selection Level Selection Level
Male 0.036∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
Minority 0.023∗∗∗ −0.377∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
Urban Hukou at age 12 -0.001 1.164∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗
Coastal Province at age 12 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
Mid education(Parents) -0.005 0.255∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗
High education(Parents) -0.002 0.221∗∗∗ -0.051 0.217∗∗∗
Mid occupation(Parents) -0.010 0.252∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
High occupation(Parents) -0.017∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ -0.056 0.295∗∗∗
Member of CCP(Parents) 0.009 0.103∗∗∗ 0.043 0.073∗∗
Number of sibling 0.001 −0.046∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.052∗∗∗
Married in 2010 -0.118∗∗∗
Constant 11.140∗∗∗ 8.173∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗ 8.544∗∗∗
Observations 17176 15821 17176
ρ -0.952∗∗∗
σ 1.65∗∗∗
λ -1.57∗∗∗
1 ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
2 The coefficients of the selection equations are presented in the form of marginal effect.
The selection equation in the Hurdle model shows a similar result. The coefficients
for male, minority, coastal province and high parents’ occupational level are significant
at the 5% level in 2012. Given their coefficient, we conclude that those who are male, the
minority group, living in inland provinces or having lower parents’ SES are more likely
to earn positive income. This result is consistent with the results from the independent
t-test as well as the Heckman model.
In the selection equation, the difference between the Hurdle model and the Heckman
model is that the Heckman model indicates a higher marginal effect than the Hurdle
model. For example, the Hurdle model suggests that rural and urban Hukou have similar
probabilities of receiving zero income, while the Heckman model indicates that urban
Hukou holders are 28.4% more likely to have a higher reservation wage than the market
wage. Given a negative and significant ρ, we conclude that the OLS model (which is
also the level equation in Hurdle model) could be biased and the assumption of the
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reservation wage gives a better explanation of the decision on the labour participation
than the Hurdle model.
In the level equation, different circumstances have different impacts on income. Com-
paring parents’ SES with other variables, we find that gender, ethnicity, whether one
lives in a coastal province and Hukou status seem to contribute more to income inequal-
ity than parents’ SES does. These demographic characteristics affect not only income
but also the decision in labour participation. Parents’ SES, on the other hand, affects a
person’s income earned but has less implication in their labour participation.
Among all circumstances, Hukou status has the largest impact on income and the
labour participation, which might indicate a substantial rural-urban inequality in China.
Urban Hukou holders are less likely to participate in the labour market but they could
earn 112.5% more, if they work, than their rural counterparts. Given a similar impact
of living in a coastal/inland province14, we conclude that regional disparities can be the
most important factor of income inequality in China. This finding is in line with other
researches in regional inequality in China such as researches from Wan et al. (2006), Xie
and Zhou (2014) and Wu and Rao (2017).
3.6.2 Inequality of Opportunity at the National Level
Considering the correlation between circumstances and effort, we parameterized het-
eroskedasticity and estimated the model using MLE with equation (3.13). Table 3.6
shows the results. The first two columns are the estimators of the mean and the last two
are of the variance. Comparing this table with Table 3.5, the coefficients of the mean
are similar to the level estimation of the hurdle model. Therefore, when computing the
Shapley values, the results might be similar if replacing the coefficients of the mean from
OLS with those from MLE.
As is shown in the last two columns in Table 3.6, heteroskedasticity has a significant
effect on income inequality through a variety of factors. Male’s income has a higher
variation than female’s in 2010 (8.8%) but not in 2012 (-0.3%). This difference in income
variance might be due to a larger increase in income for low income males than high
income males from 2010 to 2012.
Hukou status also has a large impact on income distribution. Those with a urban
Hukou have 58.8% lower income variance in 2012, but are not different from their rural
Hukou counterparts in 2010; while income differential is much higher in 2012 (117.2%)
than 2010 (62.6%). This indicates that income grows much faster for those who hold
urban Hukou status than those with rural Hukou status. This finding is also supported
by other studies such as Liu (2005) and Afridi et al. (2015). For urban Hukou holders,
14For the convenience in computing IOR, we divided the 25 provinces in China into only two categories:
inland and coastal. Therefore, the coefficient of inland/coastal dummy variable only roughly shows the
regional disparity.
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those with low income might benefit more than their high income counterparts so that
the income distribution converges and the variance reduces by 58.8%.
In addition, living in the coastal province reduces the income variances from 17.8% in
2010 to 7.7% in 2012, while the income differential between inland and coastal province
increases from 27.7% to 39.1%. This indicates that for residents in the coastal province,
those with low income might benefit more than their high income counterparts.
In summary, from the heteroskedastic model, we find that variances are influenced
mainly by gender, ethnicity, Hukou status and whether one lives in the coastal province.
Those who are male, urban Hukou status and living in the coastal province with lower
income are more likely to have higher growth of income from 2010 to 2012.
Table 3.6: The MLE with Type Heteroskedasticity at the National Level
Mean Variance
2010 2012 2010 2012
Constant 8.287∗∗∗ 8.191∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Male 0.556∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Minority −0.196∗∗∗ −0.362∗∗∗ −0.007 0.088∗∗
(0.040) (0.046) (0.042) (0.042)
Urban Hukou at age 12 0.626∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗ −0.054 −0.588∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035)
Coastal Province at age 12 0.277∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Mid education(Parents) 0.199∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.037 0.014
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
High education(Parents) 0.221∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.014
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Mid occupation(Parents) 0.137∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.052
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
High occupation(Parents) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.070
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Member of CCP(Parents) 0.132∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.054∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Number of sibling −0.033∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.019∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The standard error is in the parentheses.
To implement the Shapley decomposition, we grouped 10 explanatory variables into
5 factors — gender, ethnicity, geographic characteristics, parents’ SES and the number
of siblings. Geographic characteristics comprise Hukou status and coastal province; and
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parents’ socioeconomic status includes parents’ educational level, occupational level and
member of CCP.
Table 3.7 shows the decomposition of IOR at the national level. The first two columns
are the decomposition of the results from the linear regression. Only observations with
positive income are included. The third and fourth columns are the decomposition using
the Heckman model. The fifth and sixth columns are the decomposition using the whole
hurdle model with homoskedasticity. The last two columns are the decomposition using
the hurdle model with heteroskedasticity.
Comparing the model without zero income with the first hurdle model, we found that
the inclusion of zero income only slightly changed the Shapley value for each factor. In
total, IOR decreased over 1% in both years if considering zero-income individuals. This
slight decline might indicate that those who have advantages in circumstances might be
more likely to receive zero income.
Although the Heckman model and the Hurdle model have different assumptions on
labour participation, IOR from both models yields similar results. The results from
these two models show the robustness of the Shapley decomposition when zero income
observations are considered.
In terms of the contribution of each factor to total income inequality, gender and
geographic characteristics are two main sources. They together contribute more than
20% of total income inequality if assuming homoskedasticity. This figure increases to
more than 40% when the error is heteroskedastic. Parents’ socioeconomic status accounts
for around 5% to 7% for homoskedasticity and more than 9% for heteroskedasticity. This
effect of parents’ socioeconomic status on income might explain low income mobility
and low intergenerational mobility. For example, researchers find that as the Chinese
economy has developed rapidly in the last two decades, it became more difficult for those
in the bottom to climb the economic ladder but much easier for those on the top to stay
there (Chen and Cowell, 2015). This decrease in mobility might be related to the bigger
impact of parents’ socioeconomic status on children’s income. Researchers find that the
similarities in income, education and health between parents and children have increased
in the last two decades (See Qin et al., 2016 and Eriksson et al., 2014).
Sibling number and ethnicity makes up less than 5% of total income inequality for
homoskedasticity and around 5% to 8% for heteroskedasticity. Considering all factors, we
found that IORs were 29.35% in 2010 and 40.15% in 2012 for the linear regression model.
When we accounted for the samples with zero income, IORs reduced to 27.59% in 2010
and 37.97% in 2012. However, when we allowed for heteroskedasticity, IORs increased
to around 50% in both years. These measures identify the lower bound of inequality
of opportunity in China considering that our models do not capture some unobserved
circumstances.
The difference in IORs between homoskedasticity and heteroskedasticity implies that
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circumstances also largely affect income inequality indirectly through effort. Among
these differences in IORs, we found that around 4-5% of income inequality was due to
the indirect effect of gender, about 8% to 12% was due to geographic characteristics and
about 5% was due to parents’ SES. Comparing the results over two periods, we found that
the difference in IOR arose mainly from the geographic characteristics. The gap shrinks
when heteroskedasticity is taken into account, which is in line with what we found in the
results of MLE.
Table 3.7: The Shapley decomposition at the National Level
OLS Heckman Hurdle model 1 Hurdle model 2
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012
Gender 9.34 8.71 7.35 8.34 8.95 8.39 12.41 12.57
Ethnicity 0.74 1.28 0.68 1.21 0.68 1.16 1.12 1.39
Geographic 11.27 20.33 12.54 19.02 10.47 19.02 21.61 23.99
Parents’ SES 5.77 6.92 5.26 6.48 5.34 6.4 9.69 10.13
Sibling number 2.23 2.89 2.76 2.81 1.96 2.61 3.82 5.93
Income: +/0 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.38
IOE 70.65 59.85 71.41 62.15 72.41 62.03 51.19 45.62
IOR 29.35 40.15 28.59 37.85 27.59 37.97 48.81 54.38
1 OLS is the regression without zero-income. Heckman is the Heckman model. Hurdle model 1 is the regression
using the hurdle model with type homoskedasticity. Hurdle model 2 is the regression using the hurdle model
with type heteroskedasticity.
2 The ”Geographic” factor includes individuals’ Hukou status when they were 12 years old.
3 Parents’ SES is the parents’ socioeconomic status which include parents’ educational level, occupational status
and political affiliations.
4 Income: +/0 is the contribution of probability to have a positive income.
5 All values are presented in percentages.
6 IOE stands for the proportion of income inequality due to effort and IOR represents the proportion of income
inequality due to circumstances.
We also conducted sensitive analysis for the IOR measures shown in Table 3.7. The
results are presented in the Appendix (Tables 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17). In the sensitive
analysis, the first test changed the sibling number into a three-level variable: with no
sibling, 1 sibling, and with 2 or more siblings. The number of types was reduced to 585.
The second test dropped the types with less than 5 samples. The number of types was
dropped to 534. The last test dropped the types with less than 10 samples. The number
of types was further reduced to 296. The measures in the first two tests (Tables 3.15
and 3.16) are similar to our main results (Table 3.7). The measures slightly decreased
when types with fewer than 10 samples were dropped. These results from the sensitivity
analysis show that our main results in Table 3.7 are robust and not affected by the
reduction of samples and types.
Zhang and Eriksson (2010) measured IOR in nine provinces in China from 1989 to
2006 excluding individuals with no income. Their results in IOR ranged from 46% in 1989
to 63% in 2006. Their paper uses Gini coefficients without the Shapley decomposition
and treated the predicted income from the linear regression as inequality of opportunity.
Since Gini coefficients are not path independent, the results could be biased.
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Given that circumstances c is observable and effort e is unobserved, the relationship
between income inequality and circumstances can be modelled by y = cβ +  where 
is the residual. Let the predicted income be yˆ = cβˆ, IOR = I(yˆ)/I(y)15. Applying
the same method as Zhang and Eriksson (2010), we found that IOR is 37.18% in 2010
and 53.64% in 2012. The results are higher than those from our method. Therefore, the
method using Gini coefficients without Shapley decomposition could overstate IOR.
We further implemented Shapley decomposition on IOR computed from predicted
income to identify the contribution of each factor. The results are shown in Table 3.8. The
first two columns are the results using the Gini coefficients with Shapley decomposition
only on circumstances (the same as Zhang’s and Eriksson’s (2010) method) and the
last two are the results using the Gini coefficient with Shapley decomposition on both
circumstances and effort. It shows that almost all factors record higher contribution
under the former method.
Table 3.8: The Shapley Decomposition (Including or Excluding Effort)
Excluding Effort Including Effort
2010 2012 2010 2012
Gender 13.97 11.24 9.34 8.71
Ethnicity 0.98 1.75 0.74 1.28
Geographic 14.07 28.98 11.27 20.33
Parents’ SES 6.36 8.10 5.77 6.92
Sibling Number 1.8 3.58 2.23 2.89
IOR 37.18 53.64 29.35 40.15
1 In the first two columns, Shapley decomposition is used to decompose the counterfactual income distribution deter-
mined only by circumstances; while in the last two columns, Shapley decomposition is implemented to the observed
income assumed to be influenced by both circumstances and effort.
2 The “Geographic” factor includes individuals’ Hukou status when they were 12 years old.
3 Parents’ SES is the parents’ socioeconomic status which include parents’ educational level, occupational status and
political affiliations.
4 All values are presented in percentages, representing the contribution of the relative factor to total income inequality.
5 IOR represents the proportion of income inequality due to circumstances.
Given the same method, IOR reduces from 63% in 2006 as reported in Zhang and
Eriksson (2010) to around 50% in 2012 as reported in Table 3.8. In addition, Zhang and
Eriksson (2010) estimated the contributions of each circumstance to total income. They
found that parents’ socioeconomic status is the most important factor in circumstances
while our analysis shows that the most important factors are geographic characteristics
including whether living in a coastal province and Hukou status.
Comparing this study to studies in other countries, we found that IOR in China is
higher. If we only consider individuals with positive incomes and assume homoskedas-
ticity across type, IOR in China measured by a direct ex-ante approach (29.35% in 2010
and 40.15% in 2012) is higher than most of the Latin American countries (20.8% - 37.3%
15The same method can also be found in Manna and Regoli (2012); if using variances as the inequality
index, I(yˆ) is equal to the coefficient of determination R2 (Israeli, 2007).
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from Barros et al.’s (2009) study) and U.S. (around 20% in 2001 (Pistolesi, 2009)) with
the same approach.
These differences may be due to different empirical methods and data used in these
studies. For example,Pistolesi (2009) use ethnicity, birth region, parents education and
father’s occupation as circumstances variables. Paes de Barros et al. (2009) use gender,
race, parent’s occupation, parent’s education and birth region to identify circumstances.
Our study includes not only common variables like ethnicity, parent’s education and
occupation but also variables that are particularly relevant in the case of China such as
the Hukou status, an indicator of residency in a coastal province, an indicator of political
affiliations, and number of siblings. To some extent, the Hukou status and residency in
a coastal province are similar measures compared to birth region in other studies. We
found these variables contribute up to more that 1% of income inequality, which is much
higher than the contribution of birth region for other countries.
Using Shapley decomposition and accounting for heteroskedasticity, Bjo¨rklund et al.
(2012) reported IOR to be greater than 30% in Sweden while we found that IOR is
around 50% in China. Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) use parents’ income, parents’ education,
IQ, number of siblings, BMI and family structure as circumstances. They found that the
largest contribution of circumstances to inequality comes from IQ while our results show
that it comes from the Hukou status. If IQ also has a significant contribution to income
inequality in China, the IOR could be even higher.
The higher IOR in China might explain why Chinese respondents have the lowest
“feeling of procedural justice” in the ISSP survey. However, international comparison
should be conducted with caution because different studies use different methods.
3.6.3 Inequality of Opportunity at the Regional Level
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the measures of inequality of opportunity at the regional
level using the hurdle model assuming homoskedasticity across types in 2010 and 2012
respectively (the results of regressions are presented in the Appendix from Tables 3.18
to 3.25). We did not include the heteroskedastic model because, at the regional level,
most coefficients of the mean and variance from MLE were not significant. Since some
regions contain all coastal provinces and some contain all inland provinces, we removed
the “coastal province” dummy in the regressions.
In general, IOR varies from 19.77% to 28.36% in 2010 and from 26.55% to 33.91%
in 2012 across regions. These figures are smaller than those at the national level. It is
probably because regional disparity contributes to IOP at the national level. In particular,
IOR is the highest in the mid-north region in 2010 and in the south region in 2012, while
it is the lowest in the mid-south region in 2010 and in the west region in 2012. The
differences between the highest and the lowest are around 9% in 2010 and 7.5% in 2012,
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which indicates a regional disparity in inequality of opportunity in China.
In terms of the Shapley decomposition, gender, Hukou and parents’ socioeconomic
status are three main sources of income inequality for all regions. This result is in line
with that at the national level. However, the contributions of these three sources vary
across regions. In the metropolitan region, gender accounts for 8.42% in 2010 and 4.36%
in 2012 of total income inequality; while in the mid-north, it represents 13.28% in 2010
and 14.41% in 2012 of total income inequality. The difference between these two regions
is more than 5%.
The contributions of Hukou and parents’ SES also show huge difference across re-
gions. Hukou status contributes approximately 10.61% of income inequality in 2010 in
the northern west and around 11.33% in 2012; while it contributes only 1.02% to income
inequality in the east in 2010. This negligible contribution might be due to the smaller
rural-urban income gap in the east. In our dataset, the average income in the rural east
region is 14,470 yuan and the average urban income is 20,230 yuan; while in the northern
west the rural samples earn 7,344 yuan and the urban samples earn 21,800 on average.
In terms of parents’ SES, the south region is the highest for both years. It accounts for
more than 9% in both periods. The lowest contribution is in the north (2.75% in 2010
and 4.16% in 2012).
To conclude, we find that regional disparities exist not only in income inequality
but also in its sources. Rich regions like the metropolitan region have a lower level
of income inequality but higher IOR; while poor regions have a higher level of income
inequality but lower IOR. Specifically, gender, Hukou and parents’ socioeconomic status
are the three main sources of income inequality. Their contribution, measured by Shapley
decompositions, varies from region to region, which indicates large regional heterogeneity
in each source of income inequality.
3.6.4 Provincial Inequality and GRP per capita
We also estimated inequality of opportunity at the provincial level for 25 provinces in
the dataset. The IORs at the provincial level are computed using the Shapley decompo-
sition with the hurdle model. We assumed type homoskedasticity since the sample size
for each province is too small to cover all types.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the relationship between GRP per capita and inequality of
opportunity measured by IOL and IOR at the provincial level. The upper two graphs show
GRP per capita with the observed Gini coefficients and IOR respectively. Provinces with
higher GRP per capita clearly have lower Gini coefficients but higher IOR. To interpret
this difference, we graphed the level of inequality contributed by effort (EOL) alongside
the level of inequality contributed by circumstances (IOL) in the lower panel. The graph
shows that EOL has a negative relationship with GRP, dropping from around 50% when
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GRP per capita is lower than 20,000 Yuan to below 30% when GRP per capita is close to
100,000 Yuan if assuming type homoskedasticity, while IOL only increases slightly (from
20% to 22%).
To sum up, EOL clearly shows a decreasing trend; while IOL does not show a clear
trend. This finding is in contrast to Marrero and Rodriguez (2013), who found that in-
equality of opportunity is negatively related to growth and inequality of effort is positively
related.
The difference in the results might be due to the fact that our research focussed on
a developing country— China, while Marrero and Rodriguez (2013) studied a developed
country— the United States. At the early stages of development, an increase in effort
(e.g. decision for rural residents to move to urban areas to find jobs) might make a huge
difference in income, while at the later stage of development, the same amount of increase
in effort might make no difference (e.g. for rural migrants, urban jobs are not as easy to
find as 20 years ago.).
In summary, the results indicate that income inequality reduces from about 0.7 to
0.5 when GRP per capita rises from below 20,000 yuan to more than 90,000 Yuan. This
reduction seems mostly due to the decrease in EOL, which might imply that a poor
province has a more diverse distribution of effort or a bigger influence of effort on income
inequality.
Figure 3.2: Provincial Inequality and GRP per capita
1. GRP is the Gross Regional Product per capita.
2. IOR is the proportion of income inequality due to circumstances.
3. IOL stands for the level of income inequality due to circumstances.
4. EOL represents the level of income inequality due to effort.
5. Source: GRP is collected from the China statistical yearbook (NBS, 2013).
6. Observed Gini, IOL, EOL and IOR are based on authors’ calculation.
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3.6.5 The Role of Circumstances in Income Differential between Gender,
Ethnicity and Hukou Status
This section shows the role of circumstances in income differential between gender,
ethnicity and Hukou status respectively. We used Hukou status in one’s childhood because
it is determined by one’s parents’ Hukou status and beyond the individual’s control.
Firstly, we grouped the dataset by gender, ethnicity and Hukou status. The means
and standard deviations are listed in Table 3.11. Male’s individual income is around
60% more than female’s, while male’s household income per capita is almost the same as
female’s. Therefore, using household income per capita might fail to reveal inequality of
opportunity in gender.
Household income of the majority group is 27% more than that of the minority group
in 2010, and a similar gap is observed for individual income. This gap enlarges in 2012
to around 45%, which might imply that minority group benefits little from the growth
during 2010-2012.
Among gender, ethnicity and Hukou status, the income gap is the biggest for Hukou
status. Individual income of urban Hukou holders is around 93% more than their rural
counterparts in 2010. This gap increases to 156% in 2012. A similar gap is observed
for household income, which indicates that family members in most households have the
same Hukou status as each other.
Table 3.11: Income difference in gender, ethnicity and Hukou status
(1) (2) (3)
Female Male Majority Minority Rural Urban
HHincome(2010) 17614.7 17584.6 17898.7 14108.9 15367.7 30357.1
(26598.9) (27818.2) (27470.1) (23498.2) (23792.5) (39166.1)
HHincome(2012) 21294.3 21992.0 22175.8 15294.3 19280.7 35031.5
(25087.9) (28270.2) (27222.3) (17834.9) (23905.1) (35873.9)
INDincome(2010) 10755.7 17545.1 14289.3 10321.8 12278.1 23743.4
(23338.6) (32100.0) (28438.6) (22907.3) (24838.9) (40561.5)
INDincome(2012) 12483.2 20302.9 16644.3 10873.1 13117.5 33615.1
(20274.7) (37968.9) (31066.8) (17552.3) (26298.8) (42689.3)
1 HHincome is the household income per capita.
2 INDincome is the individual income per capita.
3 “Majority” and “Minority” indicate ethnicity.
4 “Rural” and “Urban” indicate Hukou status.
4 The values in parentheses are the standard deviations.
5 Source: CFPS and authors’ calculation.
To illustrate how circumstances contribute to the income differential shown in Table
3.11, we use Oaxaca decomposition and the results in 2012 are shown in Table 3.12. In
the table, “Advantage” represents the predicted income for the advantaged groups; while
“Disadvantage” represents the predicted income for the disadvantaged groups. According
to Table 3.11, we identify the group of male, urban Hukou holders and the major ethnic
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group (Han) as the advantage groups. We treat zero income observations as if they earn 1
yuan, transform income into log income and regress log income with other circumstances.
Based on the predicted income from the regressions, we decomposed the expected income
differential between groups into three components: endowments, coefficients and interac-
tion.
We found that almost all the income differential between gender comes from coeffi-
cients. Given the same circumstances, a male earns 83.6% more income than a female in
2012. However, the effort of endowments are close to 0 and not significant, which means
a male has no advantage in circumstances.
Income differential caused by circumstances between urban and rural Hukou hold-
ers are the largest among the three demographic variables. Urban Hukou holders earn
137.5% more income on average than their rural counterparts. Around 39% of this gap
can be explained by the difference in circumstances and 85% is related to the effect of
circumstances. In other words, rural Hukou holders could not only have disadvantage
in circumstances (lower parents’ SES, for example) but also earn less if they have the
same circumstance as their urban counterparts. This finding is consistent with Afridi
et al. (2015)’s experimental study on the impact of China’s Hukou system on individuals’
performance. They found that a rural Hukou reduced the academic performance of rural
migrant students compared to their local urban counterparts.
Income gap caused by circumstances can also be found between different ethnic groups.
Individuals in the major ethnic group earn 39.7% more income on average than other
minorities. Around 38.5% of this difference in income is due to the difference in circum-
stances, while around 77.6% is due to the effect of circumstances. This indicates that
individuals in the major ethnic group have advantage in circumstances and earn more
income even though they have the same circumstances as minorities.
Since the results in Table 3.12 include zero income observations, one source of income
differential could be from those zero income observations. In Table 3.13, we excluded zero
income observations and did the Oaxaca Decomposition again. We found that the income
gap becomes smaller (reduced by 20%) for gender but becomes larger for ethnicity (18%
increase) and Hukou status (20% increase). This result indicates that female, urban
Hukou holders and majority groups are more likely to choose not to work, which is
consistent with what we found in the analysis of labour participation.
We implemented the Oaxaca decomposition using the data in 2010. The results are
shown in Table 3.26 in the Appendix. Results are generally similar to those for 2012.
The only difference is that in 2010, income differential between rural and urban Hukou
holders was much lower than that in 2012.
In summary, we find that a male earns a higher income than a female given the same
circumstances but has no advantage in other circumstances. This gap is partially due
to the lower labour participation of females and partially due to the discrimination of
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Table 3.12: Oaxaca Decomposition by Gender, Hukou Status and Ethnicity(2012)
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Hukou Ethnicity
Disadvantage 7.772∗∗∗ 8.020∗∗∗ 7.801∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0240) (0.0733)
Advantage 8.618∗∗∗ 9.395∗∗∗ 8.198∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0763) (0.0244)
Difference -0.846∗∗∗ -1.375∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0799) (0.0773)
Endowments -0.0119 -0.538∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.00884) (0.0991) (0.0212)
Coefficients -0.836∗∗∗ -1.174∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(0.0451) (0.108) (0.0827)
Interaction 0.00185 0.337∗∗ 0.0640
(0.00743) (0.123) (0.0392)
Observations 13690 13690 13690
1 Advantage is the predicted income when the dummy variable listed in column is equal to 1.
2 Disadvantage is the predicted income when the dummy variable listed in column is equal to 0.
3 Standard errors in parentheses
4 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.13: Oaxaca Decomposition by Gender, Hukou Status and Ethnicity (2012 without
Zero Income Observations)
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Hukou Ethnicity
Disadvantage 8.466∗∗∗ 8.597∗∗∗ 8.219∗∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0151) (0.0520)
Advantage 9.088∗∗∗ 10.15∗∗∗ 8.810∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0314) (0.0150)
Difference -0.621∗∗∗ -1.556∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0349) (0.0541)
Endowments -0.0141 -0.319∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(0.00964) (0.0417) (0.0195)
Coefficients -0.608∗∗∗ -1.042∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗
(0.0268) (0.0584) (0.0568)
Interaction 0.000946 -0.195∗∗ 0.0464∗
(0.00511) (0.0629) (0.0270)
Observations 12760 12760 12760
1 Advantage is the predicted income when the dummy variable listed in column is equal to 1.
2 Disadvantage is the predicted income when the dummy variable listed in column is equal to 0.
3 Standard errors in parentheses
4 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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females in the labour market. However, for ethnicity and Hukou status, the disadvan-
tageous groups have even higher job participation, which indicates higher inequality of
opportunity between ethnic groups or different Hukou status for employed people than
is shown in Table 3.12.
3.7 Conclusion
In this essay, we used the data from the CFPS and computed IOR in 2010 and 2012
respectively. Taking advantage of the heterogeneity of regional development in China, we
grouped 25 provinces into 8 regions. At the national level, we found that IOR was around
30% in 2010 and 40% in 2012 if assuming homoskedasticity across types. This finding
suggests that inequality of opportunity in China is at least 30% of income inequality in
2010 and 40% in 2012 given the observed circumstances in our dataset. Higher than
the findings for most Latin American countries and U.S., this figure indicates a large
proportion of income inequality is due to circumstances beyond individuals’ control. IOR
increases to around 50% when heteroskedasticity is accounted for. This increase might
suggest the effect of circumstances on effort and an underestimated measure of IOP if
heteroskedasticity is neglected.
We also found evidence of relationships between regional development and inequality.
GRP, as a proxy for regional development, has a negative relationship with the observed
income inequality measured by Gini coefficients but a positive relationship with IOR.
More specifically, income inequality due to effort decreases when comparing the rich
regions to the poor while income inequality due to circumstances does not show a clear
pattern. As a result, the overall observed income inequality decreases with regional
development. This result suggests that different regions have a similar level of within-
region inequality of opportunity even though income inequality varies across region.
On the one hand, the results shed light on how income inequality is driven by cir-
cumstances and effort. On the other hand, the analysis highlights possible bias in the
conventional approaches to inequality of opportunity. Application of the Heckman model
and the hurdle model were attempts to correct the bias from the exclusion of the obser-
vations with zero income. These two models also demonstrate as to how circumstances
affect labour participation. Although IORs change little after including zero-income ob-
servations, a larger sample size helps improve the robustness and the representativeness
of the results.
MLE aims to correct another bias—type heteroskedasticity. Assuming a heteroskedas-
tic model and using MLE, we show the indirect contribution of each circumstance to
total income inequality. After taking account of type heteroskedasticity, IORs show a
consistency over the two periods than the results without type heteroskedasticity. This
consistency also suggests that some circumstances such as Hukou status contributed more
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indirectly to total income inequality in 2010 than that in 2012.
Applying these econometric techniques, we are able to relax the assumption of in-
dependence between circumstances and effort and measure the indirect effect of effort
on circumstances through the heteroskedastic model. Other advanced models such as
models for panel data can be applied in a future study when the data for additional years
become available in CFPS.
We are also aware of the different role circumstances play in income for different co-
horts. Noticeably, we find a huge income gap between rural and urban Hukou holders.
This income differential between urban and rural Hukou holders is largely due to circum-
stances. Rural Hukou holders initially have more disadvantages in circumstances than
their urban counterparts. They tend to earn much less income even though they have
the same circumstances as their urban counterparts except for Hukou status.
These sources of income differentials between rural and urban Hukou holders indicate
that living in a rural/urban area in one’s childhood could have a long-term effect on one’s
income. The disadvantage for rural Hukou holders has already existed in the previous
generation because their parents have a lower SES on average compared with their ur-
ban counterparts. Given that circumstances have a large influence on total income, the
disadvantage in lower parents’ SES might result in lower income and lower SES in the
next generation. For example, Eriksson and Zhang (2012) show a high level of income
similarity between siblings in China. Du et al. (2014) report high income similarity be-
tween parents and children. These studies show a low intergenerational mobility in China
which might help explain high inequality of opportunity found in this study.
In Chapter 5, we investigated further in the effect of Hukou status on educational
inequality.
Given the substantial income gap between rural and urban Hukou holders, future
studies can explore how Hukou status affects intergenerational mobility and inequality of
opportunity in the long run and whether the influence comes from living in a rural/urban
area or the Hukou system itself.
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3.8 Appendices
Table 3.14: Hurdle Model vs Heckman Model (2010)
Hurdle Model Heckman Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selection Level Selection Level
Male 0.030∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
Minority 0.001 −0.200∗∗∗ 0.035 -0.200∗∗∗
Urban Hukou at age 12 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗
Coastal Province at age 12 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
Mid education(Parents) 0.004 0.207∗∗∗ 0.028 0.195∗∗∗
High education(Parents) -0.001 0.219∗∗∗ 0.022 0.221∗∗∗
Mid occupation(Parents) 0.008 0.140∗∗∗ 0.056 0.128∗∗
High occupation(Parents) -0.008 0.143∗∗∗ 0.001 0.172∗∗∗
Member of CCP(Parents) 0.004 0.128∗∗∗ -0.001 0.113∗∗∗
Number of siblings 0.004∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.045∗∗∗
Married 0.057
Constant 10.339∗∗∗ 8.286∗∗∗ 1.411∗∗∗ 8.532∗∗∗
17176 15860 17176
-0.91∗∗∗
1.518∗∗∗
-1.381∗∗∗
1 ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
2 The coefficients of the selection equations are presented in marginal effect.
79
Table 3.15: The Measures of Inequality of Opportunity at the Na-
tional Level (2-level Sibling Number)
OLS Hurdle model 1 Hurdle model 2
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012
Gender 9.37 8.81 8.97 8.45 12.72 13.03
Ethnicity 0.75 1.30 0.69 1.18 1.18 1.49
Geographic 11.20 20.44 10.39 19.10 22.03 24.90
Parents’ SES 5.99 7.30 5.54 6.73 10.07 10.72
Sibling number 1.89 2.00 1.68 1.82 1.03 1.81
Income: +/0 0.21 0.46 0.20 0.45
IOE 70.79 60.16 72.52 62.26 52.76 47.60
IOR 29.21 39.84 27.48 37.74 47.24 52.40
1 OLS is the regression without zero-income. Hurdle model 1 is the regression using the
hurdle model with type homoskedasticity. Hurdle model 2 is the regression using the
hurdle model with type heteroskedasticity.
2 The ”Geographic” factor includes individuals’ Hukou status when they were 12 years old.
3 Parents’ SES is the parents’ socioeconomic status which include parents’ educational level,
occupational status and political affiliations.
4 Income: +/0 is the contribution of probability to have a positive income.
5 All values are presented in percentage.
6 IOE stands for the proportion of income inequality due to effort and IOR represents the
proportion of income inequality due to circumstances.
Table 3.16: The Measures of Inequality of Opportunity at the Na-
tional Level (Dropping Types with less than 5 Samples)
OLS Hurdle model 1 Hurdle model 2
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012
Gender 9.75 9.16 9.34 8.83 12.67 12.88
Ethnicity 0.63 1.23 0.58 1.11 0.94 1.26
Geographic 10.74 18.69 9.99 17.46 20.97 23.32
Parents’ SES 5.73 6.89 5.32 6.38 9.67 10.04
Sibling number 2.35 3.14 2.08 2.84 3.84 6.04
Income: +/0 0.20 0.42 0.16 0.42
IOE 70.81 60.89 72.49 62.95 51.74 46.05
IOR 29.19 39.11 27.51 37.05 48.26 53.95
1 OLS is the regression without zero-income. Hurdle model 1 is the regression using the
hurdle model with type homoskedasticity. Hurdle model 2 is the regression using the
hurdle model with type heteroskedasticity.
2 The ”Geographic” factor includes individuals’ Hukou status when they were 12 years old.
3 Parents’ SES is the parents’ socioeconomic status which include parents’ educational level,
occupational status and political affiliations.
4 Income: +/0 is the contribution of probability to have a positive income.
5 All values are presented in percentages.
6 IOE stands for the proportion of income inequality due to effort and IOR represents the
proportion of income inequality due to circumstances.
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Table 3.17: The Measures of Inequality of Opportunity at the Na-
tional Level (Dropping Types with less than 10 Samples)
OLS Hurdle model 1 Hurdle model 2
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012
Gender 10.18 10.14 9.78 9.78 12.98 13.47
Ethnicity 0.38 0.98 0.34 0.88 0.89 1.16
Geographic 9.78 16.82 9.11 15.68 19.87 21.93
Parents’ SES 5.55 6.54 5.17 6.07 9.14 9.26
Sibling number 2.04 3.10 1.79 2.80 3.89 6.15
Income: +/0 0.27 0.52 0.22 0.52
IOE 72.08 62.41 73.54 64.27 52.99 47.52
IOR 27.92 37.59 26.46 35.73 47.01 52.48
1 OLS is the regression without zero-income. Hurdle model 1 is the regression using the
hurdle model with type homoskedasticity. Hurdle model 2 is the regression using the
hurdle model with type heteroskedasticity.
2 The ”Geographic” factor includes individuals’ Hukou status when they were 12 years old.
3 Parents’ SES is the parents’ socioeconomic status which include parents’ educational level,
occupational status and political affiliations.
4 Income: +/0 is the contribution of probability to have a positive income.
5 All values are presented in percentages.
6 IOE stands for the proportion of income inequality due to effort and IOR represents the
proportion of income inequality due to circumstances.
Table 3.18: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (Metropolitan)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 1.574∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 1.316 0.236∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.064) (0.201) (0.060)
Minority 0.870 −0.215 286,301.700 0.038
(1.073) (0.377) (426.746) (0.337)
Hukou at age 12 1.153 0.308∗∗∗ 2.911∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.070) (0.251) (0.065)
Mid education(Parents) 1.379 0.188∗∗ 0.723 0.310∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.079) (0.237) (0.075)
High education(Parents) 0.737 0.505∗∗∗ 0.667 0.321∗∗∗
(0.288) (0.098) (0.300) (0.092)
Mid occupation(Parents) 0.963 −0.035 1.214 0.145∗
(0.255) (0.082) (0.272) (0.076)
High occupation(Parents) 0.909 0.068 1.447 0.120
(0.327) (0.104) (0.360) (0.097)
Member of CCP(Parents) 1.657∗ 0.162∗ 1.015 0.028
(0.291) (0.084) (0.277) (0.078)
Number of siblings 1.102 −0.046∗∗ 0.873∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.019) (0.056) (0.018)
Constant 7.080∗∗∗ 9.383∗∗∗ 11.928∗∗∗ 9.815∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.092) (0.275) (0.086)
Observations 1,484 1,373 1,484 1,370
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.19: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (Mid-North)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 2.324∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 2.318∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.067) (0.206) (0.075)
Minority 0.876 −1.144∗∗∗ 2.970∗ −0.632∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.140) (0.596) (0.152)
Hukou at age 12 0.541 0.815∗∗∗ 0.522∗ 1.162∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.171) (0.378) (0.193)
Mid education(Parents) 0.956 0.366∗∗∗ 1.213 0.332∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.078) (0.220) (0.087)
High education(Parents) 1.067 0.403∗∗∗ 1.184 0.588∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.102) (0.283) (0.115)
Mid occupation(Parents) 1.692 0.019 0.668 0.347∗∗
(0.363) (0.119) (0.296) (0.136)
High occupation(Parents) 3.216∗∗ 0.056 1.833 0.042
(0.541) (0.141) (0.492) (0.158)
Member of CCP(Parents) 0.850 0.187∗∗ 1.258 0.155
(0.256) (0.095) (0.284) (0.105)
Number of siblings 1.081 0.021 1.138∗∗ 0.007
(0.055) (0.020) (0.058) (0.022)
Constant 7.364∗∗∗ 7.851∗∗∗ 6.077∗∗∗ 7.666∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.100) (0.263) (0.113)
Observations 1,881 1,745 1,881 1,755
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.20: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (North)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 1.450∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 1.954∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.055) (0.145) (0.054)
Minority 1.198 0.156∗ 1.111 −0.079
(0.230) (0.095) (0.246) (0.094)
Hukou at age 12 0.677∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.973 0.820∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.067) (0.160) (0.064)
Mid education(Parents) 0.843 −0.030 0.759∗ 0.121∗
(0.150) (0.065) (0.167) (0.063)
High education(Parents) 0.868 0.057 0.889 0.034
(0.192) (0.086) (0.217) (0.084)
Mid occupation(Parents) 1.015 0.161∗ 0.716∗ 0.149∗
(0.178) (0.084) (0.192) (0.082)
High occupation(Parents) 0.952 0.123 0.764 0.276∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.101) (0.244) (0.098)
Member of CCP(Parents) 0.926 0.084 1.507∗∗ 0.032
(0.160) (0.075) (0.196) (0.073)
Number of siblings 1.072∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ 1.019 −0.029∗∗
(0.033) (0.014) (0.035) (0.014)
Constant 6.837∗∗∗ 8.818∗∗∗ 8.656∗∗∗ 8.675∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.082) (0.204) (0.080)
Observations 2,675 2,367 2,675 2,433
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.21: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (East)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 1.292 0.657∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.075) (0.161) (0.085)
Minority 695,723.500 −0.193 911,550.300 0.427
(482.469) (0.487) (480.666) (0.554)
Hukou at age 12 0.597 0.343∗ 0.533∗ 1.084∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.186) (0.328) (0.213)
Mid education(Parents) 1.304 0.567∗∗∗ 0.785 0.402∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.085) (0.179) (0.097)
High education(Parents) 1.007 0.271∗∗ 1.002 0.373∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.120) (0.259) (0.135)
Mid occupation(Parents) 1.232 0.088 1.249 −0.170
(0.301) (0.130) (0.280) (0.149)
High occupation(Parents) 1.080 0.333∗∗ 1.490 0.082
(0.307) (0.142) (0.315) (0.161)
Member of CCP(Parents) 1.074 −0.041 0.751 0.226∗
(0.233) (0.104) (0.208) (0.121)
Number of siblings 1.071 −0.042∗∗ 0.950 −0.066∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.020) (0.041) (0.023)
Constant 5.725∗∗∗ 8.459∗∗∗ 9.438∗∗∗ 8.331∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.101) (0.214) (0.114)
Observations 1,704 1,531 1,704 1,520
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
84
Table 3.22: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (Mid-South)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 1.662∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.051) (0.174) (0.056)
Minority 1.623 −1.164∗∗∗ 0.711 −0.999∗∗∗
(0.728) (0.194) (0.536) (0.217)
Hukou at age 12 1.099 0.269∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.087) (0.227) (0.097)
Mid education(Parents) 0.827 0.074 0.742 0.169∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.059) (0.202) (0.065)
High education(Parents) 0.768 0.222∗∗∗ 0.814 0.196∗∗
(0.230) (0.076) (0.250) (0.083)
Mid occupation(Parents) 1.151 0.134 0.952 0.302∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.084) (0.256) (0.091)
High occupation(Parents) 0.776 −0.092 0.648 0.204∗
(0.271) (0.097) (0.265) (0.107)
Member of CCP(Parents) 1.000 0.188∗∗ 0.960 0.215∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.074) (0.226) (0.082)
Number of siblings 1.057 −0.046∗∗∗ 1.044 −0.059∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.015) (0.051) (0.016)
Constant 11.820∗∗∗ 8.486∗∗∗ 16.784∗∗∗ 8.341∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.074) (0.246) (0.080)
Observations 2,791 2,618 2,791 2,634
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.23: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (South)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 1.729∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 1.510∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.069) (0.127) (0.078)
Minority 5.034∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 1.437 0.020
(0.720) (0.157) (0.342) (0.179)
Hukou at age 12 0.522∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 1.175 1.151∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.112) (0.203) (0.123)
Mid education(Parents) 1.635∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 1.569∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.080) (0.142) (0.090)
High education(Parents) 1.501∗ 0.205∗∗ 1.539∗∗ 0.136
(0.210) (0.099) (0.178) (0.111)
Mid occupation(Parents) 1.555∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.878 0.302∗∗
(0.267) (0.110) (0.205) (0.124)
High occupation(Parents) 0.616∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.133) (0.212) (0.152)
Member of CCP(Parents) 1.332 0.281∗∗∗ 1.654∗∗ 0.081
(0.237) (0.104) (0.210) (0.117)
Number of siblings 1.003 0.003 1.041 −0.058∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.019) (0.034) (0.021)
Constant 5.940∗∗∗ 8.045∗∗∗ 3.484∗∗∗ 8.270∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.100) (0.170) (0.113)
Observations 2,223 2,013 2,223 1,914
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
86
Table 3.24: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (West)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 1.264 0.440∗∗∗ 1.429∗ 0.548∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.060) (0.202) (0.071)
Minority 1.054 −0.133∗∗ 1.319 −0.246∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.064) (0.227) (0.075)
Hukou at age 12 0.629 0.832∗∗∗ 0.589 1.209∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.144) (0.349) (0.172)
Mid education(Parents) 1.414∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.760 0.281∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.068) (0.225) (0.080)
High education(Parents) 1.152 0.085 0.743 0.204∗
(0.269) (0.097) (0.297) (0.114)
Mid occupation(Parents) 0.640 −0.051 0.673 0.199
(0.310) (0.118) (0.327) (0.141)
High occupation(Parents) 0.602 −0.061 0.811 −0.132
(0.384) (0.152) (0.428) (0.179)
Member of CCP(Parents) 1.473 0.170∗ 1.129 0.138
(0.297) (0.094) (0.305) (0.113)
Number of siblings 1.069 0.019 1.135∗∗ −0.028
(0.047) (0.016) (0.056) (0.019)
Constant 9.014∗∗∗ 8.220∗∗∗ 12.346∗∗∗ 8.076∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.077) (0.243) (0.090)
Observations 2,084 1,939 2,084 1,973
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.25: The Hurdle Model at the Regional Level (Northern West)
2010 2012
logistic OLS logistic OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 1.287 0.487∗∗∗ 2.260∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.052) (0.216) (0.058)
Minority 0.228∗∗∗ −0.281∗ 0.390∗∗ −0.941∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.165) (0.425) (0.180)
Hukou at age 12 0.395∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.141 1.551∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.112) (0.399) (0.121)
Mid education(Parents) 0.823 0.158∗∗∗ 0.896 0.260∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.059) (0.226) (0.065)
High education(Parents) 1.069 0.170∗ 0.649 0.238∗∗
(0.457) (0.089) (0.305) (0.099)
Mid occupation(Parents) 1.098 −0.055 0.863 0.080
(0.495) (0.107) (0.359) (0.119)
High occupation(Parents) 1.092 −0.057 1.209 0.041
(0.542) (0.122) (0.440) (0.135)
Member of CCP(Parents) 0.658 0.124∗ 0.724 0.094
(0.347) (0.075) (0.259) (0.084)
Number of siblings 1.305∗∗∗ −0.015 0.990 0.002
(0.084) (0.014) (0.053) (0.016)
Constant 23.022∗∗∗ 8.122∗∗∗ 18.405∗∗∗ 7.887∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.068) (0.252) (0.074)
Observations 2,334 2,274 2,334 2,222
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.26: Oaxaca Decomposition by Gender, Hukou Status and Ethnicity(2010)
(1) (2) (3)
Gender Hukou Ethnicity
Differential
Disadvantage 7.845∗∗∗ 8.133∗∗∗ 7.917∗∗∗
(0.0317) (0.0231) (0.0758)
Advantage 8.605∗∗∗ 8.753∗∗∗ 8.223∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0822) (0.0235)
Difference -0.760∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗
(0.0442) (0.0854) (0.0793)
Decomposition
Endowments -0.00358 -0.463∗∗∗ -0.0859∗∗∗
(0.00656) (0.107) (0.0177)
Coefficients -0.762∗∗∗ -0.474∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗
(0.0442) (0.110) (0.0859)
Interaction 0.00515 0.316∗∗ 0.0379
(0.00696) (0.128) (0.0392)
Observations 13690 13690 13690
1 Advantage is the predicted income when the dummy variable listed in column is equal to 1.
2 Disadvantage is the predicted income when the dummy variable listed in column is equal to 0.
3 Standard errors in parentheses
4 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 4
Essay II: Measuring Inequality of Opportu-
nity in China using A Finite Mixture Model
4.1 Introduction
In the last two decades inequality of opportunity (Cohen, 1989, Arneson, 1989 and
Roemer, 1998) has frequently been studied both theoretically and empirically in eco-
nomics. Roemer (1998) proposed a framework to measure inequality of opportunity. He
argued that inequality of outcome (such as income, health and educational equality) due
to factors beyond individuals’ responsibility (“circumstances”) is unfair while inequality
due to factors within individuals’ responsibility (“effort”) is acceptable (Roemer, 1998).
Based on Roemer’s framework, equal opportunity requires two basic principles: the com-
pensation principle and the reward principle (Fleurbaey, 2008). The former demands
that inequality due to circumstances should be compensated and the latter states that
inequality due to effort should be fully respected and rewarded.
Applying these two principles, researchers have measured inequality of opportunity
in different countries (see recent surveys such as Roemer and Trannoy, 2015; Peragine
and Ferreira, 2015; and Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016). One can easily measure the
contribution of circumstances to inequality of outcome if both circumstances and effort
can be observed. However, data imperfections restrict researchers from observing all
variables regarded as circumstances or effort. Data on circumstances such as gender,
ethnicity and family background might be easy to access, but the list of circumstances
could never be exhaustive. These unobserved circumstances can lead to a downward bias
on measures of inequality of opportunity (Lara Ibarra and Martinez Cruz, 2015).
Effort variables are even more likely to be affected by lack of data. Effort related to
individuals’ preferences and choices are difficult to observe. With the absence of effort,
one can only measure inequality of opportunity before knowing effort, i.e. using the
ex-ante compensation principle. Measures relying on the information of effort, i.e. the
ex-post compensation principle, cannot be used (Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2013).
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To solve this problem, Roemer (1998) assumed that quantiles of income distribution
conditional on circumstances represent the degree of effort. Although this assumption
provides an effective way to identify the degree of effort, it could lead to biased results if
circumstances and effort are not independent of each other.
In terms of the correlation between circumstances and effort, researchers agree that
effort variables could be shaped by circumstances; however, they use different approaches
to accounting for this correlation due to their different views in terms of what people
should be responsible for. Roemer (1993, 1998) argued that individuals should be re-
sponsible for factors within their control (this view is known as the control view). Based
on his view, preferences and tastes related to family backgrounds should also be consid-
ered as circumstances because these factors are out of individual control. If effort can
be observed, one can measure the indirect effect of circumstances on income through
effort as part of inequality of opportunity (Bourguignon et al., 2007). If effort cannot
be observed, one can take account of different variances from the distribution of effort
conditional on circumstances (Bjo¨rklund et al., 2012).
In contrast with Roemer’s view, Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981a,1981b,) and Fleurbaey
(2008) considered individual responsibilities as their preferences and choices (known as the
preference view). Based on this preference view, Barry (2005) argued that preferences and
tastes shaped by family backgrounds should be respected. Jusot et al. (2013) compared
different views on the correlation between circumstances and effort and found that the
correlation makes little difference to the measure of inequality of opportunity in terms of
health inequality.
In this study, we propose an alternative model — a latent class model, in which each
class corresponds to an unobserved level of effort. It can also be interpreted as a finite
mixture model defined as a probability-weighted mixture of distributions. The finite
mixture model (FMM) is used to estimate the average income in each level conditional
on circumstances. More importantly, this model allows the effect of circumstances on
income to be different across levels of effort. This heterogeneous effect of circumstances
indicates that the unfair inequality represented by the contribution of circumstances to
income inequality could vary with the level of individual effort. Low individual effort
such as choosing not to participate in the labour force could substantially decrease the
effect of circumstances on income. As a result, neglecting this individual effort could lead
to a biased estimate of inequality of opportunity.
However, the latent class in FMM could also correspond to unobserved circumstances
(Donni et al., 2015). To address this issue, we proposed and implemented a finite mixture
model with varying probabilities (FMMV) —a generalised version of the finite mixture
model where the classification is assumed to be determined by either circumstances or
effort. A circumstance-determined latent class captures unobserved circumstances or
effort correlated with circumstances, while an effort-determined latent class captures un-
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observed effort that is independent of circumstances. Comparing the results between
FMMV and FMM, we can have a better understanding on whether the latent class in
FMM corresponds to unobserved circumstances or effort.
In addition, we can obtain not only ex-ante but also ex-post measures to examine
inequality of opportunity using FMM. Theoretically, inequality of opportunity can be
measured by two different approaches — ex-ante and ex-post approaches: the former
approach requiring effort to be observed and the latter allowing effort to be latent. Ap-
plying the finite mixture model, we can measure inequality of opportunity using both
approaches even without the observation of effort.
Latent class models have been widely applied in both microeconomics and macroe-
conomics to handle inter-individual or time heterogeneity with different types of data
such as time-series (Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter, 2006), cross-section (Deb and Trivedi, 1997)
and panel data (Deb and Trivedi, 2013). The advantage of this model is that it specifies
data as a mixture of distributions so it has greater flexibility compared with other fully
parametric models such as a linear regression model.
In addition, a conventional model naturally assumes that the effects of circumstances
on income are homogeneous. However, in reality, this might not be the case. A low-
income individual, having deliberately chosen a low level of effort (e.g. short working
hours), might not feel the disadvantage from his/her circumstances. A more common
complaint on inequality of opportunity could be from one with a high level of effort but
low income due to his/her disadvantageous profiles. This raises an important question
about whether those with high effort may also be exposed to a higher inequality of
opportunity.
This question might be addressed by using a finite mixture model. Since income
distribution is parameterized in each component, a counterfactual income distribution
can be estimated for each level of effort so that inequality of opportunity can be measured
by comparing counterfactuals.
Our results showed a better performance in terms of the information criteria and
goodness of fit when using a finite mixture model rather than a conventional linear
regression model. We found evidence of heterogeneous effects of circumstances on income
across effort levels. In other words, sources of income inequality for each effort level are
different. Inequality of opportunity could be significantly underestimated when ignoring
this heterogeneous effect. FMM shows results similar to those obtained with FMMV
assuming an effort-determined latent class, which implies that the latent class in FMM
captures factors associated with individual effort even though effort is assumed to be
unobserved. Moreover, through examining the counterfactual income distribution for
each level of effort, we found that inequality of opportunity is the highest if everyone
exerts a middle level of effort.
The rest of this article is organised into the following sections. In section 4.2 we briefly
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review the literature on conventional approaches to measuring inequality of opportunity.
Section 4.3 introduces model specifications and econometric methodologies. Section 4.4
describes the data used in this study, while section 4.5 presents our results. Section 4.6
draws conclusions and discusses their implications.
4.2 The Conventional Approach to Measuring Inequality of Op-
portunity
To measure inequality of opportunity, one can assume a population N with two sets
of individual characteristics: a vector of circumstances c and a vector of efforts e. As
a working definition, circumstances and efforts are sets of variables with finite values.
In other words, circumstances c belong to a finite set Ω = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and efforts
e belong to a finite set Θ = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. Most of the literature defines a group of
individuals with the same circumstances as a type and a group of individuals with the
same effort as a tranche. Hence, there are n types and m tranches.
Assume that an individual’s income y is generated by circumstances, efforts and a
random term  (assumed to be independently and identically distributed) by a function
g : Ω × Θ 7→ R. The function g(·) is treated as a linear function in most empirical
researches. Given that  is additively separable in the g function, we can express the data
generation process in the following equation.
y = g(c, e) +  (4.1)
where E(|c, e) = 0.
Based on this equation, one can compute expected outcome:
E(y|c, e) = g(c, e) (4.2)
Two approaches are commonly applied to measure inequality of opportunity: the
ex-post and ex-ante approaches. The ex-post approach eliminates between-tranche in-
equality — the inequality of a counterfactual distribution in which each individual’s
outcome is replaced by the expected outcome given one’s effort (Checchi and Peragine,
2010). In contrast, the ex-ante IOP measures between-type inequality — the inequality
of a counterfactual distribution where individual’s outcome is replaced by the expected
outcome given one’s circumstances (See Van De Gaer, 1993 and Checchi and Peragine,
2010).
Using the ex-ante approach, one can measure inequality of opportunity by a distribu-
tion of expected outcome conditional on circumstances E(y|c):
IOPante = I(E(y|c)) (4.3)
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where I(·) is an inequality index such as Gini coefficient, Theil index or the mean log
deviation (MLD).
Using the ex-post approach, inequality of opportunity can be measured by a standard-
ised distribution of expected outcome where the difference between tranches is eliminated:
IOPpost = I[
y ∗ µ¯
E(y|e) ] (4.4)
where µ¯ = 1
N
∑
i∈N yi is the mean of expected outcome y, and E(y|e) is the expected
income given efforts e. Therefore, y
E(y|e) is an element-wise rescaling for each individual’s
income.
One can also measure inequality of opportunity relative to the observed inequality:
IOR =
IOP
I(y)
(4.5)
This measure shows the proportion of income inequality due to inequality of oppor-
tunity.
The difference between the ex-ante and ex-post approach is that the ex-post ap-
proach requires information on effort while the ex-ante approach can measure inequality
of opportunity without knowing effort. This difference makes the ex-post approach more
data-demanding.
If effort is observed, one can also use a measure named direct unfairness proposed
by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009). In this measure, a reference value for effort e˜ is
chosen. Hence, the measure of inequality of opportunity represents the inequality of a
counterfactual distribution if every individual exerts the reference level of effort e˜, and
IOPDU = I(E(y|c, e˜)) (4.6)
Due to the difficulty in observing effort, most literature used the ex-ante approach.
Therefore, a common practice of measuring inequality of opportunity in terms of income
inequality is based on the following linear regression (Ferreira et al., 2011):
yi = x
′
iβ +  (4.7)
where yi is individual income, xi is a set of observed individual circumstances and 
is the error term. In this model, one treats the error term as the contribution of effort to
income.
Once the parameters β are identified, the level of inequality of opportunity can be
measured using the following equation (Ferreira et al., 2011).
IOP olsante = I(E(y|x)) = I(xi′βˆ) (4.8)
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where βˆ is the estimator of β.
However, this model relies on the following four assumptions.
Assumption 4.2.1 Circumstances x have a linear relationship with income y 1
A non-linear relationship between circumstances and income could violate this as-
sumption. Hufe and Peichl (2015) found that the measure of inequality of opportunity
increases by 11% after considering the non-linearity between circumstances and income.
In this study, we add some interaction terms to capture possible non-linearity between
circumstances and income.
Assumption 4.2.2 Observed circumstances x and unobserved effort included in the
residual  should be independent of each other.
This assumption could be an issue because effort is likely to be shaped by circum-
stances. This raises the question of whether the indirect effect of circumstances on indi-
vidual income through effort should be included in the measure of inequality of opportu-
nity. Scholars have different views on this question. Roemer (1998) argued that the part
of effort determined by circumstances should also be considered as circumstances and
compensated; while Barry (2005) believed that this part of effort should be rewarded.
Another view, that of Swift (2005) emphasizes the autonomy of a family. He argued that
interactions within families should be respected. If some parts of effort are determined
by family-related circumstances such as family backgrounds, that part of circumstances
should be respected and rewarded. Jusot et al. (2013) compared the contribution of cir-
cumstances and effort to health inequality based on these three different views and found
little difference in the contributions of circumstances and effort.
Assumption 4.2.3 No unobserved circumstances exist in the model.
In Equation (4.7), x is unlikely to capture all circumstances. The contribution of un-
observed circumstances could be included in the residual and treated as the contribution
of effort. Hence, the measure of inequality of opportunity could be downwardly biased.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, Lara Ibarra and Martinez Cruz (2015) found that the
omission of a relevant circumstance can cause up to an 80 percent underestimation on
inequality of opportunity.
Assumption 4.2.4 The error term  should be homoskedastic, i.e. V ar(|x) = σ2
A heteroskedastic error term could indicate heterogeneity in type-specific effort distri-
bution or heterogeneity in the effect of circumstances on individual income. Bjo¨rklund
1Income could also be log-normally distributed. In this case, y represents log income and circum-
stances could have a linear relationship to log income.
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et al. (2012) found that the heterogeneous type-specific variance is an important source of
inequality of opportunity. Waltenberg and Vandenberghe (2007) captured the heteroge-
neous effect of circumstances on individual income using a conditional quantile regression
model.
4.3 Measuring Inequality of Opportunity: A Latent-Class ap-
proach
4.3.1 Model Specification and Assumptions
Assume there are N individuals where N = {1, . . . , N} represents the set of popula-
tion. Due to the difficulty of observing effort, we assume a vector of circumstances c and
define effort as a categorical variable with m finite values. Let Ω denote the finite set
of circumstances and let J = {1, . . . ,m} represent the finite levels of effort. By working
definition, circumstances c are exogenous and time-invariant variables. Level of effort
could be time-variant and influenced by circumstances2.
We further assume a vector of probability to exert each level of effort. Given that j
is a level of effort such that j ∈ J , for all j ∈ J , piji represents individual i’s probability
to exert j level of effort.
One can generate income yj given a level of effort j for all j ∈ J by the function
gj : Ω 7→ R+:
yj = gj(x) + j (4.9)
where yj represents income received if exerting j level of effort. Since function gj varies
across j, the effect of circumstances on income is heterogeneous across levels of effort.
Therefore, we assume the homoskedasticity of j instead of  in Assumption 4.2.4.
Assumption 4.3.1 The error term j should be homoskedastic, i.e. V ar(j|x) = σj2 for
all j ∈ J .
One can compute the expected value of yj using the following equation.
E(yj) = gj(x) (4.10)
For the convenience of interpretation and comparison, we restrict the label of effort in an
increasing order so that a bigger index represents a higher level of effort.
Assumption 4.3.2 For all j, l ∈ J , j > l (or j < l) indicates that j (or l) is a higher
level of effort than l (or j).
2Since we use a cross-sectional model in this chapter, we specify this model with no regard to time.
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Therefore, if two individuals possess the same circumstances, higher effort should result
in higher income, and vice versa:
Assumption 4.3.3 For all i, k ∈ N and i 6= k, given xi = xk, yli > yjk ⇔ l > j for
l, j ∈ J .
Suppose yji is individual i’s income given j level of effort and pi
j
i is the probability
that individual i exerts j level of effort; for any individual i ∈ N , one can compute an
individual’s expected income given circumstances:
E(yi|x) =
∑
j∈J
pijiE(y
j|x) (4.11)
Similarly to the conventional approach, one can measure inequality of opportunity
using the ex-ante, the ex-post or the direct-unfairness approach.
Derived from Equation 4.3, inequality of opportunity using the ex-ante approach is:
IOPante = I(E(y|x) = I{
∑
j∈J
pijE(yj|x)} (4.12)
where E(y|x) is the vector of expected incomes given circumstances.
Based on Equation 4.6, inequality of opportunity using the direct-unfairness approach
is that for any j ∈ J , we set pij = 1 and pil = 0 for all l 6= j ∈ J :
IOP jDU = I{E(yj|x)} (4.13)
This measure examines the level of inequality of opportunity given that every indi-
vidual exerts j level of effort.
Although effort cannot be observed, one can estimate individuals’ level of effort based
on the probabilities pi. Individuals are more likely to be exert j level of effort if piji > pi
l
i
for all l 6= j, l ∈ J . We define that j˜i = arg maxj∈J piji is a classification variable which
identifies the level of effort each individual exerts. This classification variable can partition
individual income based on levels of effort. If the latent class captures all variations of
income due to effort, i.e. the within class variation is only due to circumstances, the latent
class can represent the tranche defined in the conventional approach. Alternatively, we
define the latent class as “effort group”.
Whether or not a latent class represents a tranche, the ex-post measure can be used
to eliminate the between-class inequality.
Defining that individuals exerting j level of effort are in the set N j = {1, . . . , N j}, we
can measure the ex-post inequality of opportunity using:
IOPpost = I[
yµ
y˜
] (4.14)
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where IOPpost is ex-post inequality of opportunity, µ is the mean of y, y˜ is the counter-
factual income distribution replacing each individual income by the mean income of the
given identified class.
Decomposition approaches can also be used to measure the ex-post inequality of
opportunity. Since the latent class partitions data into several effort groups, one can
make use of the entropy index to decompose overall income inequality into within-group
and between-group inequality.
For the Theil index, the overall income inequality can be decomposed using the fol-
lowing equation:
T = Tw + Tb =
∑
j∈J
sjTj +
∑
j∈J
sj ln
µj
µ
(4.15)
where T is the Theil index for overall income inequality, Tw and Tb are within-class
Theil index and between-class Theil index respectively, sj is the income share of class j,
µj is the average income of class j and µ is the average income for the entire population.
If the latent class represents the effort group, the between-class inequality measured
by Tb should represent inequality due to effort. The within-class inequality Tw captures
inequality due to circumstances and inequality due to variation in effort within each
effort group. Therefore, Tw indicates the upper-bound of inequality of opportunity. It
gets closer to the real inequality of opportunity when the latent class captures more
variation in effort.
Similarly, Mean Log Deviation (MLD) can also be used in the decomposition of income
inequality:
LT = Lw + Lb =
∑
j∈J
rjLj +
∑
j∈J
rj ln
µ
µj
(4.16)
where L is the MLD index for overall income inequality, Lw and Lb are within-class MLD
index and between-class MLD index respectively, and rj is the population share of class
j.
4.3.2 The Finite Mixture Model
To estimate gj and piji in Equation (4.11) , we used the finite mixture model (the
latent class model3). We assumed that effort is a latent variable h with m finite values
and each i has the probability piji on each class j so the average probability for being in
class j is pij. If a sample is large enough, pij can also represent the population proportions
of class j.
Formally, individual income is determined by circumstances x and class j:
3We used the finite mixture model (FMM) and the latent class model (LCM) interchangeably: the
number of mixture components is equal to the number of latent classes
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yji = x
′
iβ
j + ji (4.17)
yi ∼
∑
pijiN (µj, σ2j ) (4.18)
For piji , we first identified the mean of pi
j
i — pi
j where pij = E[piji ] =
1
N
∑N
i=1 pi
j
i ,
∑
pij = 1
and 1 > pij > 0. Let θj = (βj, σ
2
j , pij) be the parameters of the model. To be consistent
with Assumptions 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, we defined the order of the components as µj−1 < µj <
µj+1.
Given each j ∈ J , the distribution of income conditional on x and j can be represented
by fj(y|x; θj) where θj = (µj, σj) is the vector of parameters from the normal distribution
of tranche j with the class-specific mean µj = xiβj and variance σ
2
j . Therefore, the overall
distribution of income f(y|x) given x is the weighted sum:
f(y|x) =
m∑
j=1
pijfj(y|x; θj) (4.19)
Instead of satisfying Assumption 4.2.1 to Assumption 4.2.4 in the conventional model,
this model can relax Assumptions 4.2.1 and 4.2.4 so it should satisfy Assumption 4.2.2,
4.2.3, 4.3.1,4.3.2 and 4.3.3.
To compute the conditional expectation of individual income using Equation (4.11),
the probabilities piji should also be estimated. To estimate pi
j
i , we used the posterior
probability of being in class j:
piji = Pr(i ∈ j|θ, yi) =
pijfj(yi|xi, θj)∑
j∈J pi
jfj(yi|xi, θj) , ∀j ∈ J (4.20)
In this equation, a higher prior probability could result in a higher posterior prob-
ability, and the posterior probability of class j also depends on the expected income in
that class. Higher expected income in one class indicates higher probabilities for individ-
uals of being in that class. This effect of expected income on individual’s probabilities
is consistent with what we assumed in Assumption 4.3.3, namely that a higher income
indicates a higher level of effort.
Therefore, the conditional expectation of individual income is a weighted sum of the
conditional mean of each class:
E(yi|xi) =
m∑
j=1
pijiµj (4.21)
where
∑m
j=1 pi
j
i = 1, µj = Ej(yi|xi).
To estimate the parameters θ = {pi1, . . . , pim, θ1, . . . , θm}, we used gradient-based op-
timization methods (Deb, 2008) such as the Gauss-Newton or Newton-Raphson method
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to maximize the log-likelihood, which has the following functional form:
l(θ) =
n∑
i=1
log
m∑
j=1
pijf(yi|xi; θj) (4.22)
Using Equation (4.21), one can compute a counterfactual income distribution based
on the estimator of θ for each class. Then, inequality of opportunity for each effort group
can be measured, which sheds light on whether individuals with a high level of effort
suffer a higher inequality of opportunity.
Our study attempted a finite mixture model with two to six components and used
the information criterion (AIC and BIC) to determine which model performed better. In
either case, the number of effort groups or levels of effort are assumed to be the number of
components. For each component, we estimated the counterfactual income distribution,
which is the income distribution for a given level of effort.
We also used the posterior probability to categorise individual income into different
levels of effort. We compared the posterior probability for each individual in each class
and classified individual income into the class with the highest posterior probability.
Then using Equation (4.14), we removed the between-class inequality and computed the
ex-post inequality of opportunity.
To measure ex-ante inequality of opportunity, we used the expected income computed
by Equation (4.21) and computed the measures using Equation (4.12).
4.3.3 A Finite Mixture Model with Varying Prior Probabilities
One issue related to a finite mixture model is whether the latent class represents
effort. The components in the model could also be a proxy for other variables such as
unobserved circumstances, individual intelligence, etc. To address this issue, we used the
generalized finite mixture model with varying prior probabilities (FMMV) (Jacobs et al.,
1991) in which the prior probabilities piji are parametrized. The model can be defined as
the following mixture distribution,
f(y|x) =
m∑
j=1
piji (zi)fj(y|x; θj) (4.23)
where piji is a logistic transformation of a function of z:
logit(piji ) = αj + ziγj (4.24)
This model allows the prior probability piji to depend on some exogenous variables zi.
We used two different specifications: one captures the influence of circumstances (denoted
as zc), and the other represents the impact of effort (denoted as ze). We named the
former specification as Finite Mixture Model 1 with Varying Probability (FMMV1) and
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the latter as Finite Mixture Model 2 with Varying Probability (FMMV2). In FMMV1,
the circumstance-determined latent class captures the effect of unobserved circumstances
or unobserved effort due to circumstances; while in FMMV2, the effort-determined latent
class captures the pure effect of unobserved effort. In terms of the effort variables in
FMMV2, since they can be endogenous and influenced by circumstances, we can express
the relationship between each effort variable and circumstance in the following equation.
logit(piji ) = α
j + zeiγ
j (4.25)
zei = φXi + v
e
i (4.26)
where X = [x,x, . . . ,x]′ and vei is the residual for z
e
i , which is independent of circum-
stances variables.
To let piji only represent the effort level independent with circumstances, we set φ = 0.
Therefore, the logistic transformation can only transform the residuals of effort variables.
logit(piji ) = α
j + veiγ
j (4.27)
4.4 Data Description
To measure inequality of opportunity in China, we use the data from China Family
Panel Studies (CFPS). CFPS is a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey
containing not only individual-level data but also household- and community-level data.
It has been conducted since 2010 by the Institute of Social Science Survey (ISSS) of Peking
University, China. By 2016, this project has already published its survey including three
years— 2010 baseline survey, 2011 maintenance survey and 2012 follow-up survey. Since
the survey conducted in 2011 is a maintenance survey, the sample size is small relative
to 2010 and 2012. We will not include the 2011 survey in our research.
CFPS covers 16,000 households with more than 33,000 adults and 8,900 youths in
25 provinces, municipalities or autonomous regions in China. Its main purpose is to
record the changes in the socio-economic wellbeing of Chinese people, covering a variety
of topics such as economic activities, educational attainment, family relationships and
dynamics, migration, and physical and mental health. The design of CFPS was inspired
by authoritative panel studies in other countries such as the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) so that the international comparison becomes possible.
We used the China Family Panel Study (CFPS) dataset in 2010 and 2012 and selected
individuals aged 21 to 604. The initial sample sizes in 2010 and 2012 were 33,600 and
4There is a degree of repetition between Section 4.4 and 3.5. This information is repeated for the
benefit of the readers who could be interested only in this essay
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35,720 respectively, in which 26,393 subjects have records for both 2010 and 2012. Then
we selected individuals aged between 21 to 60 years because the labour participation rate
outside this age range is relatively low. After filtering, the sample size was reduced to
19,736.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the summary statistics of the variables we used in the study.
Male respondents make up 47% of the sample. Ethnicity is represented as the dummy
variable for being in the minority groups in China. It is 0 if an individual’s ethnicity is
the majority group —Han; otherwise, it is 1. The percentage of the minority group is
around 8%. In addition, the average age of the respondents is 42.25.
We also include the number of siblings as one of the circumstance variables. Becker
and Lewis (1974) studied the relationship between the number of children and children’s
outcomes such as educational attainment and socioeconomic status. An empirical study
conducted in China (Li et al., 2008) also found a negative correlation between family size
and child outcome. In the dataset, the average number of siblings is around 3.
Another circumstance variable we used is regions of residence when the respondents
were 12 years old. Two dummy variables were generated as the measurement of regions
of residence. One is whether individuals held a non-agriculture Hukou status at age 12
and another is whether individuals lived in coastal provinces at age 12.
Hukou is a system for recording household registration in China. It divides households
into agriculture (rural) and non-agriculture (urban) Hukou. The former live in rural
areas and are registered as rural households and the latter live in urban areas and are
registered as urban households. Since there is difficulty in changing the Hukou status
from agriculture to non-agriculture, many rural immigrants hold agriculture Hukou even
though they live in urban areas. Individuals normally have the same Hukou status as
their parents before they are grown-up. In our sample, the percentage of individuals who
held non-agriculture (urban) Hukou when they were 12 years old is 15%.
Coastal provinces are the provinces in Eastern China along the coast. This area is
more developed than the inland area. We used a dummy variable to capture whether an
individual lived in the coastal province when he/she was 12 years old (coastal12). The
data showed that about 43% of the respondents lived in the coastal province when they
were 12 years old.
The annual individual income is 10,575 yuan on average in 2010 and 13,412 yuan
in 2012. To construct the income variable, we first computed the labour income by
summing individual wages, awards, allowances, incomes of working out of town and
bonuses. Then we matched each individual to his household’s business income (including
agricultural and non-agricultural business income), property income, transfer income and
other income (including gifts). The individual income is equal to labour income plus
all sources of non-labour income divided by the family size. In addition, we took the
provincial-level inflation rate into account. We used the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
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in Chinese Statistical Yearbooks and adjusted income in 2012 to the same price level as
income in 2010. In this study, we used the average income of the years 2010 and 2012 as
the dependent variable because the average income eliminates the variation over time. It
shows individual’s income over a longer period.
In Table 4.1, we also reported variables related to effort. Around 6% of respondents
are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). On average, respondents had 6.54
years of education, 61% of them were employed and 30% of them migrated from rural to
urban areas. They spent 34.98 hours on average on work and study per week.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (Respondents)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Average Income 19,736 11,993.64 20,389.70 0.00 864,893.10
Circumstances
Male 19,736 0.47 0.50 0 1
Minority 19,696 0.08 0.27 0 1
Age 19,736 42.25 10.79 21 60
Urban Hukou at age 12 19,625 0.15 0.35 0 1
Live in Coastal Province at age 12 19,736 0.43 0.50 0 1
Number of Siblings 19,736 2.98 1.90 0 14
Income from other Households 18,729 12,271.25 20,694.68 1.00 697,459.90
Effort
CCP Member 19,736 0.06 0.24 0 1
Years of Education 19,732 6.54 4.84 0.00 22.00
Employed 19,134 0.61 0.49 0 1
Migrant 19,625 0.30 0.46 0 1
Hours spent on Work and Study per Week 19,736 34.98 26.30 0.00 140.00
1 Average income is the average income between 2010 and 2012.
2 CCP is the Chinese Communist Party.
Table 4.2 shows respondents’ parents’ background when respondents were 14 years
old including parent’s education level, parent’s occupation status and parent’s political
affiliation. For all variables, we used the higher value of the two parents.
In terms of parents’ education level, it is reported in eight levels in CFPS. We merged
these levels into three levels. (1) Low level: illiterate or semi-literate ; (2) Middle level:
primary and junior high school; and (3) High level: senior high school or above. The
percentage of parents with the low-level education was 38%, and the high level made up
21%.
As far as parents’ occupations are concerned, they include eight large categories in-
cluding 595 specific occupational codes in CFPS. We regrouped them into three levels: the
low level included agricultural workers and workers in manufacture and transportation
sectors; the middle level included professionals, clerks, technical staffs and other tertiary
sector workers; and the high level included the administrative/management positions,
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics (Respondents’ Parents)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Low Occupation 17,309 0.79 0.41 0 1
Mid Occupation 17,309 0.13 0.33 0 1
High Occupation 17,309 0.09 0.28 0 1
CCP member 19,736 0.16 0.37 0 1
Low Education 19,736 0.38 0.49 0 1
Mid Education 19,736 0.40 0.49 0 1
High Education 19,736 0.21 0.41 0 1
1 All variables are respondents at 14 years of age.
2 All variables only account the higher value between parents.
teachers in tertiary education, lawyers and high-rank military officers. On average, 79%
of the individuals reported a low status of occupation for their parents and 9% a high
status.
Furthermore, we generated a dummy variable equal to 1 when one of the parents was
a member of China Communist Party (CCP) when respondents were 14 years old as a
proxy for parents’ political affiliation. The percentage of members of the CCP was 16%.
For the OLS and FMM models, we selected gender, ethnicity, Hukou status at age
12, living in the coastal province at age 12, number of siblings, parents’ educational level,
parents’ occupational level, and parents’ political affiliation as circumstances variables. In
terms of the FMMV1 model, we added income from other households to the circumstances
variables in FMM to prevent the explanatory variables for effort from being identical to
the explanatory variables for log income. In FMMV2, we used the residuals of variables
related to effort.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Results from OLS and Finite Mixture Models
In this section, we present the estimation results from the OLS and four different
specifications of a finite mixture model. Table 4.3 shows the estimation results from OLS
and FMM5. In the first six rows, we presented the estimated average income in year 2010
and 2012 for each component in logarithmic form6. Given the number of classes, all FMM
models significantly separate given data into classes.
For comparing these models, we presented log-likelihood and information criteria in
the last three rows. Obviously, OLS performs worse than any type of finite mixture
models in terms of log-likelihood and information criteria. We also used the information
5FMM is estimated using Stata module “fmm” from Deb (2008) in Stata version 14.
6We took the average of income for year 2010 and 2012 first, and then transformed the average income
into the logarithmic form.
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Table 4.3: OLS vs. FMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2FMM 3FMM 4FMM 5FMM 6FMM
Mean
Comp.1 9.276∗∗∗ 8.038∗∗∗ 7.702∗∗∗ 7.642∗∗∗ 7.336∗∗∗ 7.331∗∗∗
Comp.2 9.533∗∗∗ 9.468∗∗∗ 9.451∗∗∗ 9.800∗∗∗ 9.804∗∗∗
Comp.3 9.824∗∗∗ 9.807∗∗∗ 9.437∗∗∗ 9.434∗∗∗
Comp.4 3.532∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 4.796∗∗∗
Comp.5 10.027∗∗∗ 10.019∗∗∗
Comp.6 10.468∗∗∗
pi1 0.210 0.174 0.164 0.133 0.133
pi2 0.790 0.534 0.520 0.119 0.118
pi3 0.292 0.307 0.534 0.533
pi4 0.009 0.008 0.008
pi5 0.206 0.204
ll -2.97e+04 -2.87e+04 -2.83e+04 -2.83e+04 -2.81e+04 -2.81e+04
aic 59491.554 57476.080 56769.411 56707.641 56412.463 56344.184
bic 59599.784 57715.733 57132.756 57194.678 57023.192 57078.605
1 ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
2 The dependent variable for all models is the average income for year 2010 and 2012 in the logarithmic form.
3 Source: Authors’ Analysis.
matrix test (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990) to check for normality and homoskedasticity
assumption. The test rejects both normality and homoskedasticity in OLS model. This
rejection indicates a violation of Assumption 4.2.4 and heteroskedasticity in OLS. There-
fore, a measure of inequality of opportunity using OLS could be an underestimate as it
does not account for heteroskedasticity.
Column (2) to (6) show the results from FMM with two to six components. Based
on log likelihood and information criteria, we concluded that 3FMM preforms signifi-
cantly better than 2FMM; while 4FMM, 5FMM and 6FMM performs slightly better than
3FMM. However, the prior probability of component 4 in 4FMM, 5FMM and 6FMM is
around 0.008. This suggests that respondents are highly unlikely to be in component 4.
Therefore, we prefer 3FMM models. Since we are mainly interested in a predictive mean,
a more parsimonious model is to be preferred.
Table 4.4 shows the estimation results from OLS and 3FMM with constant and varying
prior probabilities respectively. Columns (4) and (5) show the results from two FMMV
models with three components. Both models perform significantly better than 3FMM
and OLS. The Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) drops from 56,769 in 3FMM to 53,025
in FMMV1 and to 51,520 in FMMV2. Comparing the two FMMV models, we find that
FMMV2 performs slightly better than FMMV1.
Table 4.4 also shows the mean and variance of each component. In general, means of
log income of two FMM models range from around 8 to 10 and means of the two FMMV
models range from about 6.7 to 10.1. Among the three components, the highest value is
104
Table 4.4: OLS vs. FMM (Including Varying Probability Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2FMM 3FMM FMMV1 FMMV2
Mean
Comp.1 9.276∗∗∗ 8.038∗∗∗ 7.702∗∗∗ 6.713∗∗∗ 7.685∗∗∗
Comp.2 9.533∗∗∗ 9.468∗∗∗ 8.942∗∗∗ 9.403∗∗∗
Comp.3 9.824∗∗∗ 10.041∗∗∗ 10.054∗∗∗
Variance
Comp.1 1.788∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 2.028∗∗∗ 1.718∗∗∗
Comp.2 1.022 0.933∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
Comp.3 0.591∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗
pi1 0.210
∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
pi2 0.790
∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
Loglikelihood -2.97e+04 -2.87e+04 -2.83e+04 -2.64e+04 -2.57e+04
AIC 59491.554 57476.080 56769.411 53025.023 51519.852
BIC 59599.784 57715.733 57132.756 53601.044 51958.817
1 ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
2 The dependent variable for all models is the average income for year 2010 and 2012 in the logarithmic
form.
3 Source: Authors’ Analysis.
the mean of component 3 and the lowest is that of component 1. This result is consistent
with the labelling convention we are using. Therefore, component 1 represents a low-effort
level and component 3 represents a high-effort level according to the “monotonic tranche”
assumption (Assumption 4.3.3). In terms of the variance, component 1 has the largest
variance, and component 3 has the smallest for all 3-component models. As a result, the
distribution of component 1 might overlap with the distributions of other components.
However, variances are smaller in FMMV2 models than in 3FMM and FMMV1, which
indicates that the overlap among the three components would be smaller in FMMV2
models. Therefore, we conclude that FMMV2 models appear to offer a better separation.
Given results from FMM models, we computed the prior and posterior probabilities
for each individual in terms of both 3FMM and FMMV models. The distributions of the
prior and posterior probabilities are presented in Figure 4.1. We find that distributions
of the posterior probabilities are more polarized towards 0 or 1 compared to distributions
of prior probabilities, which brings more certainties in predicting the level of effort for
each individual. Therefore, we choice posterior probabilities to identify individual’s level
of effort rather than prior probabilities.
Using posterior probabilities for FMM models, we estimated the kernel density distri-
butions of fitted log-income of the OLS model, three different FMM models and observed
income (see Figure 4.2). The observed log-income distributes from roughly 5 to 12 in both
years with two humps. This bimodality is consistent with a mixture of distributions.
Comparing the estimations of the four models, the estimation of the OLS model is
highly concentrated around the mean. It poorly predicts either the bimodality or the two
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Figure 4.1: The Kernel Distribution of the Prior and Posterior Probabilities by Levels of
Effort
(a) Low-level effort
(b) Middle-level effort
(c) High-level effort
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Figure 4.2: Comparing Predicted and Observed Log-Income
tails of the observed distribution. The three FMM models fit better to the bimodality
of observed income compared to the OLS model. In terms of the three FMM models,
FMMV2 has better goodness of fit than the other two FMM models.
This difference between OLS and FMM models shows that identifying levels of effort
and allowing the effect of circumstance on income to be different across levels of effort
significantly increase the goodness of fit. The highest goodness of fit appears in FMMV2
when the latent class is more closely determined by pure individual effort.
For three FMM models, we also examined determinants of the prior probabilities.
Prior probabilities predict the likelihood of exerting different effort levels before knowing
income. In 3FMM, prior probabilities are fixed. This model identifies that every individ-
ual has a 53.4% probability of belonging to the middle-effort level and a 17.4% probability
of belonging to the low-effort level. In the two FMMV models, prior probabilities were
parametrized by variables related to effort.
Table 4.5 shows the estimators for prior probabilities in the two FMMV models. The
high-effort level is the baseline. In FMMV1, the independent variables are considered as
observed circumstances. We find that female or minorities with rural Hukou are more
likely to be in the low effort level. Individuals whose family members have higher income
are more likely to be in the low level. The coefficients of parents’ socio-economic status
are not significant in the low level but negative and significant in the middle level, which
means that individuals whose parents have a higher socioeconomic status are more likely
to be in the high level.
In FMMV2, the independent variables are considered as pure effort. All coefficients
are negative and significant, which indicates that individuals are more likely to be in
the high-effort level if they exert more effort via CCP membership, years of education,
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Table 4.5: The Estimators for Prior Probabilities in FMMV models
FMMV1 FMMV2
Effort Level Low Middle Low Middle
Female -0.214 0.305 CCP Membership -1.247∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗∗
Minority group -1.849∗ -0.018 Years of Education -0.212∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗
Rural Hukou at age 12 0.317 1.610∗∗∗ Employed -3.382∗∗∗ -1.467∗∗∗
Female and Minority 0.88 0.625 Migration -0.839∗∗∗ -1.659∗∗∗
Rural Hukou and Minority 2.753∗∗∗ 1.477∗∗∗ Hours spent -0.010∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
Rural Hukou and Female 1.528∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗
Living in coastal province 0.134 -0.973∗∗∗
Mid-educated Parents 0.011 -0.647∗∗∗
High-educated Parents 0.229 -0.449∗∗∗
Mid Occupation (Parents) 0.133 -0.667∗∗∗
High Occupation (Parents) 0.168 -0.850∗∗∗
Parents CCP Membership -0.274 -0.187
Number of sibling 0.044 0.234∗∗∗
Log-income from other families 0.203∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗
Constant -1.860∗∗∗ -0.778∗ -0.544∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗
1 ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗< 0.01
2 Source: Authors’ Analysis
getting employed, migration, and hours spent on work and study.
To show how circumstances affect income differently for each level of effort, we es-
timated kernel density distributions of three components for each FMM models. The
results are shown in Figure 4.3. The log income distribution of each component is the
counterfactual log income assuming all individuals in the sample are in that component.
In the 3FMM and FMMV2 models (Figure 4.4(a) and 4.4(c)), component 2 overlaps with
component 1 and 3; while in the FMMV1 model, component 1 distributes from around
2 to 10, which overlaps with component 2 and 3. This is because the latent class is as-
sumed to be determined by circumstances in FMMV1 while for FMMV2 the latent class
is determined by pure effort. Since 3FMM is closer to FMMV2, the latent classes for
FMM are more likely to be determined by pure individual effort.
Given the results from 3FMM and FMMV2, we can conclude that individuals with the
middle level of effort could have the highest inequality of opportunity — the highest effect
of circumstances on income. The estimated distribution for these two models are bimodal
for the low-level effort, multimodal for the middle-level effort and close to unimodal for
the high-level effort, which indicates that circumstances affect income differently across
levels of effort.
For FMMV1, given that the latent class is determined by observed circumstances,
the lowest level has the highest inequality of opportunity, which indicates that circum-
stances could have more effect on income if individuals exert the low level of circumstance-
correlated effort — the effort that is driven by their own circumstance.
108
Figure 4.3: Kernel Density Estimation of Three Components
(a) 3FMM
(b) FMMV1
(c) FMMV2
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To more specifically show heterogeneous effects of circumstances on income across
effort levels, we present the estimators of circumstance variables for 3FMM and FMMV2
in Table 4.6. In general, the results from 3FMM and FMMV2 are similar.
Table 4.6: The Heterogenuous Effect of Circumstance Variables on Income Across Effort
Levels
3FMM FMMV2
Effort Level Low Middle High Low Middle High
Female -0.743∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗
Minority group -0.572 -0.854∗∗ 0.154∗ -0.524 -0.806∗∗ -0.053
Rural Hukou at age 12 -0.38 -1.107∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.661∗∗∗ -1.029∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
Female and Minority 0.385 0.522∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗ 0.2 0.498∗∗∗ -0.192∗
Rural Hukou and Minority 0.483 0.001 -0.306∗∗∗ 0.456 0.07 -0.069
Rural Hukou and Female -0.086 -0.682∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.614∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗
Living in coastal province -0.196∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
Mid-educated Parents 0.222∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.138 0.307∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
High-educated Parents 0.295∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
Mid Occupation (Parents) 0.19 0.200∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.146 0.198∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
High Occupation (Parents) 0.157 0.230∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.126 0.194∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
Parents CCP Membership 0.409∗∗∗ 0.064 0.105∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
Number of sibling 0.015 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.024 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗
Constant 7.702∗∗∗ 9.468∗∗∗ 9.824∗∗∗ 7.685∗∗∗ 9.403∗∗∗ 10.054∗∗∗
1 ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
2 Source: Authors’ Analysis
More importantly, there are significant differences in the effect of circumstances across
effort levels. Some circumstances such as being in minority groups, having rural hukou,
female in minority groups, rural female and living in a coastal province could have huge
impacts on income in the middle level of effort compared to other levels of effort. This
might explain the reason why inequality of opportunity is the highest for the middle-level
effort.
For the low level of effort, circumstances like minority groups, rural hukou, female in
the minority groups, rural female and parents’ occupation have insignificant effects on
income; while female and parents CCP membership have the highest impact on income
compared to other effect levels. This suggests that the sources of inequality of opportunity
for the low level of effect are limited to several circumstances such as gender and political
affiliation, which explains the bimodal feature of income distribution presented in 4.3 for
this level of effort.
For the high level of effort, although most circumstances have significant effect on
income, their effect is relatively small compared to other effort levels. As a result, the
income distribution for this level of effort is more concentrated to its mean.
Based on the estimators of the three FMM models, we conducted joint tests to test
heterogeneity between class for each circumstance variable. The null hypothesis is that
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the estimators for a given variable are identical across all classes. The results are presented
in Table 4.7. The heterogeneous effect mainly occurs for the variables related to regions
such as Hukou status and living in coastal province. The effect of parents’ socioeconomic
background is homogeneous between classes.
Table 4.7: The Joint Test of Estimators of Circumstance Variables
3FMM FMMV1 FMMV2
Female 0.2052 0.156 0.1658
Minority group 0.0373 ∗∗ 0.1228 0.0362 ∗∗
Rural Hukou at age 12 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Female and Minority 0.2513 0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
Rural Hukou and Minority 0∗∗∗ 0.5601 0.67
Rural Hukou and Female 0.1357 0.0676∗ 0.0367 ∗∗
Living in coastal province 0∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Mid-educated Parents 0.0831∗ 0.1876 0.2882
High-educated Parents 0.7826 0.7441 0.6952
Mid Occupation (Parents) 0.8258 0.5871 0.8959
High Occupation (Parents) 0.9499 0.976 0.4095
Parents CCP Membership 0.0443 ∗∗ 0.6434 0.2292
Number of sibling 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.5893 0∗∗∗
1 ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
2 The null hypothesis is that the estimators for given variable (e.g. female) are
identical for all classes. For a three-class model, given estimators βˆ1, βˆ2 and βˆ3.
The null hypothesis is: βˆ1 = βˆ2 = βˆ3.
3 Figures in the table are p-values of the joint test for each variable.
4 A significant value represents a rejection of the null hypothesis that estimators are
the same between classes.
5 Source: Authors’ Analysis
The results from the joint test statistically prove the heterogeneous effect of circum-
stances on income across levels of effort. This heterogeneous effect is taken into account
using the FMM models to measure inequality of opportunity.
4.5.2 Within- vs. Between-Tranche Inequality
In this section, we report within- and between-tranche inequality. Within-tranche
inequality shows income inequality among individuals exerting the same effort level.
Between-tranche inequality implies income inequality for different effort levels.
Table 4.8 shows predicted income for 3-component models. For 3FMM and FMMV1
models, the expected income for the high level of effort is about six times as high as that
for the income for the low level. In terms of the FMMV2 model, the difference in income
between the high and the low level is even larger (more than 15 times). This significant
difference indicates high between-tranche inequality and shows that FMMV2 captures
more between-tranche inequality than the other two, but results are broadly consistent
across the three models.
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Importantly, the results raise an additional question: whether the difference in effort
causes income gap of more than ten times. One reason for such a large income gap could
be due to the presence of extreme income observations. We conducted a robustness test
by dropping observations with extreme income. The results are similar to those obtained
when including extreme income. Therefore, a presence of extreme incomes is unlikely to
be the source of large income gap.
In addition, the level of effort is always associated with an individual’s decisions and
choices. For example, an individual from a high-income family member might have more
flexible working hours. A decision concerning working or not can make a huge difference
in income. In FMMV models (Table 4.5), we find that if other family members earn no
income, individuals are highly likely to be classified into the high level of effort.
Table 4.8 also reports standard deviations (Column 2) and Gini coefficients (Column
3). Gini coefficients show inequality in the counterfactual income distribution assuming
every individual exerts the same level of effort (the within-tranche inequality).
We find that component 2 has the highest within-tranche inequality in FMM and
FMMV2; while component 1 has the highest within-tranche inequality in FMMV1. The
difference in the highest within-tranche could be due to the fact that the class variable
is assumed to be determined by circumstances in FMMV1, whereas the class variables in
3FMM and FMMV2 are more likely to indicate the pure effect of effort.
Table 4.8: Predicted Income for Three-Components
Model
Mean St. Dev Gini Min Max
3FMM
Comp.1 3948.445 2214.317 0.29 1445.066 15537.1
Comp.2 10038.94 10709.47 0.49 1344.219 61322.71
Comp.3 23200.88 10964.22 0.26 4583.262 67827.6
FMMV1
Comp.1 3530.331 5001.106 0.56 31.58417 52347.34
Comp.2 8221.551 4966.052 0.30 3120.518 29831.92
Comp.3 23960.5 6941.157 0.16 9947.511 53545.4
FMMV2
Comp.1 1714.289 1016.217 0.29 644.4515 7762.05
Comp.2 9342.952 9101.504 0.45 1565.19 52502.21
Comp.3 29644.51 15170.18 0.28 6448.702 95158.84
1 Results are generated using log-normal transformation assuming ho-
moskedasticity.
2 St. Dev is standard deviation. Gini is Gini coefficient within compo-
nents.
3 Source: Author’s calculation.
We also use the Lorenz curve to show the within-tranche inequality. Figure 4.4 shows
the Lorenz curve of the counterfactual income distribution estimated by three component
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finite mixture models. The line “Component 1 (2 or 3)” represents counterfactual income
distribution if one exerts the low (middle or high) level of effort. In general, income
inequality is lowest if every individual exerts high-effort level in all models. Individuals
with middle-effort level suffer the highest level of income inequality in FMM and FMMV2.
This implies that circumstances have the largest impact on income for those who exert
the middle level of effort.
Figure 4.4: Lorenz Curve of Predicted Income
4.5.3 Ex-ante and Ex-post Inequality of Opportunity
To compute inequality of opportunity, we first classified the sample into three tranches
based on posterior probabilities. Table 4.9 shows the results of the classification. More
than 62.94% is classified as the middle-effort level in 3FMM. The figure reduces to 61.89%
in FMMV1 and 56.33% in FMMV2.
Table 4.9: Estimated Proportions of Latent Classes (Percentage)
Low Middle High
3FMM
6.94 62.94 30.13
FMMV1
3.98 61.89 29.74
FMMV2
9.10 56.33 31.95
1 Figures in the table are repre-
sented in percentages.
2 Source: Author’s calculation.
113
Table 4.10 shows the results for ex-ante and ex-post inequality of opportunity using
OLS and three different specifications of 3-component finite mixture models. We also
used 5-component finite mixture models as a robustness check. Comparing the results
obtained with a 3-components to a 5-components finite mixture model, we found that
results are similar.
For Table 4.10, we use three different inequality measures: Gini coefficients, Theil
index and MLD index. In general, the observed income inequality (Row 3 in Table 4.10)
is around 0.65 in Gini coefficients, 0.84 in Theil and 1.05 in MLD.
Table 4.10: The Measures of Inequality of Opportunity (3 Components)
OLS 3FMM FMMV1 FMMV2
Gini Coefficient
Ex-ante IOL 0.35 0.45 0.53 0.53
Observed Gini 0.65 - - -
Ex-ante IOR 0.54 0.69 0.82 0.82
Theil
Ex-ante IOL 0.21 0.34 0.47 0.47
Ex-post IOL 0.77 0.44 0.45
Observed Theil 0.84 - - -
Ex-ante IOR 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.56
Ex-post IOR 0.92 0.52 0.54
MLD
Ex-ante IOL 0.20 0.35 0.50 0.50
Ex-post IOL 0.76 0.40 0.43
Observed MLD 1.05 - - -
Ex-ante IOR 0.19 0.33 0.48 0.48
Ex-post IOR 0.72 0.38 0.41
1 IOL is the absolute level of inequality of opportunity.
2 Ex-ante IOL uses predicted income of each model; ex-post IOL removes
the between-class inequality.
3 IOR is the relative level of inequality of opportunity; it is the ratio of
IOR to observed inequality.
4 Source: Authors’ own calculation based on CFPS data.
The first row shows results from the absolute values of ex-ante inequality of oppor-
tunity in Gini coefficients. We find that FMMV models capture more inequality than
3FMM model. IOL is 0.53 using the FMMV2 model and the FMMV1 model. The dif-
ference between the four models is similar for the Theil and MLD indices. However,
the Gini and entropy indices differ in that Gini coefficients capture more inequality of
opportunity than the entropy indices. This is because the Gini coefficients do not have a
path independence property (Foster and Shneyerov, 2000) 7 so that the sum of ex-ante
IOL and inequality due to effort is larger than the overall income inequality. Since de-
composing income inequality in the Gini index requires different approaches such as the
7If one decomposes income distribution into two — a smoothed between-group distribution and a
standardized within-group distribution, a “path independent” measure keeps the sum of inequality of
these two distributions equal to the inequality of the total income distribution
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Shapley decomposition, we only use the Theil and the MLD index to compute the ex-post
inequality of opportunity in this essay.
For the ex-post measure, we find that the within-class inequality is the highest for
3FMM. This result indicates that the latent class captures less variation in effort com-
pared to FMMV1 and FMMV2. In FMMV1, the ex-post measure captures 38% of the
within-class inequality, using the MLD and 52% using the Theil index. Both figures
are significantly lower than those obtained in 3FMM. This indicates that between-class
inequality is much higher if the latent class represents factors related to observed cir-
cumstances. This result also suggests that inequality of opportunity could be highly
underestimated if unobserved circumstances and circumstances-related effort are omitted
in the measure.
In FMMV2, the ex-post measure captures 41% of the within-class inequality when
using the MLD and 54% when using the Theil index. Since the latent class is determined
by pure effort in FMMV2, between-class inequality fully represents inequality due to
differences in effort. Therefore, this measure could be the upper bound of inequality of
opportunity and it could also be a more accurate measure of inequality of opportunity
compared to 3FMM and OLS.
One issue for our results is the incompatibility between the ex-ante and ex-post mea-
sures (Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2013). On the one hand, the ex-ante measure is computed
by the between-type income inequality. If there are some unobserved circumstances, this
measure could be underestimated. On the other hand, the ex-post measure is computed
by eliminating the between-class income inequality and it could be overestimated because
the variation in effort cannot be fully captured due to data limitations. However, our
results show that the ex-ante measure, the one supposed to be underestimated, is larger
than the ex-post measure in the two FMMV models, the one supposed to be overesti-
mated. This inconsistent result might relate to the incompatibility between the ex-ante
and ex-post measure.
In spite of the incompatibility, both ex-ante and ex-post measures show that IOR is
more than 40% when using the MLD in FMMV2 models, which suggests that inequality
of opportunity in China accounts for more than 40% of total income inequality in China.
4.6 Conclusion
Since inequality of opportunity requires a decomposition of inequality of outcome in
terms of circumstances and effort, one needs to know whether each factor should belong
to circumstances or effort when applying this idea. However, scholars have different views
and have reached little agreement. Barry (2005) stated that effort should be respected
even though it is determined by circumstances; while Roemer (1998) argued that the part
of effort determined by circumstances is beyond the individual’s control and should be
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eliminated.
Another difficulty is data imperfection. The lack of appropriate data explains that
most of the literature treated circumstances such as gender, ethnicity, birthplace, the
educational attainment of parents and the main occupation (Paes de Barros et al., 2009)
as exogenous variables, while treating effort as unobserved. However, unobserved circum-
stances and effort lead to biased measures. As a result, most of the literature claims that
their measures are “the lower bound” of inequality of opportunity.
To address these issues, we assume that effort is an unobserved categorical variable —
a latent class, in other words. Using a finite mixture model, we estimated each individual’s
effort level according to the latent class to which he/she is likely to belong to. Although
this classification only roughly shows every individual’s level of effort (three levels of effort
in our cases), it does not rely on a particular set of effort variables. Bourguignon et al.
(2007) used the individual’s own schooling attainment and a migration dummy as effort
variables. Jusot et al. (2013) used health-related behaviours toward smoking, obesity
and vegetables consumption as effort variables. In this paper, the latent class assumed
as effort does not represent any specific variables. As a result, when we use the ex-post
approach, the measures are more likely to represent inequality when the overall effect of
effort is removed.
One issue for a latent class model is that it is difficult to know exactly what a latent
class represents. Our FMM models identify three latent classes which might represent
either different levels of effort or even unobserved circumstances. To clarify the identifi-
cation of latent classes, we used the finite mixture model with varying prior probabilities
that allows the prior probabilities (the latent class) to be influenced by a set of factors
z. These factors can be circumstances or effort variables. Our results showed that the
identification of latent classes in the FMM model with constant prior probabilities is sim-
ilar to that in the FMMV2 model in which the latent class is determined by pure effort.
This result indicated that a latent class model is effective in identifying different levels of
effort even though effort is unobserved.
With the ability to identify effort without observing it, this model makes the applica-
tion of the ex-post approach feasible. Most literature uses the ex-ante approach because
of the difficulty of observing effort. However, inequality of opportunity given the ex-ante
approach shows only one particular perspective — the inequality when effort has not
been exerted. Relying on this approach provides no insight into the role effort plays in
income inequality and how effort interacts with circumstances. In this paper, we try to
address these questions using the latent class model.
Our findings show a lower IOR based on the ex-post measure than the one obtained
on the basis of an ex-ante measure. These differences between the ex-ante and ex-post
measure have been addressed by other researches (Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2013). Our
results confirmed that when we used more advanced models, we captured more variations
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so that the ex-ante measure increased, and the ex-post measure decreased. The ex-post
measure turned out to be lower than the ex-ante measure.
Benefiting from the estimate of effort levels, our finding confirms the heterogeneous
effect of circumstances on income across different levels of effort. Inequality of opportunity
turns out to be the largest if everyone exerts the middle level of effort. This finding implies
that the group with the middle level of effort should be compensated more than other
groups.
This idea of categorizing effort into several classes has also some limitations. The finite
mixture model cannot support too many components. In this paper, we also measured
inequality of opportunity given five components. Although the results are similar to those
obtained in a 3-components model, we do not know whether the results would change for
10 components. Future research could develop alternative empirical tools to overcome
this obstacle.
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Chapter 5
Essay III: Inequality of Opportunity in the
Access to Higher Education in China: Evi-
dence from a High-Ranked University
5.1 Introduction
People have more opportunities to attend college in contemporary China due to the
rapid expansion of tertiary education in the last three decades. The number of graduates
from higher education institutions with a bachelor’s degree increased from 805,000 in
1995 to 6,809,000 in 2015 (NBS, 2016). At the macro-level, the expansion of tertiary
education plays an important role in economic growth. Whalley and Zhao (2013) found
that 39.4% of economic growth in China during 1999-2008 was contributed by growth in
human capital stock.
At the micro level, tertiary education brings high returns for individuals. Awaworyi
and Mishra (2014) conducted a meta-analysis and found that college education and above
in China leads approximately to a 14% increase in individual income, more than other
levels of educations do.
However, the opportunity to receive tertiary education might not be equally dis-
tributed. If the opportunities provided by the expansion favour those with a certain gen-
der, ethnicity and family background, this unequal distribution of opportunities might
drive educational inequality and lower economic and social mobility.
This paper uses the framework of equal opportunity (Roemer, 1998, Cohen, 1989
and Arneson, 1989) to examine the fairness of the expansion of tertiary education in
China. This framework has been widely used in studying income (Checchi and Peragine,
2010 and Paes de Barros et al., 2009) and health (Jusot et al., 2013) inequality. It
regards inequality due to factors beyond individuals’ responsibilities (“circumstances”) as
unfair and accepts inequality due to factors within individuals’ responsibilities (“effort”).
Applying this framework, we examine to what extent college admission and graduate
outcomes are determined by circumstances.
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Some researchers have used the framework of equal opportunity to study educational
inequality. Ferreira and Gignoux (2014) developed a measure to capture the effect of cir-
cumstances on students’ academic achievements. This measure has been used to examine
inequality of opportunity in education in different regions and countries, e.g. Gamboa
and Waltenberg (2012) for Latin America and Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2014) for the Middle
East and North Africa. Nevertheless, students’ academic achievements are one objective
in achieving equal opportunity in education. The access to education is also critical to
educational equality of opportunity.
Brunori et al. (2012) examines the access to the tertiary education in Italy base on
the framework of inequality of opportunity. In their paper, the educational outcome is
defined as a binery outcome with intrinsic ordering (e.g. unemployed after graduation,
and work or studied in a university after graduated from a high school). Different from
Brunori et al. (2012), we use a multinomial outcome to identify graduate outcomes with
no intrinsic ordering.
Researchers have found inequality of opportunity in terms of the access to education in
China. For example, children from rural households receive fewer years of schooling than
their urban counterparts (Zhang et al., 2015). Rural girls have been found disadvantaged
in the access of middle school and high school (Connelly and Zheng, 2003).
Inequality of opportunity could be more obvious in college access. Li et al. (2015)
found that rural youth from poor counties were seven times less likely to access any
college than urban youth in 2003 and the gap was even larger in access to elite colleges.
In China, college admission is mostly determined by the College Entrance Exami-
nation (CEE). It is designed to provide equal opportunity to all high school graduates.
However, researchers find an overrepresentation of certain characteristics (e.g. male, ur-
ban, etc.) of students in colleges. Wang et al. (2013) showed that rich, Han (the major
ethnic group in China) and urban males are overrepresented in colleges. Zeng et al. (2014)
found that a female’s opportunity to attain college is significantly lower than a male in
rural areas.
Although the expansion of tertiary education brings more opportunity to high school
graduates, it also increases graduate unemployment (Li et al., 2014). To reduce graduate
unemployment, the government expanded postgraduate enrollments. The numbers of
entrants for postgraduate degrees rose from 51,053 in 1995 to 645,055 in 2015 NBS (2016),
more than 10 times during the two decades, compared to the 8.5 times increase in bachelor
degree places. Meanwhile, some college graduates choose to go overseas for a postgraduate
degree. Therefore, the expansion of postgraduate study raises the question of whether
college graduates have equal opportunity of gaining access to postgraduate study.
This research studies educational inequality of opportunity in China during the ex-
pansion of tertiary education and focuses on inequality of access to higher education in
two aspects: college admission and graduates’ whereabouts. Using the administrative
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data on economic graduates from a highly-ranked university in China during the period
2008-2015, we investigate students’ demographic characteristics to see which individual
characteristics were overrepresented and examine the effect of circumstances on grad-
uates’ CEE scores. If the enrolment of a university truly depends on the CEE scores,
circumstances variables are expected to be uncorrelated with CEE scores. Deviation from
this expectation could be evidence of inequality of opportunity, or some policies such as
affirmative actions that target particular groups. We also study what factors influence
graduates’ whereabouts when seeking employment, or when continuing a domestic or
oversea postgraduate degree. Opportunity is equal when graduates’ whereabouts are
independent of circumstances after controlling for their academic achievement.
In this study, we particularly focus on the difference in college admission and grad-
uates’ whereabouts between rural and urban areas. Researchers reported gaps between
rural and urban areas in income (see Kanbur and Zhang, 1999, Sicular et al., 2007 and
Whyte, 2010) and education (Qian and Smyth, 2008). These gaps are one of the main
determinants of rising income inequality in contemporary China (Xie and Zhou, 2014).
To study the rural-urban difference, we make use of students’ Hukou status.
Hukou is a household registration system in China. Households’ permanent residential
address, referred to as “Hukou address”, is recorded by the government. These addresses
are divided into agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou based on whether the Hukou
address is in rural or urban areas.
This division causes some restrictions on the rural population. For example, rural
households could have limited access to education and employment (Liu, 2005) in urban
China. Their children are only allowed to take college entrance exams in their domicile
based on Hukou. These restrictions prevent rural householders from bringing their chil-
dren to urban areas to receive education even though they find jobs there, and this might
be one reason (Biao, 2007) that more than 20 million children (NBS, 2016) were left be-
hind in rural areas by 2015. Due to these restrictions, the Hukou system has a structural
effect on income inequality (Whalley and Zhang, 2007) and educational inequality (Afridi
et al., 2015) between rural and urban areas. In this study, we examine how the Hukou
system affects college admission and graduates’ whereabouts using the administration
data from one university in China.
Our study confirms that there is a widening rural-urban inequality in tertiary edu-
cation. The proportion of rural students decreases dramatically between 2008 and 2015
in the examined university. Rural graduates also have fewer opportunities after their
graduations than their urban counterparts. The household income gap between rural
and urban areas might explain this rural-urban inequality. A higher household income
can positively affect a student’s chance to enrol in a highly-ranked university even though
the student has a lower entrance exam score. It can also provide more opportunities for
students after graduation.
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The rest of this essay is presented in the following sections, as follows. Section 5.2
introduces the tertiary education system in China. Section 5.3 shows the estimation
strategy. Section 5.4 describes the data used in this study. In section 5.5, we present and
discuss the result and section 5.6 is the conclusion.
5.2 The College Admissions System in Contemporary China
The tertiary education system in China was reformed and started to recover in 1978
after the Cultural Revolution. It relies on the College Entrance Examination (CEE),
known as gaokao; that is a decisive test for entrance into almost all tertiary education
institutions. In this section, we explain the admission system including CEE and other
related policies that affect students’ opportunities to receive tertiary education in China.
In China, every child should receive nine-year compulsory education including five
years in elementary school and four years in junior middle school. After graduating from
junior middle school, graduates can choose to work, learn a specific skill in a technical or
vocational school, or study in a high school. Those who enrolled in a high school would
take part in CEE in the final year of their study in the high school.
In general, CEE comprises “3 + X” subjects, where “3” refers to three compulsory
subjects, including “Chinese, Mathematics and English” and “X” stands for a subject
students can choose by themselves. In the high school, students are required to choose
between two courses of study: art or science. Those who choose the art stream can select
a major from Political Sciences, History, and Geography while those who choose science
can select a major from Physics, Chemistry, and Biology. This difference in majors could
result in a university having different entry score requirements for students from art and
science. In our dataset, students are classified as art or science students, depending on
which subject they choose in the CEE.
Students can obtain an exemption or bonus points in the CEE. For example, some
students could receive an exemption and a direct admission without the CEE due to
their outstanding academic performances in high school. Minorities, foreign nationals,
and those who have achieved distinguished results in science and technology competitions,
sports competitions and art competitions can also receive additional points in the CEE.
After students take the CEE, they receive their CEE scores within several days. After
they receive their CEE scores the students complete the application form with a list of
ordered preference. The application form is classified into several tiers1. Students are
aware of the cutoff score for each tier; however, they do not know the exact entry score
for each university. Therefore, they face uncertainty when applying to universities.
Although the purpose of the CEE is to provide a nationwide standardized and merit-
1The first tier comprises key universities; the second tier is regular universities; the third is vocational
universities.
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based exam, the content and form of the exam varies from province to province. For
example, the maximum score of the CEE is normally 750. Some provinces and munici-
palities such as Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang and Hainan Provinces have different maxi-
mum scores ranging from 480 to 900. This is because these provinces have permission to
customize their own exams. Until now, 16 provinces and municipalities are permitted by
the Ministry of Education to adopt customized exams.
In addition, universities set a different quota for each province. They usually give a
large quota to students from their home province. For example, around 57% of students in
our dataset come from the home province of the university investigated. Due to regional
disparities in the CEE and the quota, we only surveyed students from the home province
to analyze the impact of individual characteristics on the CEE score.
In the last decade, going abroad to study has become an increasingly popular choice
among students. The Chinese Ministry of Education reports that fewer than 200,000
students went abroad in 2008 and this figure has increased to more than 500,000 in 2015.
In our study, we consider an overseas postgraduate degree as one of three main options
of graduates.
5.3 Data
The data used in this paper come from student administrative records in one of the
Project 985 universities2 in China. The data spans the years 2008 to 2015. This university
is one of the top universities in China and it is the best university in its home province.
The dataset includes graduates’ academic performance, family backgrounds and their
whereabouts immediately after graduation.
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of the data. The data contain 2,565 observa-
tions of students in the economics faculty who graduated during 2008 to 2015. Females
constitute 57% of all graduates. Ethnic minority accounts for only 4% of the graduates
and 57% of students are from the home province; that is, the province where the univer-
sity is. Graduates who have a single parent make up only 3%. Among those graduates,
the majority of them (63%) holds an urban Hukou.
Regarding family background, 1,998 out of 2,565 report their father’s annual income,
with an average income of 27,335.6 yuan and 1,775 report their mother’s income, with an
average of 20,847.86 yuan. Household income per capita is reported by 2,354 graduates.
We took into account economies of scale and computed household income per effective
member, which on average was equal to 27,777.11 yuan. The number of missing variables
was the lowest for household income. We therefore decided to use household income per
effective member3 instead of parents’ income as one of the proxies for family background.
2Project 985 is a project for both central and local governments to provide funds to universities.
There are 39 universities sponsored by Project 985; most of them are top universities in China.
3The Household income per effective member equals to the total household income divided by the
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Father’s income 1,998 27,335.6 32,137.1 0 600,000
Mother’s income 1,775 20,847.86 21,803.39 0 360,000
No. family members 2,565 3.62 0.95 2 9
Imputed No. family members 2,565 0.03 0.18 0 1
HHincome 2,278 27,777.11 39,749.4 0 1,247,077
GPA 2,554 83.11 5.34 29.00 94.74
CEES 2,338 611.50 56.16 168.50 785.00
Year of graduation 2,565 2,008 2,015
Female 2,565 0.57 0.49 0 1
Ethnic Minority 2,565 0.04 0.19 0 1
Single parent 2,565 0.03 0.18 0 1
Home Province 2,565 0.57 0.49 0 1
Urban Hukou 2,565 0.63 0.48 0 1
Self-reported poverty 2,565 0.18 0.39 0 1
Major in science 2,565 0.51 0.50 0 1
Direct admission 2,565 0.004 0.06 0 1
Unemployed 1,321 0.12 0.32 0 1
Failed postgraduate exam 783 0.09 0.28 0 1
1 Home Province is whether the graduates’ households are in the same province as the university.
2 Imputed No. family members is a dummy for the missing value of No. family members.
3 GPA is Grade Point Average during undergraduate study. CEES is Chinese Entrance Exam Score ranging from 0
to 750.
4 Self-reported poverty is whether the graduates report that their families are in poverty.
5 Major in science is whether the graduates majored in science when they were in high school.
6 Direct admission is a dummy for those who were directly admitted by the university.
7 Failed postgraduate exam is a dummy for those who failed the entrance exam for postgraduates.
8 HHincome is household income per effective member.
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In China, high school students usually have no income because getting in a top uni-
versity is highly competitive, which left students with no time for any part-time work. It
is quite rare even rarer for a university student to acquire a part-time job. This is because
most families provide financial supports to their children until they graduate. Therefore,
we assume that household income is exogenous. However, it is possible that to support
children for studying in a good university, parents could work harder.
For the number of family members, we treated the missing value as “3” if the graduate
was not from a single parent family and “2” if the graduate was from a single parent family
because most families have only one child due to the One Child Policy. However, this
treatment might understate the number of family members, especially among those from
rural areas because rural parents are more likely to have more than one child than their
urban counterparts. The average number of family members is 3.62.
In addition, we also collected the information about parents’ occupation as shown
in Table 5.2. Based on the administrative data, we divided parents’ occupation into 11
categories: administrator (those who have administrative jobs such as business execu-
tives and government officers), civil servant, farmer, manual worker, other professionals
(those who do non-manual work other than teaching), other teacher (those not teaching
in university), passed away, retired, self-employed, unemployed and university teacher.
Within these 11 categories, farmers and other professionals are the two biggest groups ac-
counting for around 30% of the population; administrators are comprised of 14.7% males
and 6.82% females; teachers (including university and non-university teacher) account for
more than 10% of the population.
In terms of graduates’ performances, the dataset has information on GPA obtained
by students at universities, Chinese Entrance Exam Score (CEES) and their major in
high school. On average, the students got 83.11 out of 100 for their GPA and 611.50 out
of 750 for their CEES4. 51% graduates choose science in high school.
Table 5.3 shows graduates’ major in university. Since the administrative data are
only from the School of Economics of the University, the majors shown in Table 5.3 are
provided by the School of Economics. The most popular major is finance with 34.22% of
the population, and the least popular is insurance accounting for 5.59% of the population.
The dataset also has details for graduates’ whereabouts. In the last row of Table 5.1,
unemployed is a dummy for the graduates who did not get the job they had applied for or
did not pass the entrance exam if they chose to take the entrance exam for a postgraduate
degree. The percentage of those unemployed graduates is 10%.
Table 5.4 shows graduates’ choices regardless of the outcomes of their choices. For
example, some graduates may end up being unemployed even if they decided to look for
a job. We put those graduates in the same group as those who successfully found a job.
square root of the number of members in the household
4Some students can be awarded extra marks due to their special talent.
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Table 5.2: Parents’ Occupation
(1) (2)
Father Mother
No. Percentage(%) No. Percentage(%)
Administrator 348 14.70 150 6.82
Civil Servant 112 4.73 69 3.14
Farmer 596 25.18 680 30.91
Manual Worker 144 6.08 97 4.41
Other Professionals 701 29.62 712 32.36
Other Teacher 211 8.91 257 11.68
Passed Away 24 1.01 9 0.41
Retired 14 0.59 37 1.68
Self-employed 122 5.15 102 4.64
Unemployed 19 0.80 31 1.41
University teacher 76 3.21 56 2.55
Total 2367 100.00 2200 100.00
1 Administrator is a occupation category for business executives and government officers.
2 Other Professionals are positions for non-manual work other than teachers.
3 Other teacher is a category for teachers exluding those who are teaching in university.
Table 5.3: Graduates’ Major in School of Economics
No. Percentage(%)
Public Finance 367 14.55
Economics 208 8.25
Finance 863 34.22
Financial Engineering 333 13.20
Insurance 141 5.59
International Trade 399 15.82
Mathematical Finance 211 8.37
Total 2522 100.00
1 These majors listed above belong to the School of Economics
in the univerity we studied.
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In Table 5.4, half of the graduates choose to work; 30.53% graduates decide to continue
their postgraduate studies in China and 13.80% to do their postgraduate study overseas.
Table 5.4: Graduates’ Choices
No. Percentage(%)
Domestic postgraduate 783 30.53
Not Sure 107 4.17
Oversea postgraduate 354 13.80
Work 1321 51.50
Total 2565 100.00
1 Graduates choosing domestic postgraduate include those who
had been successfully enrolled in universities in China for post-
graduate programs and those who had failed National Postgrad-
uate Entrance Examination.
2 Graduates choosing oversea postgraduate include those who
reported themselves studying oveaseas or intending to study
oveaseas.
3 Graduates choosing work include those who reported their new
jobs or reported themselves looking for jobs.
Figure 5.1 is the stacked bar chart of graduates’ choices by year and by percentage.
The proportion of graduates doing overseas postgraduate increased sharply after 2012.
Figure 5.1: The Stacked Bar Chart of Graduates’ Choices by Year by Percentage
Source: Authors’ calculation.
In summary, this section gives a brief introduction on the administrative data we
used. It provides an overview of graduates’ family backgrounds, academic performances
and their choices after graduates. These data are used in this paper for studying how
students’ family backgrounds affect their educational outcomes.
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5.4 Estimation Strategy
We use a multinomial model to identify the relationship between individuals’ choices
and their individual characteristics. The probability that individual i chooses option j is
(McFadden et al., 1973):
piij = Pr(Yi = j) =
exp(µj + βjXi)
1 +
∑J
j=1 exp(µj + βjXi)
(5.1)
The probability, based on the theoretical framework for discrete choice, is the stan-
dardised utilities. We make use of the criterion of the second stochastic dominance to
check whether equal opportunity prevails between rural and urban students, and between
different parents’ occupations.
Using administrative data from the university, we identified three types of graduates’
choices: work; domestic postgraduate; and overseas postgraduate. These choices can be
decided by graduates in three different ways. First, graduates can view the three choices
independently. In this case, we adopted a multinomial regression model and tested the
assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) using the Small-Hsiao test
and the Hausman test with one model including all variables except parents’ occupation
and the other including all variables except mother’s occupation and major.
Graduates can also make their decision on two choices first, given some choices having
similar attributes. For example, graduates are supposed to be in China if they choose
work or a domestic postgraduate. Thus, they may first decide whether they would like
to stay at home or go overseas. Alternatively, graduates would study if they choose a
domestic postgraduate or an overseas postgraduate course. Therefore, they may first
decide whether they would like to study or work. In both cases, we use a nested logit
model.
If three choices are independent, the multinomial regression model should satisfy the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumptions; that is, the exclusion of one
alternative should not affect the choices between the other two alternatives. We use the
Hausman test and the Small-Hsiao test.
The Hausman test of IIA (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) is defined as:
HIIA = (βˆR − βˆ∗F )′[ ˆV ar(βˆR)− ˆV ar(βˆ∗F )]−1(βˆR − βˆ∗F ) (5.2)
where βˆF is the estimate of the full model with all three choices, βˆ∗F is a subset of βˆF in
which the coefficients are dropped if their corresponding choice have not been estimated
in a restricted model and βˆR is the estimate of a restricted model with two choices. HIIA
is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square if IIA is true.
An alternative way to test IIA is the Small-Hsiao test (Small and Hsiao, 1985). The
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statistic of the Small-Hsiao test is from a Likelihood Ratio test which is:
SH = −2[L(βˆS1S2u )− L(βˆS2r )] (5.3)
where
(βˆS1S2u ) = (
1√
2
)βˆS1u + [1− (
1√
2
)]βˆS2u (5.4)
The data are randomly divided into two samples S1 and S2. βˆ
S1
u is the estimates of
multinomial regression for sample 1. βˆS2u is the estimates of multinomial regression for
sample 2. βˆS2r is the estimates of the restricted model for sample 2 in which an alternative
is excluded. The statistic of the Small-Hsiao test is shown to be asymptotically distributed
as a chi-square if IIA is true.
Alternatively, when two choices are correlated with each other, we use the nested
logit model. Assume that in the set of all choices J , a nest n contains choices which are
correlated with each other with a correlation coefficient 1− λ. There are two nests in J
such that the two nests are mutually exclusive.
Figure 5.2: The Alternative Tree Structures for Nested Logit Models
Note: Figure (a) shows that individuals first make choices between work and study, while figure (b) shows that
individuals first make choices between domestic and overseas.
Figure 5.2 shows the alternative tree structures for nested logit models. Individuals
could make sequential decisions first between work and study or between domestic and
overseas, and then they choose the specific alternative within each nest. Given three
choices, the nested logit model releases the assumption of IIA. The probabilities between
the nests can be decomposed into the probabilities between nests and the conditional
probabilities given nest containing j (Koppelman and Bhat, 2006):
piij = pinpiij|n = Pr(j ∈ n)Pr(Yi = j|j ∈ n) (5.5)
where the within-nest probability is determined by factors X that vary within nests
— factors affecting choosing between domestic study and oversea study within “study”
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or factors affecting choosing between work and domestic study within “domestic”:
piij|n =
exp(α0 + αjXi)∑
j∈n exp(α0 + αjXi)
(5.6)
The between-nest probability is determined by factors Z that vary across nests — factors
determining choosing between work and study or factors determining choosing between
domestic and overseas:
pin =
exp(γ0 + γjZi + λIVn)∑
n∈J exp(γ0 + γjZi + λIVn)
(5.7)
where IVn is the inclusive value of nest n:
IVn = ln
∑
j∈n
exp(α0 + αjXi) (5.8)
Using the nested logit model, we can not only release the assumption of IIA but also
examine the hypothesis of graduates choosing their whereabouts based on a sequential
decision-making process.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Rural vs. Urban Graduates
In this section, we examine the impact of Hukou status on graduate outcomes. First,
we show the percentage of rural and urban Hukou by year in Figure 5.3. The rural
Hukou graduates decrease dramatically from more than 50% in 2008 to less than 25%
in 2015; while the percentage of rural residents, i.e. the urbanization rate in China only
sightly declines from more than 50% to less than 50% during 2008-2015 (NBS, 2016).
The sharp decrease in the proportion of rural graduates implies fewer opportunities for
rural students to be admitted to this highly-ranked university.
We also compare GPA, entrance exam score, household income and numbers of family
among rural and urban graduates (Table 5.5). Rural graduates on average live in house-
holds with 4.178 members which is more than the average among urban graduates (3.3
members). Although rural graduates had slightly higher CEES than urban graduates,
their GPA scores are lower than their urban counterparts. The difference is not significant
in CEES but significant in GPA.
Figure 5.4 shows the difference in average GPA and CEES between urban and rural
graduates during 2008-2015. In this figure, a positive value represents a higher average
score for urban graduates. The blue line represents the trend of the difference in GPA.
The red line represents the difference in CEES including both home and other provinces.
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Figure 5.3: Graduates’ Hukou Status by Year (Percentage)
Note: 1.The annual data referring to the percentage of urban residents in the home
province of the university and in China from 2008 to 2015 is from annual editions of
NBS.
2. The stacked chart is based on authors’ calculations.
Table 5.5: Rural vs. Urban Graduates
(1) (2) (3)
Rural Urban Difference
GPA 82.63 83.67 -1.034***
(4.993) (5.050) (-4.90)
CEES 614.4 610.4 4.073
(51.15) (57.63) (1.68)
HHincome 12432.4 36473.2 -24040.77***
(15577.5) (46141.3) (-14.49)
No. Family 4.178 3.300 0.878***
(1.076) (0.695) (24.54)
1 ”GPA” is Grade Point Average, ranging from 0 to 100.
2 ”CEES” is the score from the Chinese Entrance Exam, ranging from
0 to 700.
3 ”HHIncome” represents household annual income per effective
household member and ”No. Family” is the number of family mem-
bers.
4 For column (1) and (2), the coefficients represent the mean values
and the standard errors are in parentheses.
5 For column (3), the coefficients represent the difference of mean
between rural and urban graduates. t statistics in parentheses:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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The grey line represents the difference in CEES excluding other provinces. In general,
CEES and GPA have similar trends during the period. This indicates that a student with
a higher CEES is more likely to have a higher GPA in the university as well. In addition,
the score gap between urban and rural graduates increased during 2008-2015 except in
year 2013 even though the proportion of rural graduates decreased during that period.
Figure 5.4: Difference in GPA and CEES between Urban and Rural Graduates
Note: A positive value represents a higher average score for urban students.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The biggest difference is in household income. Urban graduates’ households earn
more than three times as much as their rural counterparts. Figure 5.5 shows the change
in income gap between rural and urban households by year. In 2008, urban graduates’
households earned around two times as much as their rural counterparts. This gap became
more than three times higher in 2015.
The difference between rural and urban graduates can also be found in their where-
abouts. Figure 5.6 shows graduates’ whereabouts by Hukou status during 2008-2015
excluding those who were not sure about their whereabouts. In 2008, the percentage
of graduates who continued their studies in China is around 20% and 15% for urban
and rural graduates respectively. The percentage of overseas postgraduates is less than
5% for both Hukou statuses. The percentage of domestic postgraduates increases at the
same pace for students from rural and urban areas during 2008-2015. In contrast, the
percentages of overseas postgraduates only increase for graduates from urban areas. Dur-
ing the whole period, only 2.13% of rural graduates choose to undertake a postgraduate
course overseas compared to 21.39% urban graduates who choose an overseas postgrad-
uate course. This difference in whereabouts could indicate more opportunities available
for urban graduates than their rural counterparts.
Given all these differences between rural and urban graduates, we use multivariate
regression analysis in the next two sections to examine whether graduates’ academic
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Figure 5.5: Graduates’ Household Income by Hukou Status
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Figure 5.6: Postgraduates by Hukou in Graduates’ Whereabouts During 2008-2015 (Per-
centage)
Note: Those who were not sure about their whereabouts are excluded in this figure.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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performance and whereabouts are affected by their Hukou and other factors.
5.5.2 Regression Analysis on College Admission
To study the relationship between circumstances and college admission, we regress the
CEE score (CEES) on circumstances. Suppose that before knowing the entry score of
this university, there are N students applying for this university. Given those students’
circumstances — the vector c, the relationship between circumstances and students’
CEES can be described in the following equation:
CEESi = αci +  (5.9)
where α is a coefficient for circumstance variables and  is an error term. Since the
university sets an entry score for admission, students’ CEES should not be dependent on
their circumstances. Therefore, the coefficients should be equal to 0.
However, circumstances could affect students’ CEES in the following three ways. First,
circumstances could affect CEES if the university sets different entry scores for different
students. For example, students could have a lower entry score if they belong to a minority
group. In addition, the entrance scores for students from art and science can be different.
The second way is that students’ circumstances could directly affect their scores. For
example, a gender gap has been found in PISA test scores (Gonza´lez de San Roma´n and
De La Rica, 2012). If distributions for each gender have the same variance but different
means for all applicants, the difference might also be found after admission. To check this
type of influence attributable to students’ circumstances, we also regress students’ GPA on
their circumstances. GPA represents the academic performances after admission. It has
no relationship with the admission and the selection problem. Therefore, the relationship
between circumstances and GPA is more likely to be the direct influence of circumstances
on academic performances.
The last way is that students with a certain circumstance might be more risk-taking
than other students. If two distributions for two different circumstances have the same
mean but different variances, a higher average score for the higher-variance distribution
could be found after admission. Students have been given their scores before applying
to colleges but they have not been given the entry score of each university until a couple
of days after they submit the college application form. Students with a lower score
could face more uncertainties when they apply to a top university. In consequence, their
circumstances might play a role in their risk-taking preferences.
Table 5.7 shows the results of regressing GPA and CEES on a number of socioeco-
nomic variables. We use GPA as dependent variables in Columns (1) to (3) and CEES
as dependent variables in Columns (4) to (6). Since each province has different exam
questions and the university gives different quotas to different provinces, we only use the
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observations from the home province in Columns (4) to (6). The summary statistics for
the home province is presented in Table 5.6. We rescale CEES from 0 to 100, the same
scale as the GPA.
Table 5.6: Summary Statistics for the Home Province
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Father’s income 1156 27126.42 29174.21 0 600000
Mother’s income 1038 21317.98 19871.03 0 360000
No. family members 1468 3.52 0.86 2 9
Imputed No. family members 1468 0.04 0.2 0 1
HHincome 1352 15678.61 24546.92 0 1247077
GPA 1463 84.32 4.74 29 94.74
CEES 1272 630.18 37.06 168.5 785.00
Year of graduation 1468 2008 2015
Female 1468 0.54 0.5 0 1
Ethnic Minority 1468 0.01 0.11 0 1
Single parent 1468 0.03 0.16 0 1
Urban Hukou 1468 0.62 0.48 0 1
Self-reported poverty 1468 0.16 0.37 0 1
Major in science 1468 0.51 0.5 0 1
Direct admission 1468 0 0.07 0 1
Unemployed 669 0.12 0.32 0 1
Failed postgraduate exam 525 0.06 0.24 0 1
1 Home Province is whether the graduates’ households are in the same province as the university.
2 Imputed No. family members is a dummy for the missing value of No. family members.
3 GPA is Grade Point Average during undergraduate study. CEES is Chinese Entrance Exam Score ranging
from 0 to 750.
4 Self-reported poverty is whether the graduates report that their families are in poverty.
5 Major in science is whether the graduates majored in science when they were in high school.
6 Direct admission is a dummy for those who were directly admitted by the university.
7 Failed postgraduate exam is a dummy for those who failed the entrance exam for postgraduates.
8 HHincome is household income per effective member.
Due to the correlation between graduates’ Hukou status and their household in-
come and parents’ occupation, we exclude household income and parents’ occupation
in Columns (1) and (4), add household income in Columns (2) and (5) and include both
household income and father’s occupation in Columns (3) and (6). In addition, we also
include year dummies in each regression to control for time varying heterogeneity such
as cohort effects and changes in university policies or practice.
In general, we find that graduates are more likely to achieve a higher GPA if they are
female, belong to the major ethnic group, come from the home province or have a higher
CEES. For CEES, females belonging to the major ethnic group are also likely to have a
higher score.
The average entry score of the minority is around 10 points (out of 100) lower than the
majority. This is due to China’s affirmative action policies giving preferential treatment to
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Table 5.7: The Regression Analysis on GPA and CEE Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GPA GPA GPA CEES CEES CEES
Female 2.809∗∗∗ 2.753∗∗∗ 2.716∗∗∗ 0.534∗ 0.636∗∗ 0.599∗∗
(0.189) (0.197) (0.203) (0.291) (0.307) (0.300)
Minority -2.257∗∗∗ -1.970∗∗∗ -1.859∗∗∗ -9.603∗ -9.453∗ -10.34∗∗
(0.532) (0.540) (0.556) (4.995) (4.967) (5.249)
Single 0.314 0.418 2.059∗∗ -0.551 -1.145 -0.130
(0.519) (0.536) (0.966) (1.762) (1.841) (1.062)
Home Province 2.277∗∗∗ 2.292∗∗∗ 2.234∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.215) (0.221)
Urban Hukou 0.0252 -0.158 0.00137 -0.836∗∗ -0.334 -0.186
(0.221) (0.255) (0.336) (0.349) (0.380) (0.497)
CEES 0.105∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0196) (0.0203)
No. Family 0.0281 0.0394 0.0116 0.173 0.0476 0.0452
(0.114) (0.116) (0.119) (0.209) (0.219) (0.204)
Missing No. Family 0.222 0.545 0.712 -1.668∗ 0.979 0.664
(0.600) (2.109) (2.186) (0.912) (1.179) (1.147)
Science 0.237 0.227 0.260 1.675∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.210) (0.215) (0.268) (0.275) (0.281)
Log HHincome 0.184 0.115 -0.659∗∗∗ -0.582∗∗
(0.125) (0.143) (0.156) (0.198)
Retired -2.811∗∗ -1.123
(1.220) (2.289)
Constant 68.99∗∗∗ 66.99∗∗∗ 68.40∗∗∗ 86.36∗∗∗ 92.32∗∗∗ 90.91∗∗∗
(1.631) (2.131) (2.376) (1.072) (1.857) (2.657)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Major Yes Yes Yes No No No
Father’s Occupation No No Yes No No Yes
No. Significant Occupation 1 0
Observations 2229 2068 1964 1243 1168 1126
Adjusted R2 0.264 0.264 0.260 0.130 0.131 0.137
1 Standard errors in parentheses.
2 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
3 All observations are used in Columns (1) to (3). Only observations from Home Province Province are used in Columns (4)
to (6).
4 GPA is Grade Point Average during undergraduate study. CEES is Chinese Entrance Exam Score transformed to 0 to 100.
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minorities. Also, difference in CEES between science and art majors is due to universities
in China setting different entry scores for science and arts students.
Interestingly, household income has a negative effect on CEES even though there is
no policy for the university to explicitly give special considerations to those with lower
household income. In addition, the coefficient of Hukou status is significant if household
income is excluded in the model. This implies that the effect of Hukou status can be
explained by the difference in household income. Different from CEES, GPA is not
affected by Hukou status and household income. The coefficients of Hukou status and
household income are not significant in all cases. Regarding father’s occupation, only the
coefficient of being a university teacher is significant, which means that graduates whose
father is a university teacher are more likely to have a higher GPA.
Given these results, we cannot conclude that students with a higher household income
have a low CEES on average because GPA does not show the same relationship with
household income. This negative relationship might be due to the fact that students
from rich families might have better options than those from poor families given the same
CEES. For example, if students from rich families fail to enter the top university, they
can choose to go overseas, paying more money to buy better education; while students
from poor families cannot afford to do the same and thereby have to accept going to a
low-rank university. Therefore, the negative relationship appears if students with better
household economic conditions are more likely to apply to top universities given a lower
CEE score.
To check this, we ran a quantile regression on CEES at 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9
quantiles. The results are shown in Table 5.8. We found that the lower the quantile,
the bigger the negative effects of household income. This could imply that the closer the
students’ CEES is to the entry score, the more risk averse the students are if they have
a low household income. This result is an indirect evidence of differences in risk-taking
performances for students with different household income. This explanation could be
more concrete if we can get data from those who fail to be admitted to this university.
One possible explanation of the differences in risk-taking performances is the difference
in family expectations given different economic background. Ashraf et al. (2017) find that
both poor and rich families have high expectations on the education of their children.
However, it is still not clear how different these expectations are between poor and rich
families. Studies on a household survey might be necessary to find out these differences.
In summary, we found that circumstances could affect students’ admission in a highly-
ranked university. Some circumstances, such as belonging to a minority group, are due
to the government’s affirmative action policies. Some circumstances directly affect stu-
dents’ CEES scores. For example, females have higher scores on average than males.
Most interestingly, students with high household income might have higher risk-taking
performance when applying to a highly-ranked university.
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Table 5.8: The Quantile Regression on CEES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.1Q 0.3Q 0.5Q 0.7Q 0.9Q
lninchh percap -0.659∗ -0.484∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ -0.351∗∗∗ -0.0505
(0.397) (0.108) (0.0925) (0.114) (0.0897)
Observations 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168
1 Standard errors in parentheses.
2 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.5.3 Regression Analysis on Graduates’ Whereabouts
5.5.3.1 Results from the Multinomial Regression Model
Table 5.9 is the result of a multinomial logit regression model. The baseline choice is
work and those who were not sure about their whereabouts are excluded in the regression
analysis. The coefficients reported in Table 5.9 are the odd ratio, that is the ratio of
the probability of choosing domestic postgraduate (or oversea postgraduate) to that of
choosing working.
We also conducted Small-Hsiao and Hausman tests and found that they were not
significant in both models, which indicates that the IIA cannot be rejected. Therefore,
these choices are likely to be independent of each other.
Table 5.9: Graduates’ Whereabouts (Multinominal Regression Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic postgraduate
Urban Hukou 1.523∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗ 1.212 1.442∗ 1.745∗∗
Log HHincome 1.042 0.955 1.021 1.222
Oversea Postgraduate
Urban Hukou 6.872∗∗∗ 3.212∗∗∗ 1.518 1.959∗ 1.934∗
Log HHincome 3.175∗∗∗ 2.685∗∗∗ 2.594∗∗∗ 4.442∗∗∗
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother’s Occupation No No Yes No No
Father’s Occupation No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2452 2271 2008 2155 2080
Pseudo R2 0.239 0.273 0.286 0.289 0.656
AIC 3708.2 3274.3 2942.3 3107.1 5505.4
Loglikelihood -1822.1 -1603.2 -1417.1 -1499.5 -2702.7
1 Exponentiated coefficients.
2 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
3 Coefficients except Hukou status and household income are omitted in this table.
4 Column (1) represents the baseline model. Column (2) to (4) show the results from the alternative
models where variables such as household income and parents’ occupation are included. Column (5)
is the model using the inverse propensity score weight.
In Column (1) we exclude household income and parents’ occupation and add house-
hold income in Column (2). We use father’s occupation and mother’s occupation in
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Columns (3) and (4) respectively.
Comparing the R-squared statistics, we find that including household income signif-
icantly improves the R-squared statistics. This implies that household income is crucial
for understanding graduates’ whereabouts. In contrast, including parents’ occupation
slightly increases the R-squared statistics. In addition, we find that Columns (3) and
(4) have similar R-squared statistics, which means that father’s and mother’s occupation
help explain similar variation of graduates’ whereabouts. Given the log likelihood and
Akaike information criterion (AIC), we find that the model with household income and
mother’s occupation performs better than other models.
Regarding graduates’ Hukou status, urban Hukou graduates are more likely to choose
doing postgraduates than their rural counterparts. The coefficients of urban Hukou are
significant at the 5% level in Columns (1) and (2) but not in Columns (3) and (4). This
might be due to the correlation between urban Hukou and other circumstances.
Since Hukou status is correlated with other circumstances, the difference in gradu-
ates choices between the two Hukou statuses does not reflect the pure effect of Hukou
status. If we consider the effect of Hukou status as a treatment effect, respondents in
the dataset are not randomly assigned to two groups classified according to their Hukou
status. Therefore, to show the pure effect of Hukou status on graduates’ whereabouts,
we weighted the regression by the inverse propensity score. We calculated the propensity
score based on the following logistic regression:
P (hukou = 1|z) = σ(θ′z) (5.10)
where hukou is a dummy variable for Hukou status. It equals 1 when Hukou status
is urban. The logistic function is σ(), θ is the coefficients and z is a vector of variables
related to Hukou status. We use female, minority, the number of family members, father’s
occupation and household income per effective members in z.
The predicted probability of urban Hukou given z is the propensity score p. Then the
inverse propensity score weight is:
ipw =
1p if hukou = 11
1−p if hukou = 0
(5.11)
The results from the weighted regression are presented in column (5).
After weighting the regression by the inverse propensity score, the coefficients of urban
Hukou become significant again. According to this weighted regression, we find that
urban Hukou graduates are 1.745 times more likely to choose domestic postgraduates
and 1.934 times more likely to choose oversea postgraduates than their rural counterparts
respectively. This indicates that Hukou status plays an important role in the choice of a
postgraduate degree.
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Household income also affects graduates’ choices. The results show that a 1% increase
in household income would increase the probability of choosing oversea postgraduates by
at least 2.594 times, although this increase is not significant and has no impact on the
probability of choosing a domestic postgraduate course. This difference suggests that a
higher household income brings a graduate more opportunity to pursue an oversea study
but has no effect on the choice of domestic postgraduate.
Since there are only 12 rural graduates who chose to study overseas, we did regressions
on rural and urban graduates respectively and merged domestic and oversea postgraduate
into one category. The results of graduates choosing postgraduate are shown in Table
5.10. For urban graduates, we assume either a three-choice model using a multinomial
regression (Column (1) and (2)) or a two-choice model using a logistic regression (Column
(3) and (4)); while for rural graduates (Column (5) and (6)), we only assume a binary
choice between work and postgraduate study. Since we focus on choices between work
and postgraduate study in Table 5.10, we omit the results from oversea postgraduate
study in column (1) and (2).
The results in Table 5.10 show that for urban graduates, the two-choices model has
lower AIC and loglikelihood than the three-choices model. This indicates that the two-
choices model performs better than the three-choices model. Comparing the explanatory
variables, we find that some factors influencing a postgraduate study are different be-
tween rural and urban graduates. The effect of GPA on a postgraduate degree is higher
for rural than urban graduates. Rural graduates are 38% to 41% more likely to choose a
postgraduate if their GPAs increase by 1%. In contrast, the figures for urban graduates
are around 26%. In addition, the number of family members only affects urban gradu-
ates but not rural graduates. Urban graduates are 22% to 27% less likely to choose a
postgraduate if they have one or more family members.
Household income and parents’ occupations also have a different impact on choosing a
postgraduate degree depending on whether graduates are rural or urban. Rural graduates’
whereabouts are more related to the father’s occupation. Rural graduates are more likely
to choose a postgraduate if the father is a teacher. Given the father’s occupation, the
coefficient of household income becomes not significant. For urban graduates, household
income is still a significant factor even though father’s occupation is given.
Mother’s occupation is more related to urban graduates’ whereabouts than rural grad-
uates’ whereabouts. Some occupations such as administrator, professionals and teachers
including university teachers are highly significant and positively related to the choice to
undertake a postgraduate course. These effects are not found in urban graduates.
In addition, some occupations of urban parents are not found among rural counter-
parts. No rural parent is a civil servant, university teacher or retired. This might indicate
that rural parents have a lower social status and welfare than their urban counterparts.
In summary, given the results from the multinomial regression and the logistic regres-
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Table 5.10: Graduates’ Choosing Domestic Postgraduate (Rural vs. Urban)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MNL MNL Logit Logit Logit Logit
Urban Urban Urban Urban Rural Rural
Female 0.943 0.889 0.979 0.931 0.873 0.860
Minority 0.917 1.034 1.367 1.514 0.974 1.095
Single 1.179 0.395 0.993 0.524 0.446 1.425
Home Province 1.273 1.167 1.315∗∗ 1.228 0.99 1.055
GPA 1.357∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗ 1.267∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 1.418∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗
No. Family 0.805∗ 0.88 0.730∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗ 1.029 0.990
Missing No. Family 6663004.4 3.748 2.493
Log HHincome 0.991 0.777∗ 1.351∗∗∗ 1.215∗ 1.164 1.280∗
Parents Occupation Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother
Administrator 1.167 2.672∗ 1.238 2.600∗ 1.109 0.598
Civil Servant 0.71 1.739 1.062 2.182
Manual Worker 1.092 2.249 0.855 1.943 1.039 1.583
Other Professionals 1.222 3.331∗∗ 1.165 2.905∗∗ 0.842 1.228
Other Teacher 1.339 4.108∗∗∗ 1.033 2.873∗∗ 2.931∗∗ 1.471
Passed Away 7.92E-008 4.172 0.169 2.834 2.577 1.014
Retired 3.096 3.129 1.835 3.086∗
Self-employed 1.606 1.967 1.058 1.357 0.979 0.559
Unemployed 0.246 0.805 0.24 0.862 0.588 3.577
University teacher 1.553 12.48∗∗∗ 2.078 10.24∗∗∗
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1378 1270 1377 1270 775 735
Pseudo R2 0.245 0.239 0.253 0.254 0.274 0.257
AIC 2303.6 2161.5 1463.1 1344.7 738.6 721.3
ll -1099.8 -1030.7 -706.6 -647.4 -346.3 -337.6
1 Exponentiated coefficients.
2 “MNL” stands for the multinomial logit regression and “Logit” represents the two-choice logit regression.
3 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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sion, we find that Hukou status and parents’ socioeconomic status have large effects on
graduates’ whereabouts. A urban graduate with rich parents or parents who are teachers
is more likely to study towards a postgraduate degree. In addition, an oversea post-
graduate is different from a postgraduate in the home country. An oversea postgraduate
heavily relies on household income while a domestic postgraduate does not and urban
graduates have more opportunities to study overseas than their rural counterparts.
5.5.3.2 Results from the Nested Logit Model Given the Whereabouts are
Correlated
Table 5.11 shows the results from the nested model. Graduates first make choices
between nests — work and study (Columns (1) and (3)), or staying in China and going
oversea (Columns (2) and (4)), and the final within-nest decision is made based on either
household income (Columns (1) and (2)) or GPA (Columns (3) and (4)).
Table 5.11: Graduates’ Whereabouts (Nested Logit Model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Postgraduate Domestic Postgraduate Domestic
Female 1.032 0.805 1.034 0.806
Minority 1.257 0.521∗∗ 1.259 0.520∗∗
Single 0.791 1.790 0.783 1.780
Home Province 1.325∗∗∗ 0.835 1.327∗∗∗ 0.836
No. Family 0.807∗∗∗ 2.710∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 2.698∗∗∗
Missing No. Family 2.445 0.272 2.427 0.271
Urban Hukou 1.592∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 1.597∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
GPA 1.254∗∗∗ 1.013
Log HHincome 1.267∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
Domestic postgraduate
Log HHincome 0.134∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
GPA 0.756∗∗∗ 0.974
Work
Log HHincome 0.217∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
GPA 0.663∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗
Observations 6801 6801 6801 6801
AIC 3708.0 3976.2 3673.1 3991.5
Loglikelihood -1836.0 -1970.1 -1818.6 -1977.8
1 Exponentiated coefficients.
2 ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3 Year Dummies are used as independent variables in each regression.
Comparing AIC and log likelihood for each model, we find that models with nests
between work and study perform significantly better than models with nests between
staying in China and going overseas. This might indicate that graduates are more likely
to choose between study and work first and consider domestic and oversea study after
their first decision.
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Regarding explanatory variables, household income is an important factor in all model
specifications. Higher household income is especially important for those who choose
going overseas for postgraduate study. Another crucial factor is urban Hukou which
positively affects the choice of study. These findings are consistent with the results from
the nested logit model and the multinomial regression model.
The results from GPA are different for the nested logit model compared to the multi-
nomial regression model. GPA is not significant if graduates make decisions between
domestic and overseas first. This implies that GPA or personal academic performances
have little impact on the decision to go overseas. Instead, it is family backgrounds and
economic wellbeing that determine the decision to go overseas.
Generally, the nested logit model show results similar to the multinomial regression
model, which increases the robustness of our main findings. In addition, the nested logit
model indicates that graduates are more likely to make a decision between work and
study than between domestic and overseas postgraduate study.
5.5.4 The Effect of Hukou Status and Parents’ Occupation on Graduates
Choices: An Alternative Approach
From the regression analysis, we found that Hukou status and parents’ occupation
are two determinants of graduates’ choices. In this subsection, we identified the effect of
Hukou status and parents’ occupation on graduates choices using the stochastic domi-
nance approach (Lefranc et al., 2008). Assume that graduates’ choices follow the criteria
of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) and second-order stochastic dominance (SSD).
The definitions of stochastic dominance are as follows:
Definition 5.5.1 For two different vectors of circumstances c, c′ ∈ C where c 6= c′, c
first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) c′ for choice j, i.e. c %FSDj c′ iff:
F (pj|c) ≤ F (pj|c′), ∀pj ∈ R+ (5.12)
where F (pj|c) is the cumulative distribution of probabilities pj of choosing option j. c, c′
are vectors of circumstances belonging to the set of all possible vectors of circumstances C.
In other words, c %FSDj c′, when graduates with circumstances c have higher probabilities
in choosing j than graduates with circumstances c′.
However, the first-order stochastic dominance does not consider individuals’ risk-
averse preference. Given two circumstances, individuals might prefer circumstances which
provide more predictable probabilities in choosing to choose j than a less predictable
probabilities. To take the risk-averse preference into account, we used the second-order
stochastic dominance (SSD) (Lefranc et al., 2008)
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Table 5.12: Lorenz Dominance Test (Domestic Postgraduate)
Father Farmer/Worker Adminstrator Teacher
Farmer/Worker - < <
Adminstrator - - <
Teacher - - -
Hukou Rural Urban
Rural - <
Urban - -
Mother Farmer/Worker Adminstrator Teacher
Farmer/Worker - < <
Adminstrator - - =
Teacher - - -
Hukou Rural Urban
Rural - <
Urban - -
1 > The row dominates the column.
2 < The row is dominated by the column.
3 = The row neither dominates nor is dominated by the column.
Definition 5.5.2 For two different vectors of circumstances c, c′ ∈ C where c 6= c′, c
second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) c′ for choice j, i.e. c %SSDj c′ iff:∫ 1
0
F (pj|c)dx ≤
∫ 1
0
F (pj|c′)dx,∀pj|c ∈ R+ (5.13)
The SSD is equivalent to generalized Lorenz dominance (GLD)(Lefranc et al., 2008).
Formally:
∀pj|c ∈ R+, c SSD c′ ⇔ ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]GLF (·|c)(pi) ≥ GLF (·|c′)(pi) (5.14)
where GLF (·|c)(pi) is the value of the generalized Lorenz curve at pi for the distribution of
F (·|c).
Based on the definition of stochastic dominance and the results from multinomial
regression, we conducted Lorenz dominance tests. The results are shown in Table 5.12
and Table 5.13. Table 5.12 shows Lorenz dominance tests on the probabilities of choosing
domestic postgraduates and Table 5.13 shows Lorenz dominance tests on the probabilities
of choosing overseas postgraduates. We use the estimators in columns (3) and (4) of Table
5.9 and three categories of parents’ occupations: farmers and manual workers; government
officers, administrators and civil servants; and teacher. We find that students with parents
who are farmers and manual workers are Lorenz dominated by the other two occupations
in choosing both domestic and overseas postgraduates. Teachers dominate the other two
occupations in domestic postgraduates but are dominated by administrators in overseas
postgraduates.
We also compare two Hukou statuses: rural and urban. We find that rural Hukou is
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Table 5.13: Lorenz Dominance Test (Oversea Postgraduate)
Father Farmer/Worker Adminstrator Teacher
Farmer/Worker - < <
Adminstrator - - >
Teacher - - -
Hukou Rural Urban
Rural - <
Urban - -
Mother Farmer/Worker Adminstrator Teacher
Farmer/Worker - < <
Adminstrator - - >
Teacher - - -
Hukou Rural Urban
Rural - <
Urban - -
1 > The row dominates the column.
2 < The row is dominated by the column.
3 = The row neither dominates nor is dominated by the column.
dominated by urban in both domestic and overseas postgraduates. These results suggest
that graduates’ choices are substantially affected by circumstances such as Hukou status
and parents’ occupations.
Figure 5.7 shows the cumulative distribution of probabilities on father’s occupation
and Hukou status. The figures in the first row show the cumulative distributions of
three different occupations for each choice. Students with a father who is a farmer or a
worker are less likely to choose domestic or overseas postgraduates. A father who is an
administrator is more likely to send his children overseas.
The figures in the second row show the cumulative distributions on Hukou status.
Rural students are more likely to choose work but less likely to choose domestic and over-
seas postgraduates than their urban counterparts. These results are consistent with what
we find in the multinomial regression analysis and suggest the influence of circumstances
on graduates’ choices.
5.6 Conclusion
This essay uses graduates’ administrative data from one university in China during
2008 to 2015. Through the analysis of this dataset, we find a widening gap in admission
to tertiary education and its outcome between rural and urban residents. In particular,
the proportion of rural graduates decreased from 50% in 2008 to less than 25% in 2015;
the rate of the decrease is much faster than the rate of increase in urbanization rate —
from less than 50% to more than 50%. This finding is consistent with other research on
educational inequality in China such as Connelly and Zheng (2003), Wang et al. (2013)
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Figure 5.7: The Cumulative Distributions of Probabilities on Father’s Occupation and
Hukou status
(a) Domestic Postgraduate (b) Oversea Postgraduate
(c) Work (d) Domestic Postgraduate
(e) Oversea Postgraduate (f) Work
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and Zhang et al. (2015).
However, there are differences between this study and other related research. For
example, the longitudinal data in this thesis highlights the increase of educational in-
equality for a longer period when focused on tertiary education. This thesis shows a
decrease in the share of rural students in highly-ranked colleges. In contrast, the study
by Wang (2014) reports an increase in the share of rural students in lower-quality colleges.
Both studies show a widening rural-urban gap in college enrolment though in different
perspectives.
The rural-urban gap in China could be due to unequal allocations of educational re-
sources (Wang, 2014) and the restriction on the education of rural migrants’ children
(Zhang et al., 2015). This thesis detected another factor — the economic conditions of
households. Having a higher household income could be an advantage for students when
it comes to enrollment in a highly-ranked university even when they did not perform well
in the college entrance examination. We find that, for those who have already been ad-
mitted to this university, the entrance score is negatively related to household income. In
contrast, when estimating a similar regression on GPA, the relationship between house-
hold income and academic performance disappears. These results provide evidence that
students with a higher household income might have more options in choosing universi-
ties than their lower-household-income counterparts. Due to the lack of data on those
who failed admission to universities, this thesis cannot examine the impact of household
income on university admission.
Household income is also a main determinant of graduate outcomes. Graduates with a
high household income are more likely to enroll for a postgraduate degree. The household
income of graduates choosing an overseas postgraduate program is significantly higher
than those who choose to do a domestic postgraduate program or to work. This finding is
supported by research on educational expenditure in China. Qian and Smyth (2011) find
that household income has significant effects on expenditures on domestic and overseas
education. Students with a higher household income are more likely to go overseas for
education with financial support.
With lower household income, rural graduates have fewer opportunities in their where-
abouts after graduation. Graduates with a rural Hukou are much less likely to choose
to study for a postgraduate degree after graduation than their urban counterparts, let
alone for an overseas postgraduate. However, the lack of opportunities for rural graduates
is not because of their lower academic performance in college. Instead, rural graduates
have similar GPAs to their urban counterparts. In addition, the academic performance in
college is uncorrelated with graduates’ Hukou status and household income. This means
that GPA can represent individuals’ effort on academic performance which is independent
of circumstances. Although GPA affects graduates’ whereabouts, it fails to explain why
rural graduates exclude the choice of studying overseas.
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Based on these findings, we conclude that inequality of opportunity in tertiary ed-
ucation in China has significantly escalated in the last decade. Students who entered
highly-ranked universities relied more on their circumstances such as family backgrounds,
parents’ socioeconomic status and Hukou status. They also faced unequal opportunity
when they graduated. Having similar academic performances, graduates with urban
Hukou and wealthy parents had more opportunities in their whereabouts.
Since our data is from a highly-ranked university, this study only focuses on the
admission and graduates’ outcome in highly-ranked universities. The admission and
graduates’ outcome in a low-quality university might be a different story. Nevertheless,
using this dataset, this paper sheds light on reasons and highlights the trend of inequality
of opportunity in tertiary education and addresses the issues of rural-urban inequality in
China.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary and Findings
The main objective of this thesis is to improve the empirical methodology in mea-
suring inequality of opportunity, and to apply the new methodologies to gain better
understanding of inequality of opportunity in China. Specifically, we study inequality of
opportunity in terms of income and education in China. The measurement of inequality
of opportunity in income shows that income is not fairly distributed as it is influenced by
circumstances. To study the educational inequality of opportunity, we examine whether
students’ opportunities to access a highly-ranked university and their opportunities af-
ter graduation are fair and not determined by circumstances. Ideally, equal opportunity
holds when the rate of enrolment and the graduate outcomes are identical for those with
different circumstances.
We address several empirical issues in three main essays. One issue is the independence
between circumstances and effort assumed by most of the literature. This assumption
simplifies the approach to measure inequality of opportunity, but at the cost of potentially
underestimating the extent of inequality. In Essays I and II, we identify two different
ways in which circumstances could be affected by effort. First, different types, which
are groups with individuals sharing the same circumstances, could have different effort
distributions. Second, circumstances can have different effects on income for different
levels of effort.
In Essay I, we capture the effect of circumstances on effort through differences in
variances across types. Variances in income distributions imply that there are differences
in individual effort among individuals with the same circumstances. We use Maximum-
Likelihood Estimation to parameterize both mean and variance for each income distribu-
tion conditional on the circumstances. This method allows us to estimate not only the
overall effect of circumstances on income but also the effect of each circumstance vari-
able such as gender, ethnicity and parents’ socioeconomic status on income. We believe
that measures showing the effect of each circumstance variable are more useful for policy
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consideration than a composite measure. Circumstances contributing more to income
inequality should be given greater attention and be prioritized in policy design.
In Essay II, we address the effect of circumstances on effort by examining the het-
erogeneous effects of circumstances on income between different levels of effort. Most
literature assumes a homogeneous effect of circumstances on income and an unobserved
effort due to data limitation. Inequality of opportunity still can be measured (Ferreira
and Gignoux, 2008) without knowing effort. However, without information on effort, the
measure could be biased if the effects of circumstances on income differ across levels of
effort. To identify this heterogeneous effect, we use a latent-class model in which each
level of effort is represented by a class so that levels of effort can be estimated even
though they cannot be observed. To allow for heterogeneity, the effects of circumstances
on income are parameterized separately for each level of effort.
Using two different approaches to identifying the correlation between circumstances
and effort, we find that the heterogeneous effect between types accounts for about 20%
of income inequality and the heterogeneous effect of circumstances on income between
levels of effort accounts for about 29%. These figures imply that neglecting the impact of
circumstances on effort could lead to a significantly underestimated measure of inequality
of opportunity.
In terms of the measure of inequality of opportunity, we use both an ex-post measure
— a measure requiring the same outcome for those who exert the same degree of effort,
and an ex-ante measure — a measure requiring the same average outcome for those with
different circumstances. The former measure emphasises the respect for individual effort
while the latter measure pays more attention to compensating the disadvantaged. These
two measures correspond to two basic principles with regard to equal opportunity: the
reward principle and the compensation principle (Fleurbaey, 2008). However, these two
principles can lead to controversial results (Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2013). A measure
consistent with the reward principle might suggest that a larger proportion of income
inequality should be respected while a measure consistent with the compensation principle
might indicate that a larger proportion of income inequality should be compensated. In
Essay II, we find some evidences of the incompatibility between the ex-ante and ex-post
measure. Results show that inequality of opportunity is about 41% when using an ex-
post measure compared to 48% when using an ex-ante measure. These results suggest
that more of income inequality should be respected (100% − 41% = 59%) if using an
ex-post measure and more of income inequality should be compensated (55%) if using
an ex-ante measure. Considering that there are unobserved circumstances and effort, the
real gap between the ex-ante and ex-post measures could be higher. This inconsistent
result between the ex-ante and ex-post approach needs more investigation in any future
study.
In Essay III, we develop an approach to measure inequality of opportunity in the
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access to a highly-ranked university and its graduate outcomes. This study is different
from most empirical literature in measuring inequality of opportunity in that graduate
outcome is a categorical variable. In the empirical literature, the outcome of interest is
either a continuous variable such as income or a binary variable such as having tertiary
education or not. A categorical variable is different from a continuous variable in that it
sometimes cannot be directly ranked. High income or having tertiary education clearly is
an advantage over low income or not having tertiary education. In contrast, a categorical
variable could have no order but options related to individual choices and preferences. In
Essay III, there are three whereabouts for graduates: work, postgraduate study in China,
or oversea postgraduate. Inequality of opportunity exists if these graduates’ whereabouts
are affected by circumstances. To evaluate inequality of opportunity given graduate
outcomes, we use stochastic dominance (Lefranc et al., 2008) to examine the effect of
circumstances on the categorical outcome. There is inequality of opportunity if the dis-
tributions of graduates outcomes, given one circumstance, is second-order stochastically
dominated by the distributions of graduates outcomes given other circumstances.
6.2 Policy Implication
By addressing these issues and improving the methodology, we closely examine in-
equality of opportunity in China in both income and education on the basis of the con-
ventional framework developed by Roemer (1998). In Essay I, unfair income inequality
accounts for about 50% of total income inequality if the impact of circumstances on effort
is considered. In Essay II, unfair income inequality accounts for about 48% to 56% of
total income inequality. These figures suggest a large proportion of income inequality is
unfair and due to circumstances such as gender, ethnicity, the Hukou Status and parents’
socioeconomic backgrounds.
We do not limit our study to providing a rough and general figure for indicating
inequality of opportunity in China. Instead, we identify types associated with lack of
opportunity — the opportunity-deprivation profile purposed by Ferreira et al. (2011).
For example, Ferreira et al. (2011) found that ethnic minority is the most important
reason for the deprivation of opportunities in Brazil. In China, our findings suggest
that geographic factors such as the Hukou status and residential provinces are the most
important factors for deprived opportunities. These findings indicate substantial rural-
urban inequality and regional disparity in China. A rural household earns about half of
the income an urban household does, and rich provinces have an average income over
four times that of poor provinces.
More importantly, our findings suggest that geographic factors play an increasingly
important role in education. In the third essay, we find that the proportion of students
from rural areas attending a highly ranked university decreased from more than 50% in
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2008 to about 20% in 2015. Even when rural students have entered and completed a
bachelor degree in a highly-ranked university, they are still less likely to study towards a
postgraduate degree. These findings are in line with researches on rural-urban inequality
in educational opportunity (e.g. Wang et al. 2013, and Zhang et al. 2015). The difference
is that our study emphasizes inequality of opportunity in graduate outcomes for graduates
studying at the same highly-ranked university. Distribution unfairness not only exists in
the labour market and the access of education; it also affects the decisions of individuals
to invest in their own human capital. This rising inequality in educational opportunity
might lower the intergenerational mobility in the next generation in China.
6.3 Future Research
The focus of this thesis is mainly on improving the empirical methods and measuring
inequality of opportunity in China in terms of income and education. However, the
improvement is limited by the data we used. For example, we used the China Family
Panel study for Essay I and II, but this dataset only contained two waves at the time we
worked on these two essays. Future improvement on the empirical methods can be made
by using a panel model based on a dataset with a longer period. In Essay III, our data
is the administrative data from one highly ranked university. The result will be more
concrete if data from other universities become available.
In addition, this thesis contributes less to the theoretical aspect of inequality of op-
portunity. For example, our study points out that circumstances could affect effort in
different ways and the biases due to omitting these effects are identified empirically. On
the contrary, we do not claim that these effects must be compensated. Future research
could clarify whether these different types of effects of circumstances on effort should be
considered unfair or not.
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